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Lazarus Spearphishing Campaign Used Word Templates, Rundll32, and Startup Persistence

Threat Actor Intelligence · 6 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Jan 27, 2020

Lazarus Spearphishing Campaign Used Word Templates, Rundll32, and Startup Persistence

The Lazarus Group ran a spearphishing campaign that delivered malicious Microsoft Word documents to targets in aerospace, defense, research, and financial sectors, including organizations linked to Boeing, BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin, and the Republic of Korea Army. The infection chain used remote template injection to fetch an external DOTM file, whose macro dropped a lure document and a malicious DLL such as onenote.db into the victim’s AppData path, then executed the implant while showing a decoy file to reduce suspicion. Related reporting describes similar Lazarus lures sent in spoofed emails, with separate payloads for 32-bit and 64-bit systems and reconnaissance-focused first-stage malware.

The implant executed through rundll32.exe and established persistence via the Windows Startup folder, techniques widely tracked in MITRE ATT&CK as T1218.011 and T1547.001. Once active, it collected host, process, and disk information, compressed or encrypted the data, and exfiltrated it over HTTP POST using compromised or attacker-controlled infrastructure, including IIS/Plesk-hosted domains such as elite4print.com and astedams.it. Analysts linked the activity to Lazarus based on recurring tradecraft, lure themes, victim profiling, and overlap with operations such as Operation Dream Job, where the group similarly abused rundll32.exe and autostart mechanisms for stealthy execution and persistence.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

10 events · 2019 – Jan 27, 2022
  1. Jan 27, 20225y ago

    Malwarebytes reports Lazarus abusing Windows Update Client

    On January 27, 2022, Malwarebytes Labs described Lazarus-linked malware that used a Startup-folder shortcut named windowsupdateconf.lnk to launch wuauclt.exe with unusual arguments and load a malicious wuaueng.dll. The DLL contained an embedded payload for command-and-control activity, marking a new execution and persistence technique distinct from the earlier rundll32-based campaigns.

    Shortcut to Windows Update - Cyber and Ramen
  2. Jan 18, 20225y ago

    Malwarebytes observes Lazarus using GitHub for command and control

    On January 18, 2022, Malwarebytes observed a Lazarus spear-phishing campaign using Lockheed Martin job lures in which the malware retrieved modules embedded in PNG files from a GitHub repository and exfiltrated results back via HTTP PUT. The report said this was the first time the researchers had seen Lazarus leverage GitHub as C2 in this way.

    North Korea’s Lazarus APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign
  3. Jan 27, 20207y ago

    SQLite source build used in Lazarus implant is dated

    The analyzed sqlite3 component embedded in the later Lazarus implant corresponded to a SQLite source ID dated 2020-01-27 19:55:54. This provides a concrete technical timestamp for a component used in the malware.

    CyberThreatIntel/North Korea/APT/Lazarus/2020-05-05/Analysis.md at master · StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel · GitHub
  4. 2020

    Analysis links 2020 campaign infrastructure and attributes it to Lazarus

    The analysis identified elite4print.com and astedams.it as command-and-control domains hosted on Windows IIS/Plesk infrastructure and attributed the campaign to Lazarus. The attribution was based on recurring tradecraft, lure themes, targeting, and campaign clustering.

    CyberThreatIntel/North Korea/APT/Lazarus/2020-05-05/Analysis.md at master · StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel · GitHub
  5. 2020

    Implant uses Startup-folder persistence and HTTP POST exfiltration

    The DLL implant established persistence via the Windows Startup folder, gathered host, process, and disk information, and exfiltrated data to command-and-control servers over HTTP POST using a Mozilla-like user agent. It also used rundