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Sophos reported that the Dharma ransomware operation, also known as CrySis, continues to profit as a ransomware-as-a-service scheme by targeting small and medium-sized businesses through high-volume intrusions. Investigators said many attacks begin with compromised or poorly secured Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access, often using stolen credentials purchased on criminal forums, before affiliates move deeper into victim networks and deploy the ransomware payload.
The operation relies on a standardized affiliate toolkit built around a menu-driven PowerShell script, toolbelt.ps1, that automates much of the attack chain for low-skill operators. Sophos said the toolkit combines Windows utilities, legitimate freeware, public exploits, and custom scripts for credential theft with Mimikatz, reconnaissance, Active Directory discovery, lateral movement, antivirus disruption, Tor-based communications, and final encryption, while a two-stage decryption process keeps affiliates dependent on core operators for key retrieval and victim support.
TTPs, infrastructure, and targeting history in one profile.
5 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
A Dharma ransomware variant discovered in March 2021 was reported to append the ".biden" extension to encrypted files. The reference describes this as part of the long-running Dharma/CrySiS ransomware-as-a-service family.
According to statistics cited from Coveware in the report, Dharma ransom demands averaged $8,620 in December 2019, illustrating the group's lower-demand, high-volume business model.
The report states that Dharma ransomware, also known as CrySis, was first spotted in 2016 and went on to become a long-running ransomware threat.
SophosLabs and Sophos MTR documented three recent Dharma intrusions that revealed a common affiliate toolkit centered on the menu-driven PowerShell script toolbelt.ps1.
The report says a source code package for one Dharma variant was offered for sale on Russian-language criminal forums through an intermediary for $2,000 in March.
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Multiple incident reports show attackers repeatedly using exposed or weakly protected **Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)** as both an entry point and an internal movement channel. In one intrusion, an actor brute-forced a local administrator account over RDP, created additional access, used **Mimikatz** to dump credentials and Kerberos tickets, and moved across systems before deploying an **XMRig**-based Monero miner. Separate reporting on **Conti** and other hands-on-keyboard operations shows similar post-compromise tradecraft, including credential theft, reconnaissance, use of remote management utilities, and abuse of legitimate Windows administration features to avoid dropping obvious backdoors. Ransomware and espionage cases show the same pattern extending to interactive remote-control tooling beyond standard RDP. ASEC reported **Crysis/Dharma** and **Venus** ransomware actors brute-forcing RDP, stealing credentials, terminating processes, deleting shadow copies, and encrypting systems, sometimes retrying with a second ransomware family after a failed first attempt. North Korea-linked **Kimsuky** has also used **RDP Wrapper**, patched Terminal Services, **VNC**, **Chrome Remote Desktop**, **Ngrok**, and malware such as **AppleSeed**, **Amadey**, and **RftRAT** to maintain GUI-based access, evade user awareness, and support keylogging, file theft, and persistent control of compromised hosts.
Aug 14, 2026
Ransomware operators have been observed using **bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver (BYOVD)** techniques and custom anti-security tools to shut down endpoint protections before encrypting enterprise networks. Kaspersky documented a MedusaLocker intrusion in Brazil in which attackers accessed an SMTP server over RDP with valid administrative credentials, used **Mimikatz** to extract NTLM hashes, and moved laterally with pass-the-hash via PowerShell-based WMI and SMB execution before deploying a new AV-killer tool, `All.exe`. That tool loaded a renamed **TechPowerUp `ThrottleStop.sys`** driver (`ThrottleBlood.sys`), exploited vulnerable IOCTLs for physical memory read/write, hijacked kernel execution through `NtAddAtom`, and repeatedly terminated products from Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Sophos, Symantec, Bitdefender, ESET, Avast, AVG, McAfee, Panda, Quick Heal, and Kaspersky; the driver issue was assigned **`CVE-2025-7771`**. A separate report on **The Gentlemen** ransomware described a similar pattern in enterprise attacks across the Asia-Pacific region, where the group likely gained entry through an exposed FortiGate device or stolen credentials, then conducted Active Directory reconnaissance, used **PsExec** for lateral movement, established persistence with **AnyDesk**, abused **GPO** and **NETLOGON** for domain-wide deployment, and exfiltrated data with **WinSCP** for double extortion. TrendAI said the group evolved from generic anti-AV tooling to customized variants tailored to the security products installed in each victim environment, while also disabling Windows Defender and recovery mechanisms before dropping `README-GENTLEMEN.txt` and encrypting files with the `.7mtzhh` extension. Together, the incidents show ransomware crews increasingly pairing credential abuse and lateral movement with vulnerable-driver abuse and bespoke defense evasion to maximize encryption success.
Aug 21, 2026
Play/PlayCrypt ransomware operators have used a repeatable double-extortion workflow beginning with compromised administrator credentials and RDP access. In two examined intrusions, the actors manually identified valuable data, archived it with WinRAR using the distinctive `-ep1 -scul -r0` options, and exfiltrated it through WinSCP. One operation was disrupted before encryption but continued data theft after defenders disabled an account; another reached encryption on more than 15 systems within roughly six hours, using PsExec to deploy distinct ransomware payloads from `C:\Users\Public\Music\`, disabling Windows protections, and deleting shadow copies. The group, active since 2022 and responsible for roughly 900 known victim entities as of May 2025, also gains entry through exposed applications, including FortiOS, Microsoft Exchange ProxyNotShell, and activity associated with SimpleHelp `CVE-2024-57727`. Its tooling includes Grixba for domain-wide discovery and inventory of security, backup, and remote-management products, plus a custom VSS utility that copies locked files from shadow snapshots before encryption. Defenders should prioritize MFA and rapid remediation of internet-facing vulnerabilities, while monitoring for the WinRAR command-line pattern, WinSCP transfers, Defender exclusions, random service creation, PsExec activity, and executable writes under the Public Music directory; offline immutable backups and network segmentation remain essential to limit impact.
Sep 20, 2026