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The FBI issued a FLASH warning that TeamPCP is carrying out large-scale software supply chain compromises by trojanizing trusted developer and security tools, including Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, and the Telnyx Python SDK. The campaign is designed to infiltrate CI/CD pipelines, cloud infrastructure, and security workflows, then steal high-value secrets such as cloud access tokens, API keys, SSH keys, and Kubernetes secrets. Reporting tied to the alert describes TeamPCP as a financially motivated group whose operations show persistence and scale more commonly associated with advanced threat actors.
Authorities and researchers said the activity is linked to malware families including CanisterWorm, SANDCLOCK, Mini Shai-Hulud, and Miasma, which were used to establish persistence, exfiltrate credentials, and spread access into downstream victim environments. The FBI said the group has also engaged in extortion, published victim names on a leak site, and collaborated with other threat actors, raising the risk that stolen credentials will be reused long after the initial compromise. Defenders were urged to rotate exposed secrets, pin GitHub Actions to verified commit SHAs, hunt for worm-created repositories, harden CI/CD environments, and review published indicators such as domains, IP addresses, hashes, and related CVEs.
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5 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Sophos confirmed at least one VECT ransomware deployment that used credentials sourced from TeamPCP's software supply-chain compromises. The report tied TeamPCP's credential-theft activity to VECT's victim selection and ransomware operations.
VMRay researchers traced a phishing and business-email-compromise-style campaign targeting the maritime shipping sector back to April 2026. The activity used RedLine and Formbook-linked infrastructure, fraudulent lookalike domains, and fake supplier personas to target organizations including Kangrim Heavy Industries.
TeamPCP carried out a campaign that trojanized legitimate developer and security packages, including Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, and the Telnyx Python SDK, to steal credentials and gain downstream access. The activity targeted CI/CD pipelines, cloud infrastructure, and security workflows, and was associated with malware families including CanisterWorm, SANDCLOCK, Mini Shai-Hulud, and Miasma.
On 2026-07-02, the FBI issued a FLASH advisory warning that TeamPCP was conducting large-scale software supply chain compromises. The notice described credential theft, persistence, extortion activity, leak-site publication of victim names, and provided indicators and mitigation guidance.
In the 48 hours after the Telnyx PyPI disclosure on 2026-03-27, no new package compromises were confirmed for the first time since operations began on March 19. The update assessed that TeamPCP was likely shifting from rapid supply-chain expansion to monetizing previously harvested credentials, while noting no additional named victims were disclosed.
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TeamPCP has expanded a multi-ecosystem software supply chain campaign that compromised open-source security and developer tools including **Trivy**, **Checkmarx KICS**, **LiteLLM**, **Telnyx**, GitHub Actions, OpenVSX extensions, Docker images, and packages published through **PyPI** and **npm**. Reporting indicates the attackers used stolen developer and publishing credentials to push malicious releases through trusted channels, harvest environment variables, shell histories, cloud credentials, and GitHub tokens, and move laterally across CI/CD environments. In the Telnyx incident, valid credentials were reportedly used to publish malicious PyPI releases, with a second-stage payload hidden in a WAV file and code triggered on import. The campaign is now being linked to follow-on ransomware activity through an alleged partnership between TeamPCP and the **Vect** ransomware group, which has been advertised on BreachForums as an emerging ransomware-as-a-service operation. Researchers say the supply chain compromises may serve as initial access for extortion campaigns against downstream organizations, with TeamPCP reportedly recruiting negotiators after the Trivy breach and previously exfiltrating roughly **300 GB** of compressed credentials; the LiteLLM compromise alone was tied to hundreds of thousands of stolen credentials. The incidents underscore how compromised open-source tooling and CI/CD infrastructure can give attackers privileged enterprise access and create a path from package poisoning to ransomware deployment.
Jul 19, 2026
A broad software supply-chain campaign attributed to **TeamPCP** compromised trusted developer and security tools, beginning with a poisoned **Trivy GitHub Action** after attackers allegedly stole a personal access token via a misconfigured `pull_request_target` workflow. Researchers said malicious commits were pushed to most Trivy action tags, allowing the attackers to steal CI/CD secrets, cloud credentials, SSH keys, Kubernetes configuration, and other sensitive data from downstream users. The campaign then spread through stolen credentials to additional projects, including **Checkmarx KICS**, **LiteLLM** versions `1.82.7` and `1.82.8` on PyPI, the **Telnyx SDK**, and later **Bitwarden CLI**, with malware exfiltrating data to attacker-controlled infrastructure such as `checkmarx[.]zone` and `models[.]litellm[.]cloud`. Reporting also tied the operation to hundreds of compromised systems and large-scale theft of `.env` files and secrets from cloud, AI, payment, database, and messaging environments. The fallout expanded beyond package poisoning into downstream intrusions and data leaks. **Checkmarx** confirmed that data later leaked by **LAPSUS$** came from its private GitHub repository and said the initial access was likely enabled by credentials exposed in the Trivy-related compromise; researchers also linked the broader campaign to **Bitwarden** through shared malware and command-and-control patterns. Malicious KICS Docker images, GitHub Actions, and editor extensions were reported to steal credentials and scan results, while Bitwarden’s CI/CD workflow was allegedly abused to expose an npm token and publish a tainted `@bitwarden/cli` release. Security researchers and vendors warned that the campaign shows how attackers are increasingly targeting open-source maintainers and security tooling as high-leverage entry points, with reported ties to extortion and ransomware groups including **LAPSUS$** and **Vect** raising the risk that stolen access will be resold or used for follow-on attacks.
Jul 4, 2026
A supply-chain attack against Aqua Security’s **Trivy** ecosystem let attackers publish malicious artifacts and hijack GitHub Action tags, turning a widely used security scanner into a credential stealer. Reporting indicates the intrusion began with abuse of a misconfigured GitHub Actions workflow and theft of privileged credentials, followed by incomplete containment that left residual access in place. Attackers then poisoned **`aquasecurity/trivy-action`** by force-updating 75 of 76 tags, compromised **`setup-trivy`**, and published a backdoored **Trivy `v0.69.4`** release; later activity also pushed malicious Docker Hub images **`0.69.5`** and **`0.69.6`**. The malware harvested GitHub tokens, cloud credentials, SSH keys, Kubernetes secrets, Docker configs, and other CI/CD data from runners and developer environments, encrypted the loot, and exfiltrated it to attacker-controlled infrastructure or fallback GitHub repositories such as **`tpcp-docs`**. Researchers and vendor advisories linked the campaign to **TeamPCP** and described it as an expanding, multi-stage operation that also included a brief OpenVSX compromise of the Trivy VS Code extension, defacement of **44** repositories in Aqua Security’s internal **`aquasec-com`** GitHub organization, and follow-on compromises affecting Checkmarx tooling and the **LiteLLM** PyPI package. Aqua removed malicious artifacts, revoked tokens, restored safe references, and said commercial products were not affected, while GitHub and public advisories identified safe versions including **Trivy `0.69.2`/`0.69.3`**, **`trivy-action` `0.35.0`**, and **`setup-trivy` `0.2.6`**. U.S. CISA added **`CVE-2026-33634`** to the KEV catalog, and incident responders warned organizations that ran affected versions to assume full pipeline compromise, rotate all accessible secrets, audit workflow logs and GitHub activity, and pin GitHub Actions to immutable commit SHAs.
Jul 19, 2026