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Researchers reported that BTMOB, an Android remote access trojan derived from SpySolr, is being used to compromise mobile devices through phishing websites and fake app stores. The malware goes beyond typical banking-trojan behavior by abusing Android Accessibility Services to gain elevated access and deliver broad remote-control capabilities on infected phones, enabling attackers to burrow deeply into devices and expand post-compromise actions.
The operation is being marketed as a malware-as-a-service offering that includes an APK builder, allowing affiliates to quickly generate localized malicious apps and phishing lures without coding skills. Observed campaigns targeted users in Brazil and Argentina, including impersonation of Argentina’s tax and customs authorities, and researchers warned that the service’s availability and possible leakage into secondary criminal markets could drive wider adoption. ESET said it detects the toolkit and related payloads under MSIL/BtmobRat, Android/Spy.Agent, and TrojanDropper signatures.
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ESET said BTMOB-related files were briefly posted for free on a dark web forum in January 2026. The exposure raised concerns that leaked or resold versions of the Android RAT could spread more widely in underground markets.
ESET reported on BTMOB, an Android remote access trojan evolved from SpySolr, describing its distribution via phishing websites and fake app stores, abuse of Accessibility Services, and observed campaigns in Brazil and Argentina including lures impersonating Argentina’s tax and customs authorities. The report also noted the malware’s malware-as-a-service model, APK builder, and published related indicators, hashes, and defensive guidance.
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Researchers reported that **BTMob** is operating as an Android banking malware and fraud-as-a-service platform that lets multiple criminal actors create branded malicious apps and run large-scale device-takeover campaigns. Analysis of leaked source packages and exposed infrastructure linked the operation to roughly **1,400 live servers**, including command-and-control nodes, an automated APK-building ecosystem, and backend components used to manage victim infections and operator access. The platform is being spread through fake apps, cloned download pages, and social-engineering lures, including WhatsApp messages and phone calls in Brazil that pressure victims to sideload APKs and grant dangerous permissions. Investigators tied the activity to infrastructure using `/yaarsa/` PHP backend paths, HTTP and WebSocket endpoints, a control panel on port `3000` identified by the string **"painel de controle elite"**, and payloads including `lnat-tv-pro.apk`, `BTMob.exe`, `SolrStarter.exe`, and `SolrWorker.exe`, while also linking the operation to the earlier **CraxsRAT** and **SpySolr** malware families.
Aug 22, 2026
Researchers reported two **Telegram-marketed malware-as-a-service (MaaS)** offerings focused on mobile device compromise and surveillance. *ZeroDayRAT* is advertised as a subscription spyware platform claiming full monitoring of **Android and iOS** devices, with infections driven by **smishing** and other social-engineering lures that push victims to malicious links disguised as legitimate apps/updates; delivery chains reportedly use multi-stage redirects, URL shorteners, and in some cases trusted hosting such as *GitHub Pages* to evade reputation-based filtering. Once installed, the operator-facing web panel is advertised to provide extensive monitoring, including device profiling, app-usage timelines, GPS tracking, and remote activation of camera/microphone, plus screen recording and keystroke logging—capabilities consistent with credential theft and broad user surveillance. Separately, Cyble detailed ongoing development of *SURXRAT* (marketed as **SURXRAT V5**) as an Android RAT sold through a structured reseller/partner licensing model that enables affiliates to generate customized builds while the operator retains centralized control. The malware is described as a full-featured surveillance and device-control toolkit that abuses **Android Accessibility** permissions for persistent control and uses **Firebase-backed C2**; code similarities indicate lineage from **ArsinkRAT**. Recent samples were observed conditionally downloading a **large LLM module from Hugging Face**, which researchers assess as experimentation that could enable AI-assisted functionality, deliberate device performance impact, or new monetization approaches alongside established behaviors such as data exfiltration, remote command execution, and ransomware-style device locking.
Jun 29, 2026
Two newly reported Android **Remote Access Trojans (RATs)**—**SURXRAT** and **Oblivion**—highlight a continued shift toward *commercialized, subscription-based mobile malware* that enables non-expert criminals to gain full control of victim devices and exfiltrate data. Both threats are positioned as scalable offerings (i.e., **Malware-as-a-Service**) with structured sales models and distribution support, lowering the barrier to entry for surveillance, credential theft, and account takeover. The reported infection chains rely heavily on **social engineering** to trick users into installing or activating malicious components, then escalating control by abusing **Android Accessibility Services** to bypass normal interaction and security boundaries. SURXRAT is described as modular and stealth-focused, distributed primarily via **Telegram** channels with tiered licensing/reseller options, and capable of broad data access (e.g., SMS, contacts, location, storage) once high-risk permissions are granted. Oblivion is marketed at roughly **$300/month** (with longer-term pricing tiers) and is delivered via **fake Google Play update** prompts; researchers reported capabilities including SMS theft for banking codes, keylogging, remote unlocking after reboot, and covert live screen viewing while a decoy “system updating” animation distracts the victim, with infrastructure reportedly able to manage **1,000+** concurrent victims (including via Tor).
Jun 29, 2026