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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Attackers used a modified version of the Chinese desktop wallpaper management tool QN Wallpaper to initiate a DLL sideloading chain responsible for delivering ValleyRAT.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A legitimate Chinese wallpaper-management adware application that was modified and weaponized as a signed-process DLL-sideloading vector to execute and deliver ValleyRAT.
A legitimate adware-based desktop wallpaper management application that was modified and used as a signed-process DLL-sideloading vehicle for ValleyRAT. Its normal advertising functionality was deliberately rendered nonfunctional in this campaign.
A Chinese wallpaper-management application originally characterized as adware. In this campaign, a modified copy is used as a signed-process DLL-sideloading vector to load a malicious libcef.dll and execute ValleyRAT; its normal advertising functionality is nonfunctional in the malicious package.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.