China-Linked Red Menshen Upgrades BPFDoor for Stealthy Telecom Espionage
Sector Threat Intelligence · 10 sources · Updated 5mo ago · First seen Mar 26, 2026

Rapid7 reported that the China-linked espionage group Red Menshen has expanded a long-running campaign against global telecommunications providers by deploying upgraded BPFDoor implants designed for covert, persistent access inside Linux-based core infrastructure. Victims span the Middle East, Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Europe, with reporting tying activity to telecom environments in South Korea, Hong Kong, Myanmar, Malaysia, Egypt, and other regional networks. The malware abuses Berkeley Packet Filter functionality to inspect traffic from within the kernel and stays dormant until it receives specially crafted trigger packets, allowing it to avoid exposed listening ports and conventional command-and-control patterns. Researchers said the campaign supports strategic surveillance and pre-positioning, potentially exposing telecom signaling and authentication data tied to subscriber identity, mobility, and government communications.
Newly documented BPFDoor variants hide activation inside seemingly legitimate HTTPS traffic, use fixed trigger offsets and magic markers, add ICMP-based relay and shell capabilities, and in some cases beacon outbound over port 443 while masquerading as normal NTP- or management-related traffic. Rapid7 also described variants that monitor telecom-relevant protocols such as SCTP, wipe file descriptors, timestomp artifacts, run from paths such as /var/run/user/0, and disguise themselves as HPE ProLiant or Kubernetes-related processes. Alongside BPFDoor, operators used tools including CrossC2, TinyShell, Sliver, brute-force utilities, and credential theft tooling to move from exposed edge devices into telecom cores. Rapid7 released a detection script for known BPFDoor samples and urged defenders to hunt for structural indicators such as AF_PACKET socket creation, attached BPF filters, spoofed root processes, and anomalous ICMP markers rather than relying on payload inspection alone.


