Skip to main content
Mallory
← Back to News
persistence-methodremote-access-implantdefense-evasion-methodcommand-and-control-method

DFIR Research Exposes Stealthy Persistence and Remote Access Tradecraft Across Windows, Linux, and AWS

Attack Tradecraft · 11 sources · Updated 4mo ago · First seen Jun 4, 2026

DFIR Research Exposes Stealthy Persistence and Remote Access Tradecraft Across Windows, Linux, and AWS

A series of DFIR case studies documented how attackers are increasingly relying on living-off-the-land techniques, uncommon runtimes, and legitimate administration tools to maintain access while evading detection. On Windows, investigators dissected a PHP backdoor that used php-win.exe, a scheduled task named ClockLauncher, and a ClockSystemService service to fetch and execute second-stage code invisibly; a separate intrusion used mailbombing and Microsoft Teams vishing to deliver a modular Deno-based RAT and proxy that persisted via the HKCU\Run key and communicated over WebSocket infrastructure hosted behind CloudFront. Another investigation traced a malicious .lnk file to a WebDAV-hosted Remcos payload cached under TfsStore\Tfs_DAV, while repeated compromises of a vulnerable Kentico CMS server led to webshell deployment, SEO spam, PowerShell-based payload retrieval, and installation of a malicious IIS module, HTTPCacheLog, that accepted commands through HTTP cookies.

On Linux and cloud infrastructure, researchers showed how attackers abused both commodity malware and stealthier post-exploitation tooling. TeamTNT-linked activity used tmate as a covert backdoor on Linux servers, often without normal login traces, while analysis of the REPTILE 2.0 rootkit loader showed it bypassing insmod by decrypting an embedded kernel module and loading it directly with the init_module syscall. A separate Sysrv botnet infection established cron persistence, masqueraded as kthreaddk, and included exploitation and brute-force features for propagation. In AWS, an extortion actor deleted S3 buckets and supplied a fake Linux “recovery” binary that merely simulated restoration rather than recovering cloud data. Across the investigations, defenders were urged to hunt for recurring artifacts such as scheduled tasks, Run keys, suspicious services, unusual binaries in user-writable paths, outbound SSH or WebSocket traffic, and syscall-level module loading, using telemetry and tools including Velociraptor, AutoRuns, Sysmon, and CloudTrail.

Who uses this technique?Get the actors, campaigns, and ATT&CK mapping behind it.
Get the tradecraft
Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

30 events · Apr 2022 – Jun 4, 2026
  1. Reported Jun 15, 20265mo ago

    Detection occurs during follow-on reconnaissance

    The article states that endpoint protection did not initially block the implant or its C2 traffic, and that detection happened later during reconnaissance involving LDAP queries and certificate-related activity.

    Anatomy of a Deno-Based Proxy & RAT | dfir.ch
  2. Reported Jun 15, 20265mo ago

    Deno RAT establishes persistence and CloudFront C2

    The malware launched deno.exe via conhost.exe --headless, added a Deno_AutoRun value under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and maintained a WebSocket C2 connection to d2cff16eusb8mg.cloudfront[.]net.

    Anatomy of a Deno-Based Proxy & RAT | dfir.ch
  3. Reported Jun 15, 20265mo ago

    Employee runs malicious Deno archive from fake portal

    One employee answered the vishing call and was convinced to download patch09913.b from a fake self-service portal, extract it into AppData\Roaming\DenoJSEnv, and execute the payload.

    Anatomy of a Deno-Based Proxy & RAT | dfir.ch
  4. Reported Jun 15, 20265mo ago

    Mailbombing and Teams vishing start Deno intrusion

    The Deno-based intrusion began with a high-volume mailbombing campaign against three employees, followed by Microsoft Teams calls from an external account impersonating internal IT support.

    Anatomy of a Deno-Based Proxy & RAT | dfir.ch
  5. Jun 4, 20266mo ago

    Deno malware opens loopback listener on port 10022

    Microsoft Defender telemetry recorded deno.exe creating a listening connection on 127.0.0.1:10022, corresponding to the malware's local TCP proxy and pivoting component.

    Anatomy of a Deno-Based Proxy & RAT | dfir.ch
  6. Reported Nov 16, 20251y ago

    Analyst observes no alert from at least one EDR

    The author reported that at least one tested EDR did not generate an alert for the PHP backdoor execution chain or the Bluetrait agent installation.

