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Attackers poisoned multiple open-source packages in separate supply-chain incidents, including malicious nx and related @nx npm releases and eight compromised Packagist packages. Nrwl said the Nx compromise began after attackers exploited a vulnerable pull_request_target GitHub Actions workflow in the nrwl/nx repository, stole an npm publishing token, and pushed tainted versions that ran a postinstall script. The malware searched local file systems, collected credentials and path data, exfiltrated information by creating GitHub repositories containing s1ngularity-repository in victims’ accounts, and altered shell startup files such as .zshrc and .bashrc to add a shutdown command that could prompt for a system password. Affected Nx versions included 20.9.0 through 20.12.0 and 21.5.0 through 21.8.0, while some Nx Console VSCode users were also exposed because versions 18.6.30 through 18.65.1 automatically installed nx@latest.
A separate campaign hit Packagist by hiding malicious logic in package.json instead of composer.json, targeting PHP projects that also invoke JavaScript tooling during install or build steps. Socket reported that the packages attempted to fetch a Linux binary from GitHub Releases, save it as /tmp/.sshd, mark it executable, and launch it in the background, creating a remote-code-execution path during dependency installation while suppressing errors and disabling TLS verification. The compromised versions were removed from Packagist, and the Nx packages were removed from npm after disclosure, but both incidents underscored how attackers are abusing CI/CD workflows and cross-ecosystem package metadata to distribute malware, steal credentials, and evade defenders focused on a single package manager.
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7 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Socket reported that the malicious Packagist versions were removed and warned that placing the payload in package.json could evade defenders focused only on Composer metadata. The same payload was also reportedly referenced across 777 GitHub files, including some GitHub Actions workflows, suggesting multiple execution paths.
A coordinated attack inserted malicious code into package.json files of eight Packagist packages, targeting PHP projects that also use JavaScript build tooling. The postinstall logic attempted to download a Linux binary from GitHub Releases, save it as /tmp/.sshd, mark it executable, and run it in the background.
Analysis of the incident noted that Nx Console versions 18.6.30 through 18.65.1 automatically installed nx@latest, which could trigger the malicious postinstall even in environments not otherwise using Nx directly. This expanded the understood exposure beyond standard npm consumers.
Nrwl published a security advisory describing the malicious npm releases, the GitHub Actions workflow root cause, affected versions, and indicators of compromise. The company advised users to inspect GitHub audit logs and local systems, rotate GitHub and npm tokens and other credentials, clear caches, and remove compromised versions from internal registries.
The malicious Nx and related package versions were removed from npm after the compromise was identified. Nrwl's advisory states the removals occurred on August 26-27, 2025.
Unauthorized malicious versions of nx and related @nx packages were published to npm, including affected nx versions 20.9.0 through 20.12.0 and 21.5.0 through 21.8.0. The packages contained a postinstall script that scanned local files, collected credentials and path data, exfiltrated information by creating GitHub repositories under victims' accounts, and modified shell startup files to add a shutdown command.
Attackers abused a bash injection flaw in a pull_request_target workflow with elevated permissions in the nrwl/nx repository, then triggered another workflow and stole an npm publishing token via a malicious commit and webhook. This compromise enabled unauthorized publication of malicious Nx packages to npm.
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A malicious `18.95.0` release of the **Nx Console** VS Code extension was briefly published to the Visual Studio Marketplace after attackers used stolen GitHub and marketplace publishing credentials to push a tampered build outside the normal release pipeline. The extension fetched an obfuscated payload from an orphaned commit in the official `nrwl/nx` GitHub repository and executed it when a workspace was opened, turning the trusted developer tool into a credential stealer. Researchers and vendor advisories said the malware harvested secrets from GitHub, npm, AWS, HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes, 1Password, local files, and Claude Code-related configuration, then exfiltrated data over HTTPS, the GitHub API, and DNS while using anti-analysis checks and avoiding some CIS-region systems. The intrusion was tracked as **`CVE-2026-48027`** and was described as a supply-chain attack aimed at developer workstations rather than production servers directly, with the likely objective of pivoting into repositories, CI/CD pipelines, package registries, and cloud infrastructure through stolen trust material. Reports said the payload also attempted persistence on macOS and Linux and included Sigstore, Fulcio, and SLSA-related logic that could help attackers publish packages with apparently valid signed provenance using stolen OIDC tokens. Nx removed the malicious release, revoked exposed credentials, added stricter release approvals, and told users who installed `18.95.0` and opened a workspace during the exposure window to upgrade to `18.100.0` or later, remove persistence artifacts, terminate malicious processes, rotate all reachable credentials, and audit repositories, workflows, and service-account activity for abuse.
Jun 29, 2026
Threat actors are using **malicious npm packages** to steal developer credentials and CI/CD secrets, enabling rapid escalation into cloud environments. Google reported that **UNC6426** leveraged keys stolen during the earlier compromise of the *nx* npm ecosystem to pivot from a stolen developer GitHub token into **AWS administrative access within 72 hours**, abusing **GitHub-to-AWS OpenID Connect (OIDC) trust** to create a new admin role. The actor then used that access to **exfiltrate data from AWS S3** and conduct **destructive actions** in production cloud environments; the initial *nx* compromise involved a GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` workflow abuse (“**Pwn Request**”) that enabled publishing trojanized packages containing a `postinstall` chain that executed the **QUIETVAULT** JavaScript credential stealer and uploaded stolen data to a public GitHub repo (`/s1ngularity-repository-1`). Separately, researchers reported new waves of the **PhantomRaven** npm supply-chain campaign distributing **88 additional malicious packages** (via ~50 disposable accounts) that target JavaScript developers by exfiltrating secrets from files like `.gitconfig` and `.npmrc`, environment variables, and CI/CD tokens (e.g., GitHub/GitLab/Jenkins/CircleCI). The campaign uses **slopsquatting** (LLM-suggested lookalike package names) and a stealth technique called **Remote Dynamic Dependencies (RDD)**, where `package.json` pulls a dependency from an external URL so the malicious payload is fetched at install time (`npm install`) and can evade static package inspection; researchers indicated many of these packages remained available in the npm registry at the time of reporting.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported multiple **software supply chain** threats targeting developers via public package ecosystems. Tenable analyzed a malicious npm package, **`ambar-src`**, that reached roughly **50,000 downloads** in days before removal; it executed during installation via **malicious `preinstall` behavior**, used evasion techniques, and dropped OS-specific payloads for Windows, Linux, and macOS, with typosquatting assessed as the likely lure (mimicking *`ember-source`*). Separate reporting described a campaign using **malicious NuGet packages** (e.g., **NCryptYo**, **DOMOAuth2_**, **IRAOAuth2.0**, **SimpleWriter_**) that impersonated legitimate .NET libraries, executed code on assembly load, and established local proxying/backdoor behavior to facilitate credential theft and persistence in ASP.NET environments. Additional coverage warned of an npm “worm-like” propagation pattern impacting **CI pipelines and AI coding tools**, reinforcing that developer tooling and build systems are high-risk choke points where a single poisoned dependency can spread quickly across environments. While the broader set of articles also included unrelated breach, ransomware, and policy items, the developer-focused supply chain reporting consistently emphasized that **installation-time execution** and **typosquatting/impersonation** enable compromise even when developers never directly call the malicious code, and that traditional detection can lag (e.g., low initial antivirus detection rates for obfuscated .NET payloads).
Jun 29, 2026