Loading story…
LastPass warned customers about an active phishing campaign using spoofed “security alert” emails that claim unauthorized access, vault export attempts, account recovery, or new device registration to pressure users into taking action. The messages spoof the LastPass display name (relying on many clients—especially mobile—showing only the display name) and direct victims to a fake SSO login page at verify-lastpass[.]com to steal credentials; LastPass reiterated it will never ask for a user’s master password and said it is working with partners to take down the phishing infrastructure.
Separately, researchers reported a coordinated phishing operation that abuses Google Cloud Storage (GCS) to host redirector content on a legitimate Google domain (storage.googleapis.com) to help links evade email security controls. Analysis tied 25+ distinct lure emails (e.g., “storage full,” “antivirus expired,” and brand-themed reward scams) to a single GCS bucket (whilewait) hosting comessuccess.html, which functions as a gatekeeper/redirector that forwards victims to third-party malicious sites associated with credential and/or payment-card harvesting and potential malware delivery; the consistent destination across varied themes indicates centralized attacker-controlled cloud infrastructure.
Mallory correlates global threat intelligence with your attack surface — know if you’re exposed before adversaries strike.
3 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Public reporting described the campaign's end goal as stealing payment card details through fake shipping, service-charge, or renewal payment prompts shown after redirection. Researchers also advised inspecting redirect chains, validating suspicious sender metadata, and reporting the abusive GCS bucket to Google Cloud for takedown.
After analyzing inbox activity and SMTP headers, a threat hunter linked the emails to a single Google Cloud Storage bucket, "whilewait," hosting an attacker-controlled HTML file named comessuccess.html. The page functioned as a script-heavy redirector that silently sent victims to external malicious sites.
In early March 2026, researchers identified a coordinated phishing campaign that sent more than 25 distinct emails to a single account while routing victims through a Google Cloud Storage URL on storage.googleapis.com. The campaign used varied lures but relied on the same trusted Google-hosted delivery path to evade email security controls.
Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, and breaches Mallory has linked to this story.
2 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
cybersecuritynews.com
Open sourcemalwr-analysis.com
Open sourceMap indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
LastPass warned of an active **phishing campaign** using spoofed “security alert” and “support thread” emails that claim unauthorized access, master password changes, vault export attempts, account recovery, or new device registration. The messages abuse **display-name spoofing** (e.g., “LastPass Support”) to hide unrelated sender addresses—often from compromised sites or abandoned domains—and use urgent calls to action such as “report suspicious activity,” “disconnect and lock vault,” and “revoke device” to drive clicks. Victims who follow the links are directed to a fake LastPass SSO/login page hosted primarily on `verify-lastpass[.]com`, with additional lookalike/modified URLs redirecting to the same credential-harvesting site, aiming to steal users’ **master passwords** and account credentials. LastPass stated its own infrastructure was **not compromised**, is working with partners to take down the phishing domains, and reiterated it will **never** ask users for their master password; users are advised to report suspicious LastPass-branded emails to `abuse@lastpass.com`.
Jun 29, 2026
Threat actors have launched sophisticated phishing campaigns impersonating *LastPass* to trick users into revealing their master passwords and, in some cases, to install remote access tools. One campaign, attributed to the financially motivated group **CryptoChameleon (UNC5356)**, sends emails claiming a family member has requested access to the victim's LastPass vault via a fabricated death certificate, exploiting the service's emergency access feature. Victims are directed to fraudulent sites mimicking LastPass, where they are prompted to enter their credentials or passkeys. In some instances, attackers have also called victims while posing as LastPass staff to further legitimize the scam. A separate but related campaign targets users of both *LastPass* and *Bitwarden* with fake breach notifications, urging them to download a "secure" desktop version of the password manager. The download actually installs the Syncro remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool, which is then used to deploy ScreenConnect for remote access. This allows attackers to steal data, deploy additional malware, and potentially access password vaults. Both LastPass and Syncro have taken steps to warn users and disrupt the malicious infrastructure, emphasizing that no legitimate communication will ever request a master password and advising users to verify suspicious emails.
Jun 29, 2026
LastPass warned of an active **phishing campaign** impersonating the service with fake “infrastructure maintenance” notifications that pressure users to “back up” their password vaults within **24 hours**. The emails are crafted to create urgency and direct recipients to click a **“Create Backup Now”** link, with the apparent goal of **hijacking accounts and stealing vault master passwords**; LastPass emphasized it will **never** ask customers to provide their master password or demand immediate action under a tight deadline. LastPass’ Threat Intelligence, Mitigation, and Escalation (**TIME**) team assessed the campaign as starting around **January 19, 2026**, and observed messages sent from addresses including `support@lastpass[.]server8` and `support@sr22vegas[.]com` (with additional reported senders `support@lastpass[.]server7` and `support@lastpass[.]server3`). Reported infrastructure used in the lure included an Amazon S3 URL `group-content-gen2.s3.eu-west-3.amazonaws[.]com/5yaVgx51ZzGf` that redirected to `mail-lastpass[.]com`; LastPass said it is working with third-party partners to **take down** the malicious infrastructure.
Jun 29, 2026