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ToolJet disclosed two serious vulnerabilities affecting versions prior to 3.20.178-lts, including a critical marketplace plugin poisoning flaw tracked as CVE-2026-55413. The bug lets an authenticated user with the builder role overwrite a globally shared marketplace plugin with attacker-controlled JavaScript, which then executes server-side with full Node.js access whenever any user runs a query through the poisoned plugin. The advisory said the weakness stems from weak authorization on the plugin update path, unsafe execution with exposed require and process objects, and missing integrity checks for plugin code pulled from arbitrary GitHub repositories, creating an instance-wide supply-chain style compromise that persists until the plugin is reverted or reinstalled.
ToolJet also fixed CVE-2026-55412, a high-severity SSRF issue in the RestAPI data source for ToolJet Cloud that allowed any authenticated user, including free-tier users, to bypass private IP filtering through DNS tricks such as 169.254.169.254.nip.io. Successful exploitation could reach the Azure Instance Metadata Service and expose managed identity tokens for the production AKS cluster. ToolJet patched both issues in 3.20.178-lts and advised customers to upgrade, remove or reinstall potentially compromised marketplace plugins, review plugin integrity and source repositories, and verify RestAPI data source IP filtering.
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2 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
ToolJet addressed two vulnerabilities in version 3.20.178-lts: an SSRF issue in ToolJet Cloud's RestAPI data source that could expose Azure managed identity tokens, and a marketplace plugin poisoning flaw that enabled instance-wide remote code execution. The affected references state that versions prior to 3.20.178-lts were vulnerable and recommend upgrading and reviewing related configurations or plugin integrity.
A GitHub security advisory disclosed a critical ToolJet vulnerability in which an authenticated builder could overwrite a globally shared marketplace plugin with attacker-controlled JavaScript, leading to instance-wide server-side remote code execution. The advisory described the authorization weakness, unsafe plugin execution context, and persistence of malicious code until the plugin is reverted or reinstalled.
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Researchers disclosed multiple software supply chain attacks that abused trusted package and plugin distribution paths to steal secrets and execute attacker code. SlowMist detailed the **TrapDoor** operation, which spread through more than 34 malicious packages and 384 versions across **npm**, **PyPI**, and **Crates.io**, using `postinstall` hooks, Python import-time execution, and Rust `build.rs` scripts to harvest credentials, cloud secrets, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet files. The npm branch added encrypted exfiltration, arbitrary command execution, Git hook injection, shell persistence, and poisoning of AI-assistant context files such as `.cursorrules` and `CLAUDE.md`, while infrastructure on GitHub Pages, `raw.githubusercontent.com`, `api.github.com`, and `webhook.site` helped the traffic blend into normal developer activity. A separate SlowMist investigation found that legitimate npm package **node-ipc** was compromised through malicious releases `9.1.6`, `9.2.3`, and `12.0.1`, which appended obfuscated code to `node-ipc.cjs` and exfiltrated AWS credentials, SSH keys, environment variables, and host data over fragmented DNS queries after applications loaded the package with `require("node-ipc")`. In parallel, ToolJet disclosed a critical **instance-wide remote code execution** flaw in **ToolJet 3.x** that let any authenticated builder overwrite a globally shared marketplace plugin with attacker-controlled JavaScript, causing server-side execution whenever other users ran queries through the poisoned plugin; the advisory cited weak authorization, shared plugin records, unsafe `vm.runInNewContext()` exposure of `require` and `process`, and missing integrity checks for plugin code fetched from GitHub.
Jun 29, 2026
Attackers exploited **CVE-2026-63077**, a critical (CVSS 9.8) authentication-bypass and arbitrary-command-execution flaw affecting all JetBrains TeamCity On-Premises versions, to compromise an unpatched TeamCity server supporting JetBrains’ Cadence cloud development service. Activity at `api.cadence.jetbrains.com` ran from August 8 to August 24 and may have exposed a 2024 server backup, user data, source code, credentials, configurations, build artifacts, and logs. JetBrains confirmed compromise of several AWS IAM users and access to files in its AWS S3 buckets, while it continued investigating whether customer storage buckets were accessed. Australian authorities and CISA had already warned of active exploitation and urged organizations to identify exposed TeamCity instances, apply JetBrains updates or its security patch plugin, and remove TeamCity interfaces from direct internet exposure where possible. Public exploit support has also advanced through Metasploit module `exploit/multi/http/jetbrains_teamcity_rce_cve_2026_63077`, including improved payload selection for Java/JSP, Windows, and Linux targets. Cadence users should rotate every credential and secret handled by the service, investigate connected environments for unauthorized activity and lateral movement, and treat executions and outputs generated during the exposure period as untrusted.
Aug 28, 2026
JetBrains has patched a high-severity vulnerability in TeamCity On-Premises, tracked as **`CVE-2026-44413`**, that can allow privilege escalation and expose parts of the TeamCity server API to unauthorized users. The company said affected deployments include TeamCity On-Premises **2025.11.4 and earlier**, and advised customers to upgrade to **TeamCity 2026.1** or apply the available security patch plugin. According to JetBrains, the flaw could expose sensitive data including API tokens, Git credentials, build secrets, logs, and user information, with higher risk in environments that permit inbound connections on non-standard ports or run build agents on the same host as the TeamCity server. The issue requires access to a TeamCity account, which attackers could obtain through brute force, credential stuffing, leaked credentials, social engineering, or enabled guest access, raising the prospect of follow-on compromise of cloud infrastructure, source code repositories, and software delivery pipelines. The disclosure comes against a backdrop of repeated TeamCity security incidents, including **`CVE-2024-27198`** and **`CVE-2024-27199`**, two critical flaws that allowed unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication, take over servers, alter certificates and ports, and create supply-chain attack paths; those earlier bugs were fixed in **2023.11.4** after researchers warned they could lead to full server compromise.
Jun 29, 2026