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Reporting described multiple, unrelated threat activities rather than a single cohesive incident. SOCRadar assessed a sustained DDoS campaign by NoName057(16) using the DDoSia toolset during March 2–8, 2026, logging 7,512 attack entries against 169 domains and 153 IPs, with Germany as the primary target (65.6% of entries) and Israel as a major secondary target (19.7%). The most notable pattern was heavy, systematic disruption of Germany’s public procurement ecosystem, including at least 17 procurement portals (974 entries), alongside Israeli targeting across defense industry, finance, telecom, and municipal services.
Separately, Flare reported an active phishing campaign using fraudulent domains impersonating Canadian institutions (including the Government of British Columbia and Hydro-Québec) to harvest personal and payment data; the infrastructure was linked to RouterHosting LLC / Cloudzy, a provider previously accused (in 2023) of supporting services used by multiple state-sponsored groups, including Iran-aligned actors. Two other items were not incident-specific: Hackmageddon published aggregated February 2026 attack statistics, and DataBreaches.Net summarized research on offender age distribution in cybercrime; both are higher-level analysis and do not materially add to the DDoS or phishing reporting.
TTPs, infrastructure, and targeting history in one profile.
5 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Flare's analysis connected multiple phishing domains through shared hosting IPs and SSL certificate data, repeatedly tying the infrastructure to RouterHosting LLC, rebranded as Cloudzy. A broader scan found more than 28,000 RouterHosting-hosted domains, including 134 .ca domains, many with suspicious Canada-themed naming patterns.
By March 2026, researchers observed an active phishing campaign using fraudulent domains impersonating institutions including the Government of British Columbia and Hydro-Québec to steal personal and payment-card information from Canadian residents. The phishing flow accepted obviously invalid personal data before requesting card details, indicating weak or absent validation.
On March 3, 2026, the campaign reached its peak volume, with Germany's public procurement ecosystem emerging as a major focus. At least 17 procurement portals were attacked for 974 entries, an unprecedented concentration by this actor against a single government function.
During March 2–8, 2026, the pro-Russian hacktivist group NoName057(16) conducted a sustained DDoS campaign using DDoSia, generating 7,512 recorded attack entries. Germany was the main target and Israel a major secondary target, with the activity described as geopolitically motivated.
In 2023, public reporting by Halcyon and Reuters alleged that Cloudzy/RouterHosting had provided services to numerous state-sponsored hacking groups. The March 2026 phishing infrastructure assessment cites these earlier allegations as relevant context for the current campaign.
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A sustained DDoS campaign attributed to **NoName057(16)** used the **DDoSia** tool to generate **6,649** recorded attack entries between Feb. 23 and Mar. 1, targeting **126 domains** and **135 IPs** with a multi-country focus on **Denmark, Greenland, and Ukraine**. Reported targeting emphasized public-sector services (about **44%** of attacks), alongside Ukrainian defense industry, tourism/travel (notably tied to Greenland’s economy), and transportation infrastructure; most traffic was directed at `443/tcp` (HTTPS). The activity aligns with politically motivated disruption tied to Denmark’s support for Ukraine and heightened Arctic sovereignty tensions involving Greenland. Separately, Russia’s internet regulator **Roskomnadzor** and the **Russian Defense Ministry** reported a “complex multi-vector” DDoS that briefly disrupted multiple government websites and related infrastructure, including systems of the **Main Radio Frequency Center (GRFC)**. Russian authorities said the attack was contained, but user reports indicated intermittent access issues persisted for days; the responsible actor was not identified and no public claim of responsibility was noted at the time of reporting. A ransomware “state of the month” roundup covering February incidents is not directly related to these DDoS events and should be treated as separate reporting.
Jun 29, 2026
SOCRadar reported a coordinated, multi-country **DDoS campaign** attributed to pro-Russian actor **NoName057(16)** using the **DDoSia** tool, with **5,830** recorded attack entries against **160 domains** and **181 IPs** during the Jan 26–Feb 1, 2026 analysis window. The activity showed broad geographic targeting, led by the **UK (55%)**, followed by **Ukraine (12.7%)** and **Czechia (4.9%)**, and focused heavily on public-sector and critical-service targets; the report also noted frequent target-list updates distributed via Telegram and that **port 443** was the most targeted. Separately, Polish authorities (CBCZ) arrested and then bailed a **20-year-old** suspected of running a multi-layered botnet used to DDoS “numerous popular websites,” including sites described as strategically important, using “C2 stresser” and command-and-control nodes; police seized equipment and claimed to have dismantled infrastructure used to host/distribute DDoS tools, with additional arrests possible. An NSFOCUS monthly report on **December 2025 APT activity** (e.g., TransparentTribe, Sidewinder, Konni, Gamaredon) describes broader spear-phishing-led intrusion trends and is not tied to the NoName057(16) DDoSia activity or the Polish DDoS case.
Jun 29, 2026
Researchers detailed two active Russia-linked threat operations using different intrusion models to target Western organizations. **TA577**, a phishing group active since 2020, was observed sending HTML attachments that force outbound SMB connections to `file://` URLs in order to capture **NTLMv2** authentication handshakes and steal credential hashes. Infrastructure hunting tied the campaign to a narrowed set of likely servers identified through Impacket-like 8-character SMB target names, a distinctive SMB server GUID, shared SSH banner hashes, and recurring hosting patterns across providers including **GLOBALWAYS**; some hosts also exposed a **"We’ll back soon.."** page, login panels, or default Apache pages. A separate analysis examined **NoName057(16)**, a pro-Russian hacktivist collective that has sustained disruptive attacks against Western targets, especially Italian banks, government entities, military infrastructure, and public administrations. The group operates a volunteer-driven DDoS ecosystem known as **DDosia** or **People Go Stresser 2.0**, combining attack tools, support channels, operational guidance, and cryptocurrency rewards to coordinate participants. Its operations primarily use Layer 7 HTTP floods and Layer 4 TCP-SYN attacks, with most traffic aimed at **TLS/443** services but also hitting SSH, FTP, and secure email ports; researchers also noted prior links between the collective and **Bobik RAT** infections used to support DDoS activity.
Jul 12, 2026