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The G7 Cybersecurity Working Group has called on governments and organizations across all sectors to begin preparing immediately for a transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). The group highlighted the current “harvest now, decrypt later” threat: adversaries can collect encrypted information today and retain it until cryptographically relevant quantum computers can break existing public-key encryption, placing long-lived sensitive data at risk.
The non-binding call prioritizes awareness, national strategies, research, public-private cooperation, and embedding PQC in cybersecurity requirements. Organizations should begin with a cryptographic inventory, defined ownership, limited pilots, crypto-agile architecture, hybrid standardized deployments, and PQC-focused procurement. EU member states are expected to have initiated national PQC strategies by the end of 2026, while high-risk environments—particularly critical infrastructure—should transition as early as possible and no later than the end of 2030; delayed adoption could also affect supplier eligibility for public-sector and other contracts.
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The G7 Cybersecurity Working Group published “Preparing for the Post-Quantum Era: A Call to Action,” urging governments and organizations in all sectors to begin PQC migration as soon as possible. Co-issued by G7 cybersecurity authorities, the call highlighted harvest-now-decrypt-later risks and prioritized awareness, national strategies, R&D, public-private partnerships, and PQC cybersecurity requirements.
US Executive Order 14412 directed the FAR Council to propose a rule requiring covered federal contractors to comply with NIST FIPS, including PQC-compliant algorithms, by December 31, 2030.
France’s ANSSI announced that it would cease certifying security products lacking PQC beginning in 2027, and advised French businesses to procure quantum-safe products by 2030. ANSSI certification is required for products sold to French government agencies and critical-infrastructure operators.
Under Canada’s 2025 G7 presidency, the G7 Cybersecurity Working Group published a statement on preparing for a PQC migration. It recommended phased, risk-based migration, cryptographic inventories, dependency mapping, transition planning, procurement updates, and dedicated project teams.
The G7 Cyber Expert Group published a separate post-quantum cryptography roadmap for the financial sector, orienting critical financial systems toward migration during 2030–2032 and using 2035 as a broader reference point.
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A G7 Cybersecurity Working Group led by France’s ANSSI has urged governments and industry to accelerate migration to **post-quantum cryptography (PQC)**, warning that quantum computers could eventually defeat widely deployed public-key encryption. The group said the risk is already material because adversaries can collect encrypted data now and decrypt it once cryptographically relevant quantum capabilities emerge, threatening secure communications, authentication, data integrity, and legally binding digital transactions. The G7 recommends a phased, risk-based transition: inventory cryptographic assets, map system dependencies, prioritize critical data and services, and adopt quantum-safe products during regular technology refresh cycles. Its five priorities include greater awareness, national PQC strategies and supply chains, practical research and development, public-private coordination, and incorporation of PQC into cybersecurity requirements; it also stresses crypto-agility because candidate algorithms may evolve or prove vulnerable. The call was signed by the cybersecurity agencies of all G7 members and supported by the European Commission and ENISA.
Sep 7, 2026
Organizations are accelerating **post-quantum cryptography (PQC)** planning amid concerns that adversaries are already conducting “**harvest now, decrypt later**” operations—collecting encrypted traffic today for future decryption once sufficiently capable quantum computers emerge. A supply-chain-focused analysis highlighted that procurement and third-party ecosystems often rely on long-lived trust anchored in **RSA** and **ECC**, and that sensitive data exchanged across supplier onboarding, invoicing, contracts, pricing, and banking workflows could be exposed retroactively if captured now and decrypted later. A U.S. State Department cybersecurity official urged tighter **public-private coordination** on PQC migration, framing quantum resilience as an ecosystem-wide modernization effort rather than isolated upgrades by individual organizations. The official emphasized that adversaries (including **China**) can target entire digital ecosystems, and argued that transition plans must account for long-term national security risks such as data harvesting, with modernization efforts designed to reduce predictability and strengthen collective defenses across interconnected systems, devices, and data flows.
Aug 31, 2026
Cybersecurity leaders are raising alarms about the accelerating timeline for quantum computing to break current public encryption methods, a milestone known as Q-Day. Experts warn that Q-Day could arrive as soon as 2030, threatening to undermine the core trust mechanisms of the internet, including HTTPS, digital certificates, and public-key infrastructure. In response, governments and industries are developing plans to transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), but concerns remain that critical sectors such as banking, healthcare, and government may not be fully prepared in time. One of the earliest operational changes in anticipation of quantum threats is the reduction of SSL/TLS certificate lifespans to 47 days. This move, aligned with evolving browser requirements and NIST guidance, is designed to improve crypto agility and security hygiene, helping organizations adapt to a future where static cryptography is no longer viable. Security executives emphasize the need for urgent action, drawing parallels to the unpreparedness seen during the rapid adoption of AI, and stress that building operational readiness for PQC is now a strategic imperative for digital trust and business continuity.
Jun 29, 2026