Maze and Ragnar Locker advanced double-extortion with VM-based encryption
Threat Actor Intelligence · 12 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Nov 1, 2020

Maze and Ragnar Locker were reported using increasingly sophisticated double-extortion tactics that combined data theft, public leak threats, and defense evasion during ransomware intrusions. Maze operators were linked to incidents including the attack on Cognizant and the publication of 2GB of allegedly stolen files from the City of Pensacola, underscoring that victims faced both operational disruption and potential data-breach exposure. Reporting also tied Maze to intrusion activity using exposed RDP, signed Cobalt Strike payloads, ngrok tunneling, remote execution with mshta, and tailored persistence mechanisms, with one investigated intrusion stopped before encryption was launched.
A key technical shift was the adoption of virtual-machine-based encryption to bypass endpoint defenses. In a Sophos-investigated case, Maze failed twice after security software blocked ransomware launched through scheduled tasks, then succeeded in deploying an MSI package that installed VirtualBox and a customized Windows 7 VM, mounted host drives, and encrypted files from inside the guest system. That approach mirrored Ragnar Locker, which had already used a smaller Windows XP VirtualBox image to make encryption appear to come from a trusted process while continuing its broader playbook of RDP-driven access, lateral movement, shadow-copy deletion, service termination, and Salsa20 plus RSA-2048 encryption backed by leak-site extortion.


