Maze Ransomware Affiliate Used Custom Loader and Broad Post-Compromise Tooling
Threat Actor Intelligence · 7 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Mar 22, 2024

SentinelLabs profiled a Maze ransomware affiliate tracked as SNOW, detailing how the actor gained access mainly through exposed RDP services and SMB exploitation before deploying a custom Maze loader commonly called DllCrypt alongside tools including Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, and Mimikatz. Reverse engineering showed the loader used Sosemanuk encryption with hardcoded keying material to decrypt an in-memory loader and the final Maze payload, and included an AhnLab-themed killswitch file check. The investigation also linked the affiliate to wider eCrime activity through overlaps with Zloader, Gozi, and TrickBot, including shared certificates, crypter traits, and infrastructure patterns.
Mandiant’s reporting shows those findings fit Maze’s broader operating model as an affiliate-driven ransomware enterprise that shifted from early spam and exploit-kit delivery to post-compromise deployment, enabling network-wide encryption and double extortion through stolen-data leaks. Across incidents, Maze operators used credential theft, Active Directory reconnaissance, lateral movement over Cobalt Strike BEACON and RDP, and exfiltration through FTP, WinSCP, and cloud storage, while often dwelling in victim environments for weeks or months before encrypting high-value systems. The combined reporting depicts a patient, multi-stage intrusion model in which specialized actors obtained access, escalated privileges, mapped enterprise networks, stole data, and then launched Maze ransomware at scale.


