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TamperedChef Malvertising Campaign Using Google Ads to Distribute Trojanized PDF Editor Infostealer

Social Engineering & Fraud · 2 sources · Updated 5mo ago · First seen Jan 20, 2026

TamperedChef Malvertising Campaign Using Google Ads to Distribute Trojanized PDF Editor Infostealer

Threat actors used Google Ads malvertising and look-alike websites to distribute a trojanized Windows application branded as AppSuite PDF Editor, delivering an information-stealing payload tracked as TamperedChef. Sophos X-Ops/MDR investigations reported the operation was first detected in September 2025, with infrastructure activity traced back to late June 2025, when attackers registered multiple spoofed sites to impersonate legitimate PDF-editing and “manual finder” tooling. The campaign exploited common search behavior—particularly users looking for PDF editors and appliance/product manuals—to drive victims to malicious installers that appeared legitimate but silently deployed an infostealer targeting browser-stored data and other sensitive information.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

7 events · Jun 26, 2025 – Jan 20, 2026
  1. Jan 20, 202610mo ago

    Sophos publishes TamperedChef findings and defender guidance

    On publication of the research, Sophos warned that anyone who installed “AppSuite PDF Editor” should assume browser credentials were compromised. The company advised defenders to hunt for the application and review browser download alerts for suspicious activity.

  2. Jan 20, 202610mo ago

    Researchers reveal SmartScreen bypass via valid EV code-signing

    Sophos X-Ops reported that the campaign used valid code-signing certificates, including EV certificates, from Malaysian and US-registered entities to make the malware appear trustworthy and help bypass Windows SmartScreen. The disclosure highlighted the campaign’s use of trusted signing to improve infection success.

  3. Sep 1, 20251y ago

    Sophos links TamperedChef to broad international victim set

    Victimology analysis showed the campaign reached at least 19 countries, with higher observed concentrations in Germany, the UK, and France. Sophos noted the geographic pattern may reflect incidental exposure rather than deliberate targeting.

  4. Sep 1, 20251y ago

    Sophos MDR first detects TamperedChef activity

    Sophos first identified the campaign in September 2025 during managed detection and response investigations. By that point, the operation had already affected more than 100 customer systems.

  5. Aug 21, 20251y ago

    TamperedChef infostealer payload activates on infected systems

    After a long delay intended to evade detection, the infostealer component began executing to harvest browser-stored passwords, cookies, and autofill data from victims. Researchers said the delay was about 56 days, matching the lifecycle of typical ad campaigns.

  6. Jun 26, 20251y ago

    TamperedChef malvertising campaign begins distributing trojanized installer

    Attackers started using Google Ads and search-result infiltration to lure Windows users to malicious sites hosting a trojanized MSI installer for “AppSuite PDF Editor.” The installer appeared legitimate but was designed to deploy the TamperedChef infostealer through a multi-stage infection chain.

  7. Jun 26, 20251y ago

    TamperedChef operators register look-alike AppSuite PDF Editor sites

    The malvertising operation began when threat actors registered look-alike websites advertising a trojanized Windows application called “AppSuite PDF Editor.” The campaign also used “Manual FinderApp” branding in malware metadata to target users searching for product manuals.

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Malware

1 linked

Affected products

1 linked
Windows

Observables

1 linked

Indicator values are masked on this page. See the values in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.

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