Post-Quantum Cryptography Transition Planning to Mitigate “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” Risk
Emerging Technology Risk · 64 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Feb 20, 2026

Organizations are accelerating post-quantum cryptography (PQC) planning amid concerns that adversaries are already conducting “harvest now, decrypt later” operations—collecting encrypted traffic today for future decryption once sufficiently capable quantum computers emerge. A supply-chain-focused analysis highlighted that procurement and third-party ecosystems often rely on long-lived trust anchored in RSA and ECC, and that sensitive data exchanged across supplier onboarding, invoicing, contracts, pricing, and banking workflows could be exposed retroactively if captured now and decrypted later.
A U.S. State Department cybersecurity official urged tighter public-private coordination on PQC migration, framing quantum resilience as an ecosystem-wide modernization effort rather than isolated upgrades by individual organizations. The official emphasized that adversaries (including China) can target entire digital ecosystems, and argued that transition plans must account for long-term national security risks such as data harvesting, with modernization efforts designed to reduce predictability and strengthen collective defenses across interconnected systems, devices, and data flows.


