Skip to main content
Mallory
← Back to News
persistence-methodcredential-stealer-activitydata-exfiltration-methodphishing-campaign-intelligence

DFIR Research Highlights Windows Artifacts, Persistence Abuse, and False Positive Pitfalls

Attack Tradecraft · 17 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Jan 19, 2025

DFIR Research Highlights Windows Artifacts, Persistence Abuse, and False Positive Pitfalls

Recent DFIR reporting detailed how investigators can reconstruct attacker activity from Windows and Unix artifacts while avoiding common misreads of legitimate security tooling. Securelist published deep analyses of UserAssist and AmCache, showing how shell32.dll updates GUI execution records, how session statistics and undocumented bytes can reveal usage patterns, and why AmCache can identify executables, drivers, shortcuts, and installed applications even after deletion, despite limits such as SHA-1 hashing only the first 31,457,280 bytes of large files. Separate research showed that Zsh session files can preserve command evidence even when .zsh_history is deleted, and that binaries wrapped with shc or AutoIT often remain recoverable or observable through runtime artifacts rather than being truly opaque.

Incident write-ups and field notes also showed how attackers and defenders alike can complicate investigations. Analysts documented a typosquatted npm package, peritter, that dropped OneDrive.exe into Startup and stole Chrome credentials; an intrusion in which phishing, Slack installation, RDP access, and Google Drive traffic were tied to document staging and exfiltration; and broader cases in Brazilian educational institutions involving ransomware, valid-account abuse, AnyDesk, PsExec, and insider-planted malware. Other reports warned that legitimate tools and platform features can masquerade as threats or hide them: NSSM was used to run payloads such as ngrok as Windows services, Azure Batch was abused for cryptomining, RMM cleanup scripts attempted to conceal remote access software, and Microsoft Defender for Endpoint activity including device discovery and Defender XDR deception accounts generated telemetry that could be mistaken for attacker reconnaissance or privileged account misuse unless investigators validated the underlying configuration and scripts.

Who uses this technique?Get the actors, campaigns, and ATT&CK mapping behind it.
Get the tradecraft
Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

18 events · Jan 3, 2024 – Jul 10, 2026
  1. Reported Aug 7, 20263mo ago

    SANS detailed Atuin shell history artifacts for Linux forensics

    A SANS ISC diary explained how the Atuin shell history tool stores command history in a SQLite database and identified key forensic artifacts including history.db, WAL/SHM files, encryption keys, session tokens, and configuration files. The write-up also noted soft-deleted records, sync-related cross-host history, and logging gaps investigators must account for.

    Linux Shell Forensic: Let?s Dive Into Atuin! - SANS ISC
  2. Reported Aug 3, 20264mo ago

    Insider planted Python keylogger in education-sector case

    One of the Brazilian educational-institution case studies involved an insider planting a Python keylogger on a system that used shared accounts. The article presented this as part of the broader pattern of insider threats observed in the dataset.

    An analysis of incidents at Brazilian educational institutions - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and Indicators
  3. Reported Aug 3, 20264mo ago

    DragonForce was deployed via AnyDesk after account compromise

    Another case in the Brazilian education-sector dataset involved attackers using a compromised user account to install AnyDesk and deploy DragonForce ransomware. Investigators identified the DragonForce sample through Prefetch and Amcache.hve artifacts and matched the SHA-1 of 1.EXE to a DragonForce variant.

    An analysis of incidents at Brazilian educational institutions - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and Indicators
  4. Reported Aug 3, 20264mo ago

    LockBit attackers used leaked builder and PsExec in education-sector case

    In one case from the Brazilian education-sector dataset, attackers used a leaked valid account to deploy a custom LockBit variant, disabled defenses with a batch script, enabled RDP, and used PsExec for lateral movement. Internal systems including file servers and databases storing student profiles were encrypted, and investigators found no evidence of data exfiltration.

    An analysis of incidents at Brazilian educational institutions - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and Indicators
  5. Jul 10, 20264mo ago

    Hayabusa detected Sliver C2 activity in Windows lab simulation

    In a controlled Windows 10 lab, Hayabusa analysis of Security.evtx identified Sliver implant activity along with attacker commands including whoami /all and net.exe user creation for persistence. The article also reports Windows Defender detected the delivered implant GASTRIC_EPOXY.exe as Trojan:Win32/Gracing.I during the simulation.

    Windows DFIR: ловим Silver в логах с помощью Hayabusa
  6. Jan 19, 20252y ago

    Peritter malware copied and executed OneDrive.exe from Startup folder

    Analysis showed the package's obfuscated index.js copied dataset.db into the user's Startup folder as OneDrive.exe for persistence and execution. MFT and Prefetch artifacts placed the malicious execution shortly after installation.

    Blue Team Labs Online - Insidious Writeup - Slapdash Safeguards
  7. Jan 19, 20252y ago

    Malicious npm package peritter was installed on victim host

    MFT analysis indicated the peritter package was downloaded or installed on the system. Package metadata identified the author as s1rx-dev, and analysis later showed the package contained an obfuscated index.js and a malicious payload in dataset.db.

    Blue Team Labs Online - Insidious Writeup - Slapdash Safeguards
  8. Jan 19, 20252y ago

    Victim visited malicious npm package page for peritter

    Chrome history showed the user visited the npmjs.com page for the package peritter, a likely typosquat of prettier. This browsing event preceded installation of the malicious package on the compromised host.

