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CrowdStrike terminated an employee after discovering that the individual had shared internal screenshots of company systems with a hacking group. The screenshots, which included dashboards and links to company resources such as an Okta dashboard, were later published by Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters on Telegram. CrowdStrike emphasized that their systems were not breached, no customer data was exposed, and the incident was promptly reported to law enforcement.
The hacking group ShinyHunters claimed to have offered the insider $25,000 for network access and alleged they received SSO authentication cookies, but CrowdStrike stated that the insider's access was cut off before any compromise occurred. The hackers also attempted to obtain internal reports about ShinyHunters and Scattered Spider but were unsuccessful. CrowdStrike denied any connection between this incident and recent claims of broader Salesforce-ecosystem breaches involving other companies.
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Following reports about the insider leak, CrowdStrike stated that it had not been breached and that the exposed material came from an internal employee sharing information rather than an external intrusion. This public clarification appeared as the story became widely reported.
CrowdStrike fired the employee responsible for sharing internal information with hackers. Multiple reports described the action as the company's response to the insider incident.
An insider at CrowdStrike sent internal screenshots and other non-public company information to a hacking group described in reporting as Scattered Spider/Lapsus$-linked actors. The incident was characterized as an insider leak rather than a compromise of CrowdStrike's systems.
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CrowdStrike confirmed that an insider was terminated after sharing screenshots of internal systems with the Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters, a cybercrime collective comprising Scattered Spider, LAPSUS$, and ShinyHunters. The threat actors posted these screenshots on Telegram and claimed to have paid the insider $25,000 for access, including SSO authentication cookies, but CrowdStrike detected the activity and shut down access before any customer data was compromised. The company emphasized that its systems were not breached and that law enforcement has been notified. Meanwhile, the Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters collective has escalated its operations, launching a new Telegram channel and increasing its public activity. The group, which has a history of social engineering and SaaS supply chain breaches, is also linked to the development of a new ransomware-as-a-service platform called ShinySp1d3r. This RaaS, created by ShinyHunters and Scattered Spider, is being built from scratch and features advanced capabilities, signaling a shift from using third-party ransomware to deploying their own tools in future attacks.
Jun 29, 2026
The hacking group **ShinyHunters** claimed to have breached the internal systems of *Resecurity*, a US-based cybersecurity firm, releasing screenshots purportedly showing access to sensitive dashboards, user management panels, API keys, employee data, and internal communications. ShinyHunters alleged they exfiltrated internal chats, client lists, threat intelligence data, and employee information, framing the attack as retaliation for Resecurity's alleged attempts to infiltrate threat actor groups by posing as buyers on dark web markets. The group also credited Devman Ransomware for assistance in the attack and published evidence to support their claims. However, *Resecurity* responded by stating that the data accessed by ShinyHunters was part of a sophisticated honeypot operation designed to monitor and log threat actor activity. According to Resecurity, the honeypot included simulated data and a planted honeytrap account, and there was no impact on actual customers or internal operations. Resecurity confirmed that all data referenced by ShinyHunters originated from the honeypot, and they had already logged the attackers' IP addresses. The incident highlights the ongoing cat-and-mouse dynamics between cybersecurity firms and threat actors, as well as the use of deception technologies in cyber defense.
Jun 29, 2026
ShinyHunters has claimed responsibility for breaching Cisco and stealing more than **3 million Salesforce records** along with internal corporate data, **GitHub repositories**, and contents from **AWS S3 buckets**, then posted a **"FINAL WARNING"** on its leak site threatening to publish the data after April 3. Reports said the alleged haul may include information tied to Cisco customers, employees, and personnel from U.S. and foreign government agencies, while screenshots shared by the group purportedly showed access to Cisco-linked AWS infrastructure and multiple connected cloud accounts. The intrusion was linked in reporting to three alleged access paths involving **Salesforce CRM**, **Salesforce Aura/Experience Cloud**, and AWS environments, and to activity tracked as **`UNC6040`** and **`UNC6395`**. Threat intelligence cited in the coverage said the attackers have used **vishing** to trick employees into approving malicious Salesforce OAuth applications, then abused stolen tokens to bypass MFA and move deeper into cloud environments; recommended defenses included auditing connected OAuth apps, revoking suspicious tokens, tightening API access controls, and monitoring for unauthorized Salesforce Data Loader activity. Cisco had not publicly addressed the March 2026 extortion claim at the time of reporting.
Jun 29, 2026