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Attackers Abuse RDP and Remote Access Tools for Intrusions and Ransomware

Attack Tradecraft · 9 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Aug 14, 2026

Attackers Abuse RDP and Remote Access Tools for Intrusions and Ransomware

Multiple incident reports show attackers repeatedly using exposed or weakly protected Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as both an entry point and an internal movement channel. In one intrusion, an actor brute-forced a local administrator account over RDP, created additional access, used Mimikatz to dump credentials and Kerberos tickets, and moved across systems before deploying an XMRig-based Monero miner. Separate reporting on Conti and other hands-on-keyboard operations shows similar post-compromise tradecraft, including credential theft, reconnaissance, use of remote management utilities, and abuse of legitimate Windows administration features to avoid dropping obvious backdoors.

Ransomware and espionage cases show the same pattern extending to interactive remote-control tooling beyond standard RDP. ASEC reported Crysis/Dharma and Venus ransomware actors brute-forcing RDP, stealing credentials, terminating processes, deleting shadow copies, and encrypting systems, sometimes retrying with a second ransomware family after a failed first attempt. North Korea-linked Kimsuky has also used RDP Wrapper, patched Terminal Services, VNC, Chrome Remote Desktop, Ngrok, and malware such as AppleSeed, Amadey, and RftRAT to maintain GUI-based access, evade user awareness, and support keylogging, file theft, and persistent control of compromised hosts.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

28 events · 2016 – 2023
  1. Reported Nov 30, 20233y ago

    Post-compromise Kimsuky uses RDP or Chrome Remote Desktop

    After gaining control of systems, Kimsuky used RDP or installed Chrome Remote Desktop to exfiltrate information and maintain remote access.

    Kimsuky Group Uses AutoIt to Create Malware (RftRAT, Amadey) - ASEC
  2. Reported Nov 30, 20233y ago

    Kimsuky adopts AutoIt-wrapped Amadey and RftRAT

    ASEC says recent Kimsuky variants of Amadey and RftRAT were created with or wrapped by AutoIt to hinder analysis and evade security products.

    Kimsuky Group Uses AutoIt to Create Malware (RftRAT, Amadey) - ASEC
  3. Reported Jun 28, 20233y ago

    Attackers install Chrome Remote Desktop host with preset PIN

    The attackers downloaded chromeremotedesktophost.msi and a batch script that ran remoting_start_host.exe with an attacker-generated authorization code and the PIN 230625.

    크롬 원격 데스크톱을 악용하는 Kimsuky 공격 그룹 - ASEC
  4. Reported Jun 28, 20233y ago

    AppleSeed installs infostealer, RDP patcher, and Ngrok

    ASEC says AppleSeed was used to deploy additional tooling including a browser credential stealer, an x64 RDP patcher for multiple sessions, and Ngrok for exposing systems behind NAT.

    크롬 원격 데스크톱을 악용하는 Kimsuky 공격 그룹 - ASEC
  5. Reported Jun 28, 20233y ago

    Kimsuky phishing chain drops AppleSeed via script loaders

    In the observed campaign, spear-phishing attachments disguised as Hangul, Office, or CHM files launched WSF or JS droppers that decoded and executed the AppleSeed backdoor.

    크롬 원격 데스크톱을 악용하는 Kimsuky 공격 그룹 - ASEC
  6. Reported Jun 28, 20233y ago

    Kimsuky abuses Chrome Remote Desktop for remote control

    ASEC reported that Kimsuky recently began abusing Chrome Remote Desktop to maintain browser-based graphical access to compromised systems.

    크롬 원격 데스크톱을 악용하는 Kimsuky 공격 그룹 - ASEC
  7. Reported Jun 22, 20233y ago

    Actor uses Mimikatz, NirSoft tools, and RDP lateral movement

    ASEC says the ransomware operator installed Mimikatz and multiple NirSoft utilities for credential theft and reconnaissance, then used collected credentials and RDP to move to other internal systems.

    Crysis Threat Actor Installing Venus Ransomware Through RDP - ASEC
  8. Reported Jun 22, 20233y ago

    Failed Crysis encryption is followed by Venus retry

    In previously identified attacks, the actor first attempted to encrypt systems with Crysis and, when that failed, retried encryption using Venus.

    Crysis Threat Actor Installing Venus Ransomware Through RDP - ASEC
  9. Reported Jun 22, 20233y ago

    RDP brute-force compromises lead to Crysis and Venus deployment

    According to ASEC, the actor used brute-force or dictionary attacks against weak RDP credentials, then logged in and installed both Crysis and Venus ransomware on victim systems.

    Crysis Threat Actor Installing Venus Ransomware Through RDP - ASEC
  10. Reported Jun 22, 20233y ago

    ASEC links Crysis-associated actor to Venus ransomware attacks

    ASEC discovered that a threat actor associated with Crysis ransomware was also deploying Venus ransomware in attacks that started through externally exposed RDP services.

    Crysis Threat Actor Installing Venus Ransomware Through RDP - ASEC
  11. 2023

    Kimsuky delivers XRat, Amadey, and RftRAT via LNK chains

    The LNK-based infection chains unpacked script malware that installed remote-access tools including XRat, Amadey, and RftRAT after compromise.

    Kimsuky Group Uses AutoIt to Create Malware (RftRAT, Amadey) - ASEC
  12. 2023

    Kimsuky shifts to malicious LNK files in 2023 campaigns

    ASEC reported that in 2023 Kimsuky increasingly used malicious LNK shortcut files, rather than HWP or Office documents, for initial access against targets.

