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GitHub confirmed that an attacker accessed internal repositories after a malicious Visual Studio Code extension was installed on an employee device, leading to the exfiltration of roughly 3,800 GitHub-internal repositories. GitHub said it detected and contained the intrusion, removed the malicious extension version, and isolated the affected endpoint. Independent analysis of a leaked file list reportedly found 3,874 unique .tar.gz archive names, broadly matching GitHub’s estimate of the stolen data.
The exposed repositories reportedly include projects tied to security tooling, identity systems, CI/CD, infrastructure-as-code, GitHub Actions, Terraform, certificates, and Copilot-related work, increasing the risk of follow-on supply-chain abuse and targeted social engineering. The threat actor, using the alias TeamPCP, is said to be offering the dataset for sale on an underground forum for more than $50,000, raising concerns that internal code and operational details could be weaponized against GitHub and its customers.
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5 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
The threat actor using the alias TeamPCP was reportedly attempting to sell the stolen GitHub dataset on an underground forum for more than $50,000. The report links this sale attempt to the previously disclosed repository compromise.
GitHub assessed that approximately 3,800 internal repositories were exfiltrated in the compromise. An analyzed leaked file list reportedly contained 3,874 unique .tar.gz archive names, broadly matching GitHub’s estimate.
GitHub confirmed a security incident in which an attacker accessed internal repositories via a poisoned Visual Studio Code extension installed on an employee device. GitHub said it detected and contained the activity, removed the malicious extension version, and isolated the affected endpoint.
A separate report documents a cloud infrastructure extortion scenario involving compromised or exposed buckets being ransomed. The article focuses on how the attack unfolded and the attacker’s abuse of cloud storage resources.
A report describes an S3 bucket squatting incident in which a previously deleted bucket name was re-registered by another party, allowing control over requests to that bucket name. The write-up documents the security implications of bucket-name reuse after deletion.
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GitHub confirmed that attackers exfiltrated about **3,800 internal repositories** after compromising an employee device with a trojanized Visual Studio Code extension, later identified in multiple reports as **Nx Console `18.95.0`**. The company said the malicious extension was removed, the affected endpoint was isolated, critical secrets and credentials were rotated, and incident response, log analysis, and follow-on monitoring were launched. GitHub’s current assessment is that the intrusion was limited to **GitHub-internal repositories**, with no evidence that customer repositories, enterprise accounts, or data stored outside those repositories were broadly affected, though some internal repositories may contain limited customer-related support information. The breach was widely attributed to **TeamPCP** (also tracked as **UNC6780**), which advertised the stolen source code and internal organizational data on cybercrime forums and leak sites for **$50,000 to $95,000**, threatening to publish it if unsold. Reporting tied the compromise to the broader **TanStack** supply-chain campaign and said the poisoned extension was briefly available on Visual Studio Marketplace and OpenVSX, carrying credential-stealing malware aimed at GitHub, npm, AWS, Kubernetes, 1Password, and other developer assets. GitHub later told **GitHub Enterprise Server** administrators to rotate GPG public keys as part of signing-key rotation, while government and industry alerts urged organizations to remove the malicious extension, rotate exposed developer credentials, and scrutinize CI/CD and repository activity for follow-on abuse.
Jun 29, 2026
Datadog Security Research reported sustained campaigns abusing GitHub’s public and authenticated APIs to enumerate enterprise organizations, repositories, and users while blending into normal developer traffic. The activity relied on automated scraping through endpoints including `/graphql`, dormant “ghost” GitHub accounts, and in some cases compromised OAuth tokens or personal access tokens. Researchers identified more than 50 ghost accounts since October 2025, along with recurring user agents such as `GitHub-Company-Scraper`, `GitHub-Scraper-Tool/1.0`, `GitHubAnalytics/1.5`, `GitHub-Commit-Fetcher/1.3`, `GitHub-Commit-Fetcher/1.4`, and `GitHub-Event-Fetcher/2.2`, with some infrastructure linked to 3xK Tech. While much of the traffic queried public data and appeared benign in isolation, researchers said the aggregate behavior amounted to coordinated reconnaissance that could support later theft of secrets, repository cloning, or broader intrusion activity. In a more serious observed case, a tool identified as `repo-dumper` successfully cloned or accessed a private repository, with GitHub audit logs showing `git.clone` and `api.request` events against private paths. Defenders were urged to baseline GitHub audit activity and hunt for unusual user agents, actor names, token types, source ASNs, and successful access to private resources, while also enforcing MFA, conducting access reviews, enabling audit log streaming, and using repository secret scanning.
Jul 11, 2026
Researchers disclosed a large-scale automated supply chain attack dubbed **Megalodon** that pushed **5,718 malicious commits** into **5,561 GitHub repositories** in less than six hours, using forged CI/CD bot identities and benign-looking commit messages to slip in malicious GitHub Actions workflow files. The workflows requested elevated permissions and carried base64-encoded bash payloads that executed after maintainers merged the changes, harvesting CI/CD environment data, cloud credentials, SSH keys, Docker and Kubernetes secrets, Vault and Terraform credentials, GitHub OIDC tokens, and other source-code and developer secrets. Investigators said the stolen data was exfiltrated over HTTP POST requests to **`216.126.225[.]129:8443`**, with two workflow variants observed, including payloads labeled **SysDiag** and **Optimize-Build**. The most visible downstream impact was a compromise of the **Tiledesk** repository, where a malicious workflow change led to the publication of poisoned **`@tiledesk/tiledesk-server`** npm versions **`2.18.6`** through **`2.18.12`**. Reporting tied the activity to a broader pattern of software supply chain abuse associated with **TeamPCP**, whose earlier incidents affected major open-source and commercial projects and prompted npm to invalidate some write-capable granular access tokens that could bypass 2FA protections. Security firms urged organizations to review repositories for unauthorized workflow changes, block the identified command-and-control infrastructure, rotate exposed secrets and keys, and inspect cloud and CI logs for signs of credential theft or cloud impersonation.
Jun 29, 2026