Loading story…
A low-quality phishing campaign targeted MetaMask users by claiming “unusual login activity” and urging recipients to “enable 2FA,” using fear induced by a bogus “security incident report.” The email directed victims to an AWS S3-hosted landing page at hxxps://access-authority-2fa7abff0e[.]s3.us-east-1[.]amazonaws[.]com/index.html and included an attachment named Security_Reports.pdf designed to appear like an official incident report.
Analysis of the attachment found the PDF itself was not malicious; it appears to have been generated using ReportLab (PDF metadata indicates “ReportLab PDF Library”), suggesting the attackers used document-generation tooling to lend credibility to the lure. The campaign was assessed as poorly crafted because the sender address was not spoofed and the PDF was not personalized or branded to the recipient, making the social engineering easier to detect; one observed sample PDF was reported with SHA-256 2486253ddc186e9f4a061670765ad0730c8945164a3fc83d7b22963950d6dcd1.
Get the infrastructure and lures behind it.
3 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Researchers concluded the campaign was relatively low quality because the sender address was not spoofed and the PDF lacked personalization or MetaMask-specific branding. These flaws made the scam easier for recipients to detect.
Analysts observed that the phishing link was hosted on an AWS S3 bucket and that the attached PDF was not itself malicious. Metadata showed the document was generated with the ReportLab PDF Library, suggesting automated creation.
A phishing campaign targeted MetaMask users with emails claiming unusual login activity and urging them to enable two-factor authentication via a link. The messages included a PDF named "Security_Reports.pdf" to add credibility and create urgency.
Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, breaches, and observables Mallory has linked to this story. Indicator values are masked here and available in full in the app.
Indicator values are masked on this page. See the values in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.
Get the infrastructure, lures, and IOCs behind this campaign, ready to push into your email and identity stack.
3 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
cybersecuritynews.com
Open sourcesecurityaffairs.com
Open sourceisc.sans.edu
Open sourceMap indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
Datadog Security Labs reported a targeted adversary-in-the-middle phishing campaign that impersonated the AWS sign-in experience to steal console credentials and capture MFA codes in real time, enabling attackers to hijack active sessions. The operation used at least three AWS-themed domains registered through **NICENIC INTERNATIONAL GROUP CO., LIMITED** and hosted behind **Cloudflare**, with cloned login pages and server-side logic that handled email, SMS, and authenticator-app MFA prompts. Phishing emails posing as **AWS Support** were sent through legitimate delivery services including **SendGrid** and **Nimbu** to improve deliverability and credibility. Researchers said the kit rendered pages only for pre-validated targets using an encrypted URL parameter, `input_24`, a gating method that likely tied each link to a specific victim and reduced exposure to sandboxes and scanners. Fewer than 50 target addresses were recovered, most tied to US-based software engineers and engineering leaders, and investigators also found a likely attacker validation batch file on VirusTotal. Datadog linked the infrastructure and tradecraft to a broader phishing-kit family previously used in campaigns impersonating **SendGrid**, **Salesforce**, and cryptocurrency wallet brands, indicating a reused and increasingly refined framework that defenders should track through suspicious DNS activity and anomalous **AWS CloudTrail** `ConsoleLogin` events.
Jul 12, 2026
Two separate phishing campaigns were reported using *document attachments*—rather than obvious links in email bodies—to evade email security controls and steal credentials. One campaign targeting **macOS** users impersonates audit/compliance and token-vesting workflows, using follow-up “deadline” emails with attachments that appear to be Word/PDF files but are actually **AppleScript** payloads hidden via double extensions (e.g., `Confirmation_Token_Vesting.docx.scpt`). The AppleScript stage reportedly displays fake system UI (e.g., software update progress) as a distraction while executing a multi-stage, fileless infection chain intended to collect system information, steal credentials, and establish persistent remote access. A second campaign uses procurement-themed emails with **PDF attachments** that embed links via **AcroForm** objects, helping the messages bypass link-scanning defenses. Forcepoint reported the PDFs redirect victims through a staging chain hosted on trusted infrastructure (`public[.]blob[.]vercel-storage[.]com` on Vercel Blob) to another PDF and then to a fake Dropbox login page on `tovz[.]life`. The phishing page uses JavaScript to exfiltrate submitted credentials and victim metadata (including IP and geolocation via `api64[.]ipify[.]org` and `ipapi[.]co`) to a **Telegram bot** using a hardcoded bot token and chat ID, then shows an “Invalid email or password” error after a short delay to encourage repeated entry.
Jun 29, 2026
Datadog Security Labs reported an active **adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM)** phishing campaign targeting **AWS Management Console** users with high-fidelity cloned login pages hosted on **typosquatted domains**. The kit acts as a live proxy to the legitimate AWS sign-in flow, relaying authentication in real time to **validate credentials** and capture **session material** (and likely **MFA/OTP codes**) before redirecting victims, enabling rapid post-compromise access to cloud environments. In an observed case, the threat actor accessed a compromised AWS account **within ~20 minutes** of credential submission, with console access originating from `185.209.196.132` (identified as a **Mullvad VPN** egress). Datadog identified **two active infrastructure clusters** and a third related domain, including `cloud-recovery[.]net` (IP `178.16.54[.]142`), `cloud-policy[.]com` (IP `69.67.172[.]30`), and `cloud-recovery[.]us`, with shared registrar metadata (Registrar ID **3254**, CNOBIN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LIMITED) and signs of rapid infrastructure rotation. Reporting emphasized the activity is **credential theft** rather than exploitation of an AWS vulnerability or abuse of AWS infrastructure, and that the lure impersonates an “AWS Organization Security” alert with a likely spoofed sender `noreply@security[.]aws`.
Jun 29, 2026