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Two high-severity vulnerabilities in pnpm exposed developers to supply-chain compromise through routine package installation and automatic package-manager switching. CVE-2026-55698 affects versions before 10.34.2 and 11.5.3 and allows a malicious repository to poison metadata in the first YAML document of pnpm-lock.yaml, causing direct pnpm execution to trust lockfile-selected package-manager artifacts and run attacker-chosen pnpm bytes. The vulnerable flow reached package-manager installation and execution during auto-switching, and the fix forces fresh resolution of package-manager entries from trusted registries before execution.
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11 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
A security advisory described a directory traversal and directory hijacking vulnerability in pnpm and its Rust port pacquet during headless installs with hoisted node-linker topology and an untrusted pnpm-lock.yaml. The issue allows malicious dependency alias keys from the lockfile to escape intended module paths and interfere with files or executable paths under node_modules, and the advisory says it was fixed by replacing insecure path joining with boundary-checked path handling.
A security advisory described a pnpm path traversal vulnerability in patch-remove that can be exploited to delete arbitrary files accessible to the pnpm process. The write-up highlighted elevated risk in CI/CD environments and showed a mitigation using an isSubdirectory check to keep patch file paths within the configured patches directory.
A pnpm vulnerability in the configDependencies installation flow allowed crafted dependency names or versions to abuse path construction under node_modules/.pnpm-config for path traversal and arbitrary symlink creation. The issue was remediated by adding strict validation for configuration dependency names and exact semantic versions before filesystem operations, with the fix implemented in commit 352ae489f1b14ffdc19d2c6eacb1b06b098c2ddc.
CVE-2026-55699 was published as a pnpm path traversal and arbitrary recursive deletion vulnerability in global package management operations. The issue stems from improper sanitization of package.json bin-map keys, allowing values like ".." to escape the global binary directory and be passed to fs.rmSync with recursive deletion during operations such as pnpm global remove.
CVE-2026-55700 was disclosed as a pnpm path traversal and arbitrary file write vulnerability in the `pnpm stage download` command, where crafted package manifest `name` and `version` fields from a malicious or compromised registry could cause writes outside the intended download directory. The report says versions earlier than 11.5.3 are affected and that the issue was fixed by validating package names and semantic versions and enforcing path containment checks.
The CVE record states the lockfile-based package-manager execution vulnerability was fixed in pnpm versions 10.34.2 and 11.5.3. These versions remediate the unsafe trust of env lockfile package-manager metadata.
CVE-2026-55698 was published as a high-severity remotely exploitable supply-chain vulnerability in pnpm affecting versions prior to 10.34.2 and 11.5.3. The flaw lets a malicious repository abuse package-manager bootstrap metadata in pnpm-lock.yaml to short-circuit fresh resolution and execute attacker-selected pnpm bytes during automatic version switching.
The CVE record states the transitive dependency alias path traversal issue was fixed in pnpm versions 10.34.0 and 11.4.0. These releases address the project path override via symlink replacement vulnerability.
CVE-2026-50016 was published as a high-severity remotely exploitable pnpm vulnerability affecting versions prior to 10.34.0 and 11.4.0. The issue allows malicious registry metadata in a transitive dependency alias to trigger path traversal and replace project paths with symlinks even when users run pnpm install --ignore-scripts.
A GitHub security advisory disclosed a high-severity pnpm supply-chain vulnerability in which malicious package-manager metadata in pnpm-lock.yaml could bypass fresh resolution during automatic version switching and lead to execution of attacker-selected pnpm bytes. The advisory states the patch forces re-resolution through trusted registries before installation and execution.
A GitHub security advisory described a path traversal flaw in pnpm where a malicious transitive dependency alias could escape node_modules and replace project paths with symlinks to attacker-controlled directories. The write-up included a proof of concept targeting .git/hooks to achieve delayed code execution on a later git commit.
