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Researchers reported an active malvertising/forced-redirect operation attributed to a threat actor tracked as D-Shortiez, which pushes users through malicious click-chains that ultimately land on scam pages. The campaign’s redirect payload blends common fingerprinting/tracking with aggressive multi-method redirect logic (including a nested try/catch sequence that attempts multiple redirect techniques in parallel to maximize success across browsers).
A notable technique in the payload abuses WebKit/Safari session history behavior to hijack the back button, making it difficult for victims—particularly iOS Safari users—to navigate away once redirected. The code uses the History API (window.top.history.pushState) and a window.top.onpopstate handler to trigger another redirect when the user attempts to go back, effectively trapping the user in the scam flow and prolonging exposure until the ad chain is disrupted or blocked.
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4 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Confiant published technical analysis of the campaign, describing the use of history.pushState and popstate to hijack the back button, trap users in malicious click-chains, and redirect them to scams. The report also shared associated infrastructure, including numerous domains and wildcard subdomains tied to the activity.
Apple fixed the Safari issue that enabled the back-button trapping technique abused by D-Shortiez. The remediation was referenced in Apple security update article HT213600.
Confiant notified Apple about the Safari/WebKit back-button hijack behavior used in the D-Shortiez malvertising campaign. One source places this notification on September 29, while another says the issue was reported on January 23, indicating some date ambiguity around the disclosure timeline.
Over roughly the six months preceding the reports, the threat actor tracked as D-Shortiez delivered more than 300 million malicious ad impressions. The campaign primarily targeted U.S. users, with additional activity affecting Canada and parts of Europe, and predominantly impacted iOS Safari users through forced redirect chains to scam pages.
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Threat actors are running a **ClickFix**-style social-engineering campaign that abuses **Google sponsored search results** to funnel macOS users to malicious content hosted on legitimate platforms, including **Anthropic Claude public artifacts** (`claude.ai`) and **Medium** pages impersonating trusted sources (e.g., Apple Support). The lures target common search queries such as “online DNS resolver,” “macOS CLI disk space analyzer,” and “HomeBrew,” then instruct victims to paste and run Terminal commands that decode/execute payloads (e.g., `echo "..." | base64 -D | zsh` or `curl ... | zsh`). Researchers (Moonlock Lab/MacPaw and AdGuard) reported that the malicious Claude artifact accumulated **~12,300 to 15,600 views**, indicating significant exposure (reported as **10,000+** and **15,000+** potential victims across coverage). The payloads deliver macOS information-stealing malware, including **MacSync**, which collects data such as **Keychain credentials, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet files**. Reported tradecraft includes downloading and executing a shell script, using an AppleScript component for theft, staging stolen data into `/tmp/osalogging.zip`, and exfiltrating via HTTP POST to attacker infrastructure (e.g., `a2abotnet[.]com/gate`, with C2 paths like `a2abotnet[.]com/dynamic`). The malware attempts to blend in by spoofing legitimate macOS browser User-Agent strings and includes retry logic for large/chunked uploads, then removes staging artifacts to reduce forensic traces.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported an active macOS social-engineering campaign that abuses **Google Search sponsored results** and Google-hosted content (notably `docs.google.com`, and also `business.google.com`) to funnel users to **forged Apple Support-like pages** and other lookalike content (including Medium posts). The pages instruct victims—often searching for “mac cleaner” tools or macOS maintenance tasks like clearing cache—to copy/paste an **obfuscated Base64** command into **Terminal**, which then downloads and executes a follow-on script with the user’s permissions. Once executed, the payload can enable remote access and data theft, including harvesting sensitive files and **SSH keys**, and may also deploy additional malware or cryptomining. One report ties the activity to delivery of the **AMOS (aka SOMA) stealer**, which was observed creating artifacts such as `.agent` (AppleScript used to run theft), `.mainHelper` (Mach-O binary), and `.pass` (password stored in plaintext), and attempting to access user data including **Documents** and **Notes**. Researchers also noted the apparent use of **compromised, Google-verified advertiser accounts** to place the malicious ads, helping the campaign bypass ad-platform trust checks.
Jun 29, 2026
Microsoft reported that a macOS-focused **ClickFix** campaign evolved from openly serving fake download pages to using server-side browser fingerprinting that shows the malicious lure mainly to likely macOS victims. The operation used more than **250 look-alike domains**, often following dictionary-style naming patterns that included the token `file`, and presented spoofed **GitHub-themed** pages with a fake **Download for macOS** prompt. Victims were tricked into pasting a Terminal command that fetched remote scripts and installed infostealers including **Atomic Stealer (AMOS)** and **MacSync**. The gating logic collected browser, hardware, and anti-analysis signals before deciding whether to deliver the lure, including `navigator` data, WebGL GPU details, timezone, iframe status, touch support, console serialization behavior, and prototype-tamper checks; non-qualifying visitors were sent blank or benign decoy pages. Separate IOC material tied the same broader activity to additional macOS infostealer infrastructure, including **SHub Stealer**, suspected delivery and command-and-control domains, a SHA-256 sample hash, and capabilities such as screenshot capture, file download, command execution, and self-deletion, reinforcing that the campaign relied on rotating lure domains and stealthy staging to target macOS users.
Aug 27, 2026