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Advantest, a major semiconductor chip-testing company, was reported as being hit by ransomware, indicating a disruptive cyber incident affecting a critical supplier in the semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem. Public reporting did not provide detailed technical indicators, the initial access vector, or the scope of impacted systems, but the incident aligns with ongoing ransomware targeting of large enterprises and operationally critical technology providers.
Separate reporting during the same period emphasized that ransomware operators and initial access brokers frequently gain entry via network edge devices, particularly firewalls exploited through known vulnerabilities or compromised accounts, and that legacy exposures can remain in active use for years. This broader trend context is consistent with ransomware tradecraft but is not specific attribution or confirmation of the intrusion method used against Advantest.
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3 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
SC Media, citing a TechRadar summary of Barracuda’s Managed XDR Global Threat Report, reported the findings that firewalls were exploited in 90% of ransomware incidents and referenced examples involving SonicWall appliances and Akira ransomware. This marks the public reporting of the report’s conclusions.
Barracuda's report identified CVE-2013-2566 as the most prevalent vulnerability observed in its 2025 data, indicating attackers continued exploiting long-known flaws in legacy systems. The report also said 1 in 10 detected vulnerabilities already had an exploit available.
During 2025, Barracuda says it analyzed more than two trillion IT events and 600,000 security alerts for its Managed XDR Global Threat Report. The analysis found that 90% of ransomware incidents in 2025 began with compromised firewall instances, often through known vulnerabilities or compromised accounts.
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**Advantest Corporation** reported a cybersecurity incident in which an unauthorized party appears to have accessed parts of its network and **deployed ransomware**, impacting certain internal systems. The company said it detected unusual activity on **Feb. 15 (JST)**, activated incident response procedures, **isolated affected systems**, and engaged third-party cybersecurity specialists to support investigation and containment; the investigation remains ongoing and findings may change as more facts are confirmed. Public reporting echoed Advantest’s statement that the scope and responsible ransomware group are **not yet identified**, and noted the broader trend of increased ransomware targeting of industrial and manufacturing organizations, including the semiconductor sector. Advantest stated it will provide updates and, if the investigation determines **customer or employee data** was affected, it will notify impacted individuals directly with guidance on protective measures.
Jun 29, 2026
A major global equipment manufacturer suffered a severe ransomware attack orchestrated by the BlackSuit ransomware group, also known as Ignoble Scorpius. The attack began with a vishing (voice phishing) campaign in which an attacker impersonated the company's IT help desk and convinced an employee to enter their VPN credentials into a phishing site. Using these stolen credentials, the attackers gained initial access to the corporate network. Once inside, they escalated privileges by executing a DCSync attack on a domain controller, allowing them to steal highly privileged credentials, including those of a key service account. The attackers then moved laterally across the network using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), Server Message Block (SMB), and tools such as Advanced IP Scanner and SMBExec to map the environment and identify valuable assets. Persistence was established by deploying AnyDesk and a custom remote access trojan (RAT) as scheduled tasks on domain controllers. The threat actors compromised a second domain controller and extracted the NTDS.dit database, which contains all user password hashes, enabling further credential compromise. Over 400 GB of sensitive data was exfiltrated using a renamed rclone utility. To erase forensic evidence and hinder incident response, the attackers deployed CCleaner before launching the ransomware payload. The BlackSuit ransomware was deployed using Ansible, resulting in the simultaneous encryption of hundreds of virtual machines across nearly 60 VMware ESXi hosts, causing widespread operational disruption. The attackers demanded a $20 million ransom, which the organization refused to pay. In response, the manufacturer implemented several security measures, including upgrading to newer Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance firewalls, enforcing multi-factor authentication, segmenting the network, deactivating NTLM, and restricting administrative access to isolated VLANs. The incident highlights the significant risks posed by social engineering and credential theft, as well as the sophisticated tactics used by modern ransomware groups. The attack demonstrates the importance of robust incident response, credential hygiene, and layered security controls to mitigate the impact of such breaches. The use of legitimate remote access tools and living-off-the-land techniques by the attackers complicated detection and response efforts. The exfiltration of large volumes of sensitive data prior to encryption underscores the dual extortion tactics now common among ransomware operators. The manufacturer’s refusal to pay the ransom and rapid implementation of enhanced security controls serve as a case study in post-incident resilience. The attack also illustrates the growing trend of targeting virtualization infrastructure, such as VMware ESXi hosts, to maximize operational disruption. Security researchers and incident responders continue to analyze the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used in this attack to inform defensive strategies for other organizations.
Jun 29, 2026
Dutch paint manufacturer **AkzoNobel** confirmed a network breach at one of its U.S. sites, with the **Anubis** ransomware operation claiming responsibility and alleging theft of ~**170GB** (about **170,000 files**) of data. Reported stolen materials include confidential client agreements, employee contact details, private emails, passport scans, and technical documents; AkzoNobel said the incident was contained and impact was limited, and it did not disclose whether negotiations are underway. Reporting also noted Anubis’ evolution as a **ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS)** operation and prior use of a **data-wiper** capability intended to destroy files beyond recovery. Separately, the **University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC)** reported it restored normal clinic operations after a ransomware attack disrupted electronic medical records, phone lines, and multiple IT systems for nine days; no group had publicly claimed the intrusion, though officials said they were in contact with the attackers and working with authorities and specialists. Additional context on the broader ransomware landscape included a February tally of publicly disclosed incidents across sectors and geographies, and technical reporting showing how a successful brute-force login against exposed **RDP** can lead to domain enumeration, credential-hunting, and identification of geo-distributed infrastructure tied to a **RaaS ecosystem** and **initial access brokers**—highlighting continued risk from internet-exposed remote access services and credential-based intrusion paths.
Jun 29, 2026