Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
“The web-server activity sat alongside a broader Linux malware toolkit that CPR said included ... the 3snake-based PasswordHarvester credential stealer...”
7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
39 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A 3snake-based credential-stealing tool included in the Linux toolkit.
A root-only Linux credential stealer derived from 3snake. It monitors process events, attaches to authentication-related processes with ptrace, captures credential buffers, and exfiltrates the data to C2 using RC4 encryption and Base64 encoding.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.