    Blue Team Labs Online - Insidious Writeup - Slapdash Safeguards
  9. Jan 2025

    Brazilian education-sector incidents spanned ransomware and insider cases

    The analyzed incident-response dataset covered attacks against Brazilian educational institutions from January 2025 through June 2026. It included ransomware, suspicious endpoint activity, privilege escalation, and insider threats, with DragonForce and LockBit 3 appearing prominently.

    An analysis of incidents at Brazilian educational institutions - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and Indicators
  10. Nov 5, 20242y ago

    Project Venus files were staged during Cerulean RDP session

    Windows Defender MPLog entries recorded four Project Venus-related documents being placed in Jane's Downloads folder during the attacker-linked RDP session. The files were Energy Storage.txt, Research.txt, Solar Panel Tech.txt, and Wind Turbine Design.txt, indicating staging or exfiltration activity.

    Blue Team Labs Online - Cerulean Writeup - Slapdash Safeguards
  11. Nov 5, 20242y ago

    Attacker initiated RDP session to Cerulean employee workstation

    Magnet AXIOM RDP artifacts showed an incoming RDP connection from 104.203.174.169 to Jane Andrada's workstation. The write-up tied this session to the attacker activity that followed the phishing compromise.

    Blue Team Labs Online - Cerulean Writeup - Slapdash Safeguards
  12. Nov 5, 20242y ago

    Cerulean employee opened phishing email impersonating IT Support

    Jane Andrada received and opened a malicious email masquerading as IT Support, as shown by Chrome web history and Chrome Web Visits artifacts. This phishing event preceded the attacker-controlled remote access and suspected data theft.

    Blue Team Labs Online - Cerulean Writeup - Slapdash Safeguards
  13. Nov 5, 20242y ago

    Slack was installed on Cerulean employee workstation

    Artifacts showed Slack was installed on Jane Andrada's machine despite the organization primarily using Microsoft Teams. The installation became part of the reconstructed intrusion timeline tied to later attacker activity.

    Blue Team Labs Online - Cerulean Writeup - Slapdash Safeguards
  14. May 16, 20243y ago

    Zsh session artifact example showed restored terminal timestamp

    An example .session file in Zsh contained a restored-session timestamp corresponding to Thu May 16 2024 09:47:05 UTC. The article highlighted this as useful forensic evidence for narrowing when commands were executed, even if .zsh_history is deleted.

    Today I Learned - Zsh Sessions (even more Timestamps) | dfir.ch
  15. Reported May 10, 20243y ago

    Open directory cleanup script was analyzed for hiding RMM traces

    A PowerShell cleaner script downloaded from an open directory was found to hide AteraAgent and Splashtop Streamer by setting uninstall entries' SystemComponent value, deleting Start Menu folders, and renaming a Splashtop firewall rule to resemble a benign Windows rule. Testing confirmed it removed Splashtop from Apps & features while leaving other forensic artifacts behind.

    Removing Traces of RMM Tools | dfir.ch
  16. Apr 19, 20243y ago

    Defender device discovery scanning expired in analyzed case

    Decoded Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Device discovery parameters included an ExpirationDateTime of 2024-04-19T01:26:02.1473403Z for the scan job. The investigation concluded the observed port-scan-like behavior was legitimate Defender discovery rather than attacker reconnaissance.

    Today I Learned - Device Discovery | dfir.ch
  17. Reported Mar 15, 20243y ago

    Azure Batch attacker built cryptomining environment in compromised tenant

    An attacker who had obtained access to an Azure administrator account created a new resource group and the Azure Batch account websecv1, then sought a quota increase so compute pools could be launched for mining activity. The attacker later created a Linux Ubuntu pool that used a Start Task to download and run a script that installed Docker and launched the ubtssl/webappx container running the xm miner.

    Azure Batch Misused for Crypto Mining | dfir.ch
  18. Jan 3, 20243y ago

    Mining container image used in Azure abuse was built

    Metadata from the analyzed Docker image showed the ubtssl/webappx image used in the Azure Batch cryptomining setup was created on 2024-01-03T06:31:11.0826861Z. The image later ran a Python HTTP server and the xm cryptocurrency miner with configured pool and wallet parameters.

    Azure Batch Misused for Crypto Mining | dfir.ch
Linked entities

Related entities

Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, breaches, and observables Mallory has linked to this story. Indicator values are masked here and available in full in the app.

Open in app →

Threat actors

1 linked

Malware

3 linked

Affected products

7 linked
Remote Desktop ProtocolWindows Server 2016AnydeskAzure BatchGoogle DriveMicrosoft Defender For EndpointMicrosoft Defender

Organizations

6 linked
Microsoft CorporationAteraSplashtopSimpleLAPS-GUICerulean Inc.Educational institutions in Brazil

Breaches

1 linked
CERULEANINC-2024-11

Observables

17 linked

Indicator values are masked on this page. View all 17 in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.

Do you run this?Get the adversaries, campaigns, and ATT&CK mapping behind this technique, with detections ready to deploy.
See Who Uses This Technique
Mallory platform

See the full picture, correlated to your attack surface.

This page covers what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which threat actors are using it right now, and what to deploy next.

Exposure mappingMap indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Threat actor evidenceEvery observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Associated malwareMalware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Scheduled alertsGet matching new stories delivered to your team as they break, not the next morning.
AI threadsAsk questions about this story and take action on the answers.