    Dissection of a PHP Backdoor leveraging php-win.exe | dfir.ch
  7. Reported Nov 16, 20251y ago

    Lab test shows PHP backdoor can deploy Bluetrait

    In lab testing, the author used the PHP backdoor to silently download and install a Bluetrait agent via MSI, which checked in successfully within seconds.

    Dissection of a PHP Backdoor leveraging php-win.exe | dfir.ch
  8. Reported Nov 16, 20251y ago

    Second persistence mechanism found as Windows service

    Responders also found a Windows service named ClockSystemService configured to run as LocalSystem, providing an additional persistence mechanism for the PHP backdoor.

    Dissection of a PHP Backdoor leveraging php-win.exe | dfir.ch
  9. Reported Nov 16, 20251y ago

    Analysts dissect php-win.exe PHP backdoor

    Investigation showed ClockLauncher launched php-win.exe from a temporary directory to run 5.php, a backdoor that polled a cutt.ly URL, decoded a second-stage URL from redirect headers, fetched remote PHP, and executed it with eval.

    Dissection of a PHP Backdoor leveraging php-win.exe | dfir.ch
  10. Reported Nov 16, 20251y ago

    Investigators find ClockLauncher persistence during IR

    During an incident response engagement, investigators identified an unusual scheduled task named ClockLauncher in AutoRuns data from servers and workstations.

    Dissection of a PHP Backdoor leveraging php-win.exe | dfir.ch
  11. Reported Nov 10, 20242y ago

    Mandiant reports UNC3886 using custom REPTILE launcher

    The REPTILE analysis cites Mandiant's observation that UNC3886 used a custom REPTILE launcher updated with a daemonization function.

    Reptile's Custom Kernel-Module Launcher | dfir.ch
  12. Reported Aug 8, 20242y ago

    Analysts trace WebDAV-delivered Remcos payload

    Analysis of schedule.lnk showed it would retrieve Erlianaw.exe from a remote WebDAV share, and the cached executable observed in TfsStore\Tfs_DAV matched a VirusTotal sample identified as Remcos.

    Today I Learned - WebDAV Cache | dfir.ch
  13. Reported Aug 8, 20242y ago

    Open WebDAV directory exposes malicious LNK

    An open directory at 216.9.224.58:5555 was found hosting malware-related files including a malicious shortcut named schedule.lnk.

    Today I Learned - WebDAV Cache | dfir.ch
  14. Reported Apr 14, 20243y ago

    Investigators identify Sysrv botnet malware

    Analysis of the 41hs1z sample identified it as part of the Sysrv botnet, with persistence via cron, randomized execution paths, and a config.json pointing to 194.38.23.2:8080.

    Sysrv Infection (Linux Edition) | dfir.ch
  15. Reported Apr 14, 20243y ago

    Customer incident starts after Linux miner alert

    A customer incident response case began when EDR detected a crypto miner on a Linux endpoint, leading to analysis of a malicious file named 41hs1z.

    Sysrv Infection (Linux Edition) | dfir.ch
  16. Reported Mar 6, 20243y ago

    Investigators find additional Kentico webshells

    During the follow-on Kentico investigation, responders discovered additional webshells on the server, including WebPartZone.ashx.

    Two in a row - You mitigated wrong (Kentico CMS RCE) | dfir.ch
  17. Reported Mar 6, 20243y ago

    Malicious HTTPCacheLog IIS module installed

    The downloaded dll.bat fetched HTTPCacheLog.dll from 216.83.45.170:90 and installed it as an IIS module named HTTPCacheLog, which hooked BeginRequest and accepted commands via HTTP cookies.

    Two in a row - You mitigated wrong (Kentico CMS RCE) | dfir.ch
  18. Reported Mar 6, 20243y ago

    Attackers use w3wp.exe to launch PowerShell

    PowerShell and Sysmon logs showed w3wp.exe spawning cmd.exe and a base64-encoded PowerShell command as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM to download dll.bat from 216.83.45.170:90.

    Two in a row - You mitigated wrong (Kentico CMS RCE) | dfir.ch
  19. Reported Mar 6, 20243y ago

    Customer reports renewed compromise five months later

    Five months after the first Kentico incident, the customer reported new issues on the same server and hosted websites, indicating the environment had been compromised again.

