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BPFDoor Hides in `/dev/shm` and Re-Executes via `execve` to Establish Persistence

Malware Intelligence · 2 sources · Updated 4mo ago · First seen Oct 30, 2008

BPFDoor Hides in `/dev/shm` and Re-Executes via `execve` to Establish Persistence

Analysis of the Linux backdoor BPFDoor shows the malware copying itself to /dev/shm/kdmtmpflush, changing the file’s permissions, and then re-launching the new instance through execve with the --init flag to complete setup. During execution it checks for /var/run/haldrund.pid to avoid multiple starts, deletes any prior copy of the payload, and timestomps the replacement file to 2008-10-30 19:17:16 UTC to reduce suspicion. Runtime tracing also showed the malware adopting deceptive process names including dbus-daemon --system and /usr/libexec/postfix/master to blend into normal Linux activity.

The traced sample then created a raw packet socket and attached a BPF filter with SO_ATTACH_FILTER, enabling BPFDoor to watch for specially crafted network traffic used to activate the implant. The backdoor was reported to respond to magic packets containing hardcoded passwords such as justforfun or socket, after which it could send a ping, spawn a reverse shell, or open a bind shell. The behavior highlights a stealth-focused Linux implant that combines fileless-style staging in shared memory, process masquerading, and packet-triggered remote access.

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Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

1 event · Oct 30, 2008
  1. Oct 30, 200818y ago

    BPFDoor timestomps copied payload to a 2008 timestamp

    The analyzed BPFDoor sample sets the timestamps on /dev/shm/kdmtmpflush via utimes to 2008-10-30 19:17:16 UTC as part of its execution flow. This is presented in the tracing analysis as an anti-forensics step after copying and re-executing itself.

    [s|l]trace - Linux Malware Analysis | dfir.ch
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