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Researchers reported active software supply chain attacks in which legitimate GitHub accounts and repositories were compromised and then used to distribute malware to developers. In one case, the verified dev-protocol GitHub organization was hijacked and repurposed to host polished Polymarket trading-bot repositories that secretly pulled typosquatted npm dependencies. Running the project exfiltrated .env contents including wallet private keys to attacker-controlled infrastructure, performed host fingerprinting, and modified firewall settings to expose SSH access; victims were advised to rotate wallet and API secrets and inspect ~/.ssh/authorized_keys for persistence.
A separate but related GitHub-focused campaign, dubbed ForceMemo, involved takeover of developer accounts and force-pushes to hundreds of Python repositories so that malicious code was appended to files such as setup.py, main.py, and app.py while preserving original commit metadata. Anyone installing directly from those repos could trigger the payload, and the activity affected projects ranging from Django applications to ML and Streamlit code. A report on malicious npm packages posing as a Roblox Solara executor was excluded because it describes a different npm ecosystem campaign centered on Cipher stealer, not the GitHub account and repository hijacks used in the other incidents.
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StepSecurity published technical findings on the dev-protocol-hosted Polymarket bot, confirming in a monitored GitHub Actions sandbox that typosquatted npm packages exfiltrated data to Vercel-hosted infrastructure, collected IP data, and modified firewall and SSH settings. The report also noted attackers deleted GitHub warning issues to suppress disclosure.
Attackers hijacked the verified GitHub organization dev-protocol and used it to publish more than 20 scam Polymarket trading bot repositories. The repos were made to appear credible with bot-driven stars and forks and included malware that stole wallet keys, sensitive files, and enabled SSH access on victim systems.
StepSecurity publicly reported the ForceMemo campaign, describing how attackers preserved original commit metadata while changing committer dates to hide malicious force-pushes. The report also detailed the obfuscated Python malware's use of Solana transaction memos for command-and-control and said maintainers of notable affected repositories had been notified.
Attackers began an ongoing supply-chain campaign later dubbed ForceMemo, taking over GitHub accounts and force-pushing malicious commits into Python repositories. StepSecurity said the activity started as early as 2026-03-08 and affected repositories spanning Django, Flask, Streamlit, machine learning code, and Python packages.
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GitHub has been hit by a large-scale **repo confusion** campaign in which attackers fork legitimate projects, keep names and appearances close to the originals, and inject heavily obfuscated malicious code intended to steal passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other developer secrets. Apiiro reported that the operation was largely automated and tied to more than **100,000 infected repositories**, while Ars Technica said the broader attack generated **millions of malicious repositories** and exploited the difficulty users face distinguishing authentic projects from poisoned forks. Multiple GitHub repositories later carried security issues warning that **malicious code had been injected via compromised accounts**, including projects such as `django-restful-admin`, `ImportNURBS`, `siriraj-assist`, `ood_coverage`, `issued`, and `bottom-up-attention-vqa`. The notices indicate the campaign was not limited to fake lookalike repos but also reached legitimate codebases through account compromise, extending the supply-chain risk to developers who clone, fork, or build from affected repositories while GitHub continues removing abusive content through reporting, manual review, and machine-learning-based detection.
Jun 29, 2026
Researchers reported a large-scale GitHub malware distribution campaign that has operated since March 2025, using repositories masquerading as cracked browser extensions, gaming cheats, developer tools, and, more recently, fake AI skills and MCP servers. The activity has been tied to a Vietnamese-speaking operator and spans more than 47 GitHub accounts and 600 malicious ZIP archives, with some accounts believed to have been compromised rather than created solely for abuse. The campaign’s social-engineering lures target both general users and developers seeking unofficial software, automation tools, or AI-related components. The repositories deliver a multi-stage **LuaJIT** loader chain that ultimately installs the **StealC** information stealer. Payloads are fetched from GitHub “dead drop” repositories, then decrypted through layered obfuscation including hex, XOR, `base64url`, and **AES-ECB** before process hollowing is used for injection. Researchers said the malware also resolves command-and-control infrastructure through **Polygon Mainnet** smart contracts, allowing operators to rotate C2 URLs or IPs without changing deployed binaries; telemetry linked the activity to detections such as BitDefender `Gen:Heur.FakeGit.1` and ESET’s `Lua/Agent` family, while infrastructure usage heavily overlapped with bulletproof hosting providers including **ASN 207957 (Serv.host Group Ltd)**.
Jul 21, 2026
Security researchers reported two distinct software supply-chain abuse paths that can make malicious code appear to originate from trusted sources. GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae described an active campaign dubbed **“repo squatting”** that abuses how GitHub renders and links commits from forks: a commit made in an attacker-controlled fork can be viewed under the upstream project’s URL structure, enabling convincing links like `github.com/<official-org>/<repo>/commit/<hash>` that appear to belong to the official repository. The campaign targeted the *GitHub Desktop* project by distributing a trojanized installer carrying **HijackLoader**, with the malicious download link presented in a way that could mislead users and some security tooling into believing it came from the official repo. Separately, Koi researchers disclosed **PackageGate** weaknesses in JavaScript dependency tooling that allow bypassing npm’s post–**Shai-Hulud** mitigations when installing **Git-based dependencies**. They reported that a malicious `.npmrc` in a Git dependency can override the `git` binary path, enabling **code execution even when lifecycle scripts are disabled** (e.g., `--ignore-scripts=true`), affecting multiple tools (including *pnpm*, *vlt*, *Bun*, and *npm*). Vendors reportedly addressed the issue in the non-npm tools, while npm closed the report as “works as expected,” and researchers cited evidence of prior proof-of-concept abuse (e.g., reverse shell) indicating practical exploitation risk for organizations relying on Git dependencies in CI/CD and developer environments.
Jun 29, 2026