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Researchers say DevMan, also tracked as Funky Mantis, operated a centralized ransomware-as-a-service platform with a dedicated affiliate portal for payload generation, victim management, ransom negotiation, earnings tracking, and internal coordination. PRODAFT reported the group was active from late 2025 into early 2026, used an 80/20 affiliate revenue split, and claimed 184 victims, with the heaviest concentration in the United States across technology, healthcare, financial services, professional services, and government. The operation explicitly pursued hospitals, critical infrastructure, the public sector, and law enforcement, and advertised a separate encryptor for SCADA environments, underscoring its focus on high-impact targets.
Technical reporting links DevMan’s malware to DragonForce/Conti lineage while showing the operation evolved beyond a simple variant. Earlier analysis described a DragonForce-based sample marked by the .DEVMAN extension, SMB share probing, rapid encryption, and a builder flaw that encrypted its own ransom notes; later reporting identified a Rust-based Devman Locker using ChaCha20-Poly1305, appending .devman21, dropping RESTORE_FILES.txt, mounting network shares, disabling defenses, deleting shadow copies and event logs, and inhibiting recovery. The latest portal version reportedly supports Windows, Linux, and ESXi lockers and includes features for privilege checks, lateral movement, and security-tool impairment, indicating a mature and centrally managed extortion operation.
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PRODAFT reported that Funky Mantis, also tracked as DevMan, ran a centralized ransomware-as-a-service operation active between November 2025 and January 2026. The group used a dedicated affiliate portal for victim management, access distribution, payload generation, negotiations, revenue tracking, and internal communications.
On July 21, 2026, PRODAFT published a technical report describing Funky Mantis/DevMan as a centralized RaaS operation targeting hospitals, critical infrastructure, the public sector, and law enforcement. The report detailed the Devman Locker payload, operator handles, affiliate revenue sharing, and defensive artifacts including Sigma rules and IOCs.
ANY.RUN analyzed a ransomware sample marked with the .DEVMAN extension and unique strings, concluding it was a lightly modified DragonForce/Conti variant likely enabled by DragonForce's RaaS customization model. The analysis documented behaviors including rapid file encryption, SMB share probing, and a flaw that caused ransom notes to be encrypted.
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**DragonForce**, a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation that emerged in 2023, has been linked to a growing set of intrusions targeting “critical business” environments across multiple industries, with a focus on **manufacturing, business services, technology, and construction**. Reporting attributes the group with **dual-extortion** tactics—stealing data prior to encryption and then threatening publication on a **data leak site (DLS)** to increase pressure on victims. Researchers also describe DragonForce as operationally adaptable, including changes in how it hosts and organizes leaked victim data. LevelBlue analysis cited in reporting indicates DragonForce has evolved its business approach beyond a typical affiliate program into a **“cartel” model**, allowing member groups to operate under their own brands while leveraging shared DragonForce infrastructure and services. Described offerings to affiliates include large-scale storage, continuous server monitoring, support services around file analysis/decryption, and assistance with test attacks; LevelBlue also highlighted an “**Company Data Audit**” service intended to help affiliates value stolen data and shape negotiation pressure (including prepared communications such as scripts and executive-facing letters). The group’s tooling is described as **multi-platform**, with the ability to target **Windows, Linux, ESXi, BSD, and NAS** systems and to use different encryption modes (e.g., full, header, partial), increasing potential impact across enterprise and virtualized environments.
Jun 29, 2026
Threat intelligence reporting describes **DragonForce** as a rapidly evolving ransomware operation that brands itself as a “cartel” and runs an affiliate service called *Ransombay*, offering customizable payload options and reportedly advertising an **80% revenue split** to attract pentesters and initial access brokers. Researchers assess DragonForce’s tooling as heavily derived from **LockBit 3.0** and **Conti**, and report signs of consolidation behavior, including infrastructure/code overlap with groups such as **BlackLock**, **RansomHub**, and **LockBit**; one cited incident involved DragonForce abusing a rival’s misconfiguration and a **Local File Inclusion (LFI)** weakness to obtain information including credentials, followed by defacement of the rival’s leak site. Separate industry reporting indicates ransomware victimization continued to rise sharply in 2025, with GuidePoint Security tracking a **58% year-over-year increase** and **7,515 claimed victims** across leak sites, alongside a more **fragmented** landscape (124 named groups, up 46% from 2024). The same reporting highlights concentration of victimization in the **United States (55%)** and heavy targeting of **manufacturing**, with healthcare also significantly impacted (500+ victims) and **Qilin** described as the most prolific RaaS group in 2025 with disproportionate healthcare targeting—context that aligns with the broader trend of many smaller, high-volume groups rather than a few dominant actors.
Jun 29, 2026
Ransomware operators have been observed using **bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver (BYOVD)** techniques and custom anti-security tools to shut down endpoint protections before encrypting enterprise networks. Kaspersky documented a MedusaLocker intrusion in Brazil in which attackers accessed an SMTP server over RDP with valid administrative credentials, used **Mimikatz** to extract NTLM hashes, and moved laterally with pass-the-hash via PowerShell-based WMI and SMB execution before deploying a new AV-killer tool, `All.exe`. That tool loaded a renamed **TechPowerUp `ThrottleStop.sys`** driver (`ThrottleBlood.sys`), exploited vulnerable IOCTLs for physical memory read/write, hijacked kernel execution through `NtAddAtom`, and repeatedly terminated products from Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Sophos, Symantec, Bitdefender, ESET, Avast, AVG, McAfee, Panda, Quick Heal, and Kaspersky; the driver issue was assigned **`CVE-2025-7771`**. A separate report on **The Gentlemen** ransomware described a similar pattern in enterprise attacks across the Asia-Pacific region, where the group likely gained entry through an exposed FortiGate device or stolen credentials, then conducted Active Directory reconnaissance, used **PsExec** for lateral movement, established persistence with **AnyDesk**, abused **GPO** and **NETLOGON** for domain-wide deployment, and exfiltrated data with **WinSCP** for double extortion. TrendAI said the group evolved from generic anti-AV tooling to customized variants tailored to the security products installed in each victim environment, while also disabling Windows Defender and recovery mechanisms before dropping `README-GENTLEMEN.txt` and encrypting files with the `.7mtzhh` extension. Together, the incidents show ransomware crews increasingly pairing credential abuse and lateral movement with vulnerable-driver abuse and bespoke defense evasion to maximize encryption success.
Aug 21, 2026