Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Threat actors are actively exploiting CVE-2025-25249, a critical heap-based buffer overflow flaw affecting the cw_acd daemon in FortiOS and FortiSwitchManager. The flaw permits remote, unauthenticated arbitrary code execution through specially crafted requests to the CAPWAP Control service on UDP port 5246. | That second stage is PivotC2, a purpose-built Node.js post-exploitation framework designed specifically for FortiGate appliances.
16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Attackers deploy fortirun.bin “orchestrated through Bash and Python automation scripts that repeatedly attempt exploitation against target IPs until successful.”
All traffic flows through a single encrypted socket using a binary framing protocol that multiplexes multiple communication channels.
The Node.js stager “fetches a second-stage payload from an attacker-controlled server.”
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Node.js remote-access and post-exploitation framework for compromised FortiGate devices. It establishes outbound TLS C2 connections and supports interactive shells, file transfer, SOCKS5/HTTP tunneling, and local/remote port forwarding. It also harvests FortiGate configurations, decrypts stored credential fields, identifies internal subnets, and can automatically scan internal services.
A custom Node.js remote-access and post-exploitation framework for compromised FortiGate devices. It establishes outbound TLS C2 over a multiplexed binary protocol; provides interactive shells, file transfer, SOCKS5/HTTP proxying, and local/remote port forwarding; and harvests FortiGate configurations, network data, and decrypted credentials. Its automated mode performs configuration and credential collection, internal-subnet discovery, and port scanning.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.