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Security researchers reported an npm supply-chain compromise involving a malicious package, `polymarket-clob`, that targeted cryptocurrency users by exfiltrating sensitive local files (including `.env`, `wallets.json`, and `keys/*.json`) to attacker-controlled infrastructure. The package was published in the npm registry, downloaded at least 189 times (lower bound), and later removed and replaced with a security placeholder; analysis of the code and infrastructure pivoting linked the campaign to broader activity consistent with wallet-drainer operations and **Vidar** stealer-related infrastructure, including reuse of SSH fingerprints and consistent hosting patterns. Separately, researchers disclosed **six JavaScript “zero-day” bypass issues** across multiple package managers—**npm, pnpm, vlt, and Bun**—that undermine common defensive controls used to reduce supply-chain risk, including disabling lifecycle scripts and relying on lockfile integrity. The issues (dubbed **“PackageGate”**) reportedly enable paths to regain install-time code execution or weaken integrity guarantees via mechanisms such as Git dependency handling, tar extraction behaviors, and incomplete integrity coverage for URL-based tarballs; pnpm, vlt, and Bun were reported as patched, while npm characterized the behavior as “works as expected,” raising concern that package-manager-level weaknesses could enable large-scale compromise even in hardened environments.
Jun 29, 2026
Open-source software supply chain risk continued to escalate, with reporting citing **454,600+** newly identified malicious packages across major repositories (including **PyPI, npm, Maven Central, NuGet, and Hugging Face**) and tactics ranging from **credential theft** to **multi-stage attacks** and even early **self-replicating** package malware. The activity reportedly concentrated heavily in **npm**, including high-volume “ecosystem flooding” (e.g., single accounts publishing **150,000+** malicious packages in days) and **hijacking of trusted projects**, exploiting developer reliance on superficial trust signals such as package names, READMEs, and download counts. Separately, researchers disclosed **“PackageGate”** vulnerabilities in JavaScript package managers (**npm, pnpm, vlt, and Bun**) that can bypass common post-incident defenses—namely `--ignore-scripts` and lockfile integrity—enabling malicious code execution via compromised dependencies. Koi Security reported six issues; **pnpm, vlt, and Bun** shipped fixes, while **npm** reportedly treated the behavior as expected. In parallel, threat actors abused **GitHub’s fork architecture** to distribute a spoofed *GitHub Desktop* installer promoted via search ads; execution deployed **HijackLoader** and established persistence via a **scheduled task**, underscoring that supply chain threats extend beyond package registries into developer tooling distribution channels.
Jun 29, 2026
Threat actors are using **malicious npm packages** to steal developer credentials and CI/CD secrets, enabling rapid escalation into cloud environments. Google reported that **UNC6426** leveraged keys stolen during the earlier compromise of the *nx* npm ecosystem to pivot from a stolen developer GitHub token into **AWS administrative access within 72 hours**, abusing **GitHub-to-AWS OpenID Connect (OIDC) trust** to create a new admin role. The actor then used that access to **exfiltrate data from AWS S3** and conduct **destructive actions** in production cloud environments; the initial *nx* compromise involved a GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` workflow abuse (“**Pwn Request**”) that enabled publishing trojanized packages containing a `postinstall` chain that executed the **QUIETVAULT** JavaScript credential stealer and uploaded stolen data to a public GitHub repo (`/s1ngularity-repository-1`). Separately, researchers reported new waves of the **PhantomRaven** npm supply-chain campaign distributing **88 additional malicious packages** (via ~50 disposable accounts) that target JavaScript developers by exfiltrating secrets from files like `.gitconfig` and `.npmrc`, environment variables, and CI/CD tokens (e.g., GitHub/GitLab/Jenkins/CircleCI). The campaign uses **slopsquatting** (LLM-suggested lookalike package names) and a stealth technique called **Remote Dynamic Dependencies (RDD)**, where `package.json` pulls a dependency from an external URL so the malicious payload is fetched at install time (`npm install`) and can evade static package inspection; researchers indicated many of these packages remained available in the npm registry at the time of reporting.
Jun 29, 2026