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Investigations into multiple intrusions found Quantum ransomware operators gaining initial access through IcedID and escalating to full ransomware deployment within hours. Reporting links Quantum to the Mount Locker lineage, noting the group also operated under names including Astro Locker and Xing Locker and used a leak site known as Quantum Blog. In one case, defenders observed a progression from IcedID infection to XingLocker ransomware in roughly 24 hours, while other incidents showed the attackers moving from foothold to encryption in less than four hours.
Across the cases, the attackers followed a consistent playbook: reconnaissance with AdFind, Cobalt Strike beacons for command and control, credential theft through LSASS access, lateral movement over RDP, and ransomware deployment via WMI and PsExec. Additional activity included scheduled tasks for persistence and process injection to launch Cobalt Strike. The reporting indicates that the campaign's speed and repeated tradecraft make sequence-based detection of the full attack chain more effective than relying on isolated alerts tied to single tools or commands.
TTPs, infrastructure, and targeting history in one profile.
4 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
The DFIR Report published a separate case study focused on a Quantum ransomware intrusion, documenting the group's tactics and attack progression.
The DFIR Report published a case study covering an intrusion in which attackers used IcedID and progressed to XingLocker ransomware within 24 hours.
On 2022-07-06, Anvilogic published an analysis of two Quantum ransomware incidents, concluding that sequence-based detections of attacker behavior are more reliable than isolated alerts. The article highlighted recurring use of IcedID, Cobalt Strike, credential theft, lateral movement, and rapid ransomware deployment.
The Anvilogic analysis states that Quantum ransomware had been discovered by July 2021 and describes it as a rebranding lineage of Mount Locker that also operated as Astro Locker and Xing Locker.
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Ransomware and cyber-extortion activity rose again in Q2 2026, with industry reporting showing more than 2,250 publicly named victims across roughly 90 active groups and nearly 100 countries. GuidePoint Security’s GRIT report counted 2,279 victims, up 7% from the prior quarter and 43% year over year, while ReliaQuest recorded 2,252 victims and found the United States accounted for about 49% of observed activity. **Qilin** remained a leading force in one dataset for a fifth straight quarter, while **The Gentlemen** surged into the top tier and was ranked the most active group by ReliaQuest; **DragonForce** also remained prominent despite reported declines in some rankings. Professional, scientific, and technical services stayed the most targeted sector, and researchers noted a broader shift toward **data-only extortion** and continued pressure on organizations through public leak-site exposure. Researchers also highlighted technical changes in attacker tradecraft rather than a wholesale change in ransomware operations. The quarter saw increased use of **AI and LLMs** by threat actors, including analysis of exfiltrated databases and more tailored extortion messaging, alongside continued exploitation of high-impact vulnerabilities such as `CVE-2026-50751`, `CVE-2026-48027`, `CVE-2026-46817`, and `CVE-2026-35273`. ReliaQuest identified **Deadlock** as a notable re-emerging threat after 11 months of silence, using blockchain-hosted command-and-control through a Polygon smart contract and a **BYOVD** technique to terminate EDR tools via `CVE-2024-51324`. The reports say supply-chain compromise, remote access abuse, identity attacks, lateral movement, and defense evasion remain central to ransomware operations even as payment rates decline.
Aug 11, 2026
Mandiant reported that **DARKSIDE** operated as a ransomware-as-a-service group that combined data theft and file encryption, with affiliates conducting intrusions that moved from initial access to hands-on-keyboard post-exploitation before deploying ransomware. The group’s operations were associated with common enterprise attack tooling and tradecraft designed to blend into Windows environments, helping operators maintain access, move laterally, and prepare victim networks for extortion. The referenced techniques and detections show how that activity can appear on endpoints: adversaries may abuse trusted Microsoft utilities `Regsvcs` and `Regasm` under MITRE ATT&CK **`T1218.009`** to proxy malicious .NET code execution and evade application controls, while post-compromise activity may also surface through **Cobalt Strike** named pipes tied to Beacon, Artifact Kit, and Malleable C2 profiles. Splunk previously published analytics based on Sysmon Event IDs **17** and **18** to identify those pipe patterns, underscoring how defenders can spot the command-and-control and lateral movement behavior often seen in ransomware intrusions linked to groups such as DARKSIDE.
Aug 15, 2026
Royal ransomware emerged as a major threat after first being observed in September 2022, with intrusions linked to likely Russian-speaking cybercrime actors and possible overlap with former **Conti** members. The group has hit organizations globally, including multiple Australian victims and critical infrastructure, with a concentration of cases in the United States and Canada across healthcare, manufacturing, education, and government. Royal operators steal data before encrypting systems, then pressure victims through leak-site exposure and, in some cases, social media harassment; reported ransom demands have reached **$25 million** in bitcoin. Analysts also identified infrastructure and tooling overlaps between Royal activity, **FRwL / UAC-0118**, and earlier ex-Conti-linked operations, including shared IPs and a **Cobalt Strike** watermark associated with related campaigns. Investigations show Royal gains initial access through callback phishing, SEO poisoning, malicious downloads, phishing links sent via website contact forms, exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities, exposed **RDP**, and compromised credentials. After entry, the actors have used **BATLOADER**, **Qakbot**, **Bokbot**, **Cobalt Strike**, **PsExec**, **PowerShell**, **AdFind**, **NetScan**, **Chisel**, **Rclone**, **PCHunter**, **PowerTool**, and **Process Hacker** to move laterally, evade defenses, exfiltrate data, and deploy ransomware on Windows as well as a Linux/**ESXi** ELF variant. Royal typically encrypts local drives and network shares, appends the `.royal` extension, deletes shadow copies, disables security services, and leaves `README.txt` ransom notes with Tor-based contact instructions. Defenders are urged to prioritize **software patching**, multifactor authentication, network segmentation, traffic filtering, application allowlisting, privileged account controls, and offline encrypted backups to reduce exposure to the exploitation and credential abuse techniques seen in Royal intrusions.
Aug 15, 2026