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GitHub has been hit by a large-scale repo confusion campaign in which attackers fork legitimate projects, keep names and appearances close to the originals, and inject heavily obfuscated malicious code intended to steal passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other developer secrets. Apiiro reported that the operation was largely automated and tied to more than 100,000 infected repositories, while Ars Technica said the broader attack generated millions of malicious repositories and exploited the difficulty users face distinguishing authentic projects from poisoned forks.
Multiple GitHub repositories later carried security issues warning that malicious code had been injected via compromised accounts, including projects such as django-restful-admin, ImportNURBS, siriraj-assist, ood_coverage, issued, and bottom-up-attention-vqa. The notices indicate the campaign was not limited to fake lookalike repos but also reached legitimate codebases through account compromise, extending the supply-chain risk to developers who clone, fork, or build from affected repositories while GitHub continues removing abusive content through reporting, manual review, and machine-learning-based detection.
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Security issues were opened across several GitHub repositories warning that malicious code had been injected via compromised accounts. Repositories named in the references include KeithSloan/ImportNURBS, biodatlab/siriraj-assist, BierOne/ood_coverage, metalogico/issued, and BierOne/bottom-up-attention-vqa.
A similar GitHub security issue was opened for amirasaran/django-restful-admin, indicating malicious code had been injected into the repository through a compromised account. This shows the campaign or related compromises continued to surface in additional repositories after the March disclosures.
Ars Technica reported on the ongoing campaign, citing Apiiro's findings that attackers had created millions of malicious forks impersonating legitimate repositories. The report said the malware was designed to steal passwords and cryptocurrency and noted GitHub was removing many, but not all, abusive repositories.
Apiiro researchers uncovered a large-scale campaign in which attackers forked legitimate GitHub repositories and injected obfuscated malware. The company said the operation affected more than 100,000 repositories and relied on repository confusion to trick developers into downloading infected code.
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Researchers reported active **software supply chain attacks** in which legitimate GitHub accounts and repositories were compromised and then used to distribute malware to developers. In one case, the verified **dev-protocol** GitHub organization was hijacked and repurposed to host polished **Polymarket** trading-bot repositories that secretly pulled typosquatted npm dependencies. Running the project exfiltrated `.env` contents including wallet private keys to attacker-controlled infrastructure, performed host fingerprinting, and modified firewall settings to expose SSH access; victims were advised to rotate wallet and API secrets and inspect `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` for persistence. A separate but related GitHub-focused campaign, dubbed **ForceMemo**, involved takeover of developer accounts and force-pushes to hundreds of Python repositories so that malicious code was appended to files such as `setup.py`, `main.py`, and `app.py` while preserving original commit metadata. Anyone installing directly from those repos could trigger the payload, and the activity affected projects ranging from Django applications to ML and Streamlit code. A report on malicious npm packages posing as a Roblox *Solara* executor was excluded because it describes a different npm ecosystem campaign centered on **Cipher stealer**, not the GitHub account and repository hijacks used in the other incidents.
Jun 29, 2026
GitHub disabled more than 70 Microsoft-owned repositories after detecting a suspected **Miasma** worm campaign that inserted malicious code into open source projects and disrupted dependent CI/CD workflows. Researchers said the incident began with a compromised contributor account pushing a malicious commit to `Azure/durabletask`, adding configuration files that could trigger remote code execution when developers opened the repository in IDEs or AI coding tools including **Claude Code**, **Gemini CLI**, and **Cursor**. Microsoft’s response was unusual because it shut down its own repositories rather than only removing the offending content, and GitHub reportedly disabled 73 repositories in rapid succession after automated detections fired. The activity appears tied to a broader supply-chain operation linked to earlier compromises of Microsoft’s `durabletask` PyPI package and to a newer campaign tracked by StepSecurity as **Hades**, which it describes as an evolution of Miasma. StepSecurity said the malware uses obfuscated Python import hooks to fetch additional payloads, scrape memory across Linux, macOS, and Windows, steal cloud and developer credentials, abuse GitHub Actions and OIDC/Sigstore workflows, move laterally over SSH/SCP, and backdoor IDE and AI assistant configuration files. The campaign also reportedly uses GitHub-based command-and-control and includes a token-monitoring component that can trigger a destructive wiper if a stolen GitHub token is revoked, underscoring the risk to software supply chains and AI-assisted development environments.
Jun 29, 2026
The **GlassWorm** campaign is compromising open-source software supply chains by using stolen developer credentials and stealthy code injection techniques to backdoor repositories, packages, and extensions on **GitHub**, **npm**, **PyPI**, and the **VS Code Marketplace**. Reporting describes attackers inserting obfuscated payloads into legitimate projects, including popular repositories and Python codebases, then hiding the malicious logic with tactics such as invisible **Unicode PUA** characters, Base64 encoding, and history rewriting that preserves original commit metadata. The malware is designed to steal secrets, credentials, and access tokens, and in some cases retrieves follow-on payload information through **Solana** transaction memo fields to make exfiltration and command delivery harder to detect. The campaign appears broad and operationally mature, with one report citing at least **151 compromised GitHub repositories** in early March and another describing hundreds of affected Python repositories targeted through force-pushed malicious commits. Attackers reportedly append payloads to files such as `setup.py`, `main.py`, and `app.py`, while earlier access is linked to compromised developer environments, including malicious **VS Code** and **Cursor** extensions used to steal GitHub tokens. The activity affects multiple ecosystems and developer workflows, indicating a sustained supply-chain threat rather than isolated repository tampering, with risks extending to downstream users who install or execute code from infected projects.
Jun 29, 2026