    Kimsuky Group Uses AutoIt to Create Malware (RftRAT, Amadey) - ASEC
  13. Reported Dec 1, 20215y ago

    Conti operators use credential theft, RMM tools, and Mega exfiltration

    The same report says Conti operators dump LSASS, use Mimikatz and other credential tools, spread with SMB admin shares and BITSAdmin, leverage AnyDesk and Atera, and may exfiltrate files to Mega.

    Ransomware Spotlight: Conti | Trend Micro (US)
  14. Reported Dec 1, 20215y ago

    Conti intrusion playbook includes BazarLoader and firewall exploits

    Trend Micro reported that Conti intrusions can begin with phishing emails delivering BazarLoader or exploitation of public-facing firewalls using CVE-2018-13379 and CVE-2018-13374.

    Ransomware Spotlight: Conti | Trend Micro (US)
  15. Reported Sep 26, 20215y ago

    Kimsuky customizes TightVNC for reverse VNC access

    ASEC also observed Kimsuky distributing a customized tvnserver that supports reverse VNC without installing a service, enabling control from a C2-hosted viewer.

    VNC Malware (TinyNuke, TightVNC) Used by Kimsuky Group - ASEC
  16. Reported Sep 26, 20215y ago

    Kimsuky observed using TinyNuke HVNC only

    In the observed activity, Kimsuky enabled only TinyNuke's hidden VNC capability, allowing graphical control of infected systems without the user seeing the attacker session.

    VNC Malware (TinyNuke, TightVNC) Used by Kimsuky Group - ASEC
  17. Reported Sep 26, 20215y ago

    Kimsuky deploys VNC malware through AppleSeed

    ASEC reported that Kimsuky used its AppleSeed backdoor to install VNC-based remote-control malware, including TinyNuke HVNC and a customized TightVNC implementation, on compromised systems.

    VNC Malware (TinyNuke, TightVNC) Used by Kimsuky Group - ASEC
  18. Reported Jan 18, 20216y ago

    XMRig miner is deployed during two-hour intrusion

    About an hour into the intrusion, the actor deployed an XMRig-based Monero miner via svshost.exe, hid related files, and attempted outbound connections to known mining endpoints before disconnecting.

    All That for a Coinminer? - The DFIR Report
  19. Reported Jan 18, 20216y ago

    Intruder uses RDP for lateral movement and credential theft

    After access, the actor logged in from additional IPs, moved laterally over RDP to multiple systems including a domain controller, and used Mimikatz to dump credentials and export Kerberos tickets.

    All That for a Coinminer? - The DFIR Report
  20. Reported Jan 18, 20216y ago

    Attacker-created account appears from brute-force source IP

    An account used in the intrusion was created the previous day from source IP 54.38.67.132, according to the DFIR Report.

    All That for a Coinminer? - The DFIR Report
  21. Reported Jan 18, 20216y ago

    Threat actor brute-forces RDP and enters network

    The DFIR Report describes an intrusion in which an attacker brute-forced a local administrator password over RDP to gain initial access to the environment.

    All That for a Coinminer? - The DFIR Report
  22. Reported Jun 16, 20206y ago

    Dharma/Crysis payload 1pgp.exe encrypts the victim system

    The ransomware payload 1pgp.exe was executed, encrypted the system, and left a ransom note; the sample was linked to Dharma/Crysis through a PDB path in the binary.

    The Little Ransomware That Couldn’t (Dharma) - The DFIR Report
  23. Reported Jun 16, 20206y ago

    Dharma/Crysis actor deletes shadows, clears logs, and stages persistence

    During the intrusion, the attacker ran shadow.bat and LogDelete.bat, terminated applications with closeapps.bat, and placed 1pgp.exe in Startup folders and a Run key for persistence.

    The Little Ransomware That Couldn’t (Dharma) - The DFIR Report
  24. Reported Jun 16, 20206y ago

    Dharma/Crysis actor runs NS.exe for share enumeration

    At 09:36 UTC in the same intrusion, the attacker executed NS.exe from the desktop to scan and map file shares before ransomware deployment.

    The Little Ransomware That Couldn’t (Dharma) - The DFIR Report
  25. Reported Jun 16, 20206y ago

    Dharma/Crysis actor logs in over RDP as local administrator

    In the DFIR Report case, a ransomware operator linked to Dharma/Crysis logged in from IP 217.138.202.116 as a local administrator at 08:58 UTC.

    The Little Ransomware That Couldn’t (Dharma) - The DFIR Report
  26. 2019

    AppleSeed begins appearing in Kimsuky operations

    ASEC reports that AppleSeed has been observed since around 2019 as a recurring backdoor used by Kimsuky to install additional malware and remote-access tooling.

    크롬 원격 데스크톱을 악용하는 Kimsuky 공격 그룹 - ASEC
  27. 2017

    TinyNuke source code is revealed

    ASEC says TinyNuke source code was revealed in 2017, which enabled broader reuse of its capabilities by other attackers.

    VNC Malware (TinyNuke, TightVNC) Used by Kimsuky Group - ASEC
  28. 2016

    TinyNuke banking malware is first discovered

    The ASEC report states that TinyNuke, later used by Kimsuky for HVNC access, was originally discovered as banking malware in 2016.

    VNC Malware (TinyNuke, TightVNC) Used by Kimsuky Group - ASEC
Linked entities

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Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, breaches, and observables Mallory has linked to this story. Indicator values are masked here and available in full in the app.

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Threat actors

1 linked

Affected products

3 linked
Remote Desktop ProtocolAnydeskAtera

Observables

98 linked

Indicator values are masked on this page. View all 98 in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.

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