    Two in a row - You mitigated wrong (Kentico CMS RCE) | dfir.ch
  20. Reported Mar 6, 20243y ago

    Customer applies partial Kentico mitigation

    After the initial compromise, the customer added a rewrite rule to block .asmx access except from approved source ranges, but the mitigation was implemented only after attackers had already gained access.

    Two in a row - You mitigated wrong (Kentico CMS RCE) | dfir.ch
  21. Reported Mar 6, 20243y ago

    Investigators identify Kentico CMS compromise

    Investigators found evidence including PrintNotifyPotato.exe, malicious rewrite rules, attacker-modified ASPX files, and SEO-spam behavior, and determined the server's Kentico CMS installation was vulnerable to remote code execution via /CMSPages/Staging/SyncServer.asmx.

    Two in a row - You mitigated wrong (Kentico CMS RCE) | dfir.ch
  22. Reported Mar 6, 20243y ago

    Swiss NCSC warns customer about infected domain

    The National Cybersecurity Center of Switzerland notified the customer that a domain in the customer's IP range was infected, adding evidence of compromise on the Kentico-hosting server.

    Two in a row - You mitigated wrong (Kentico CMS RCE) | dfir.ch
  23. Reported Mar 6, 20243y ago

    Customer reports recurring w3wp.exe crashes

    A customer reported sporadic crashes of the IIS worker process w3wp.exe on a server hosting Kentico CMS sites, prompting forensic investigation.

    Two in a row - You mitigated wrong (Kentico CMS RCE) | dfir.ch
  24. Reported Feb 21, 20243y ago

    Customer reports AWS S3 extortion incident

    A customer reported that an attacker had deleted several AWS S3 buckets, claimed to have downloaded data, and left a ransom note with a supposed recovery archive.

    AWS Ransomware | dfir.ch
  25. Feb 5, 20243y ago

    Attacker deletes victim's S3 buckets

    On February 5, 2024, the attacker used the DeleteBucket API to erase all buckets after querying multiple S3 configuration settings such as versioning and object lock.

    AWS Ransomware | dfir.ch
  26. Feb 2, 20243y ago

    Fake AWS recovery binary uploaded to VirusTotal

    The purported Linux recovery binary supplied by the AWS extortionist was first uploaded to VirusTotal on February 2, 2024.

    AWS Ransomware | dfir.ch
  27. Jan 29, 20243y ago

    Ransom-note variant uploaded to VirusTotal

    A second version of the AWS ransom note, without the recovery component, was first submitted to VirusTotal from France on January 29, 2024.

    AWS Ransomware | dfir.ch
  28. Jan 18, 20243y ago

    Attacker begins AWS reconnaissance

    CloudTrail logs tied the start of the AWS extortion activity to reconnaissance on Amazon SES and S3 beginning on January 18, 2024.

    AWS Ransomware | dfir.ch
  29. Dec 2022

    govcert.ch malware analysis period ends

    The observation window for the govcert.ch malware-family analysis ran through December 2022, forming the basis for the article's eight recurring hunting artifacts.

    N-IOCs to Rule Them All | dfir.ch
  30. Apr 2022

    govcert.ch malware analysis period begins

    The defensive analysis referenced in the article covers the top ten malware families observed in Switzerland by govcert.ch starting in April 2022, focusing on endpoint artifacts left by second-stage malware.

    N-IOCs to Rule Them All | dfir.ch
Linked entities

Related entities

Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, breaches, and observables Mallory has linked to this story. Indicator values are masked here and available in full in the app.

Open in app →

Threat actors

2 linked

Malware

3 linked

Affected products

5 linked
PhpInternet Information ServicesKentico CmsAmazon Simple Storage ServicePowershell

Organizations

3 linked
TmateAmazon Web ServicesKentico Software

Observables

34 linked

Indicator values are masked on this page. View all 34 in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.

Do you run this?Get the adversaries, campaigns, and ATT&CK mapping behind this technique, with detections ready to deploy.
See Who Uses This Technique
Mallory platform

See the full picture, correlated to your attack surface.

This page covers what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which threat actors are using it right now, and what to deploy next.

Exposure mappingMap indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Threat actor evidenceEvery observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Associated malwareMalware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Scheduled alertsGet matching new stories delivered to your team as they break, not the next morning.
AI threadsAsk questions about this story and take action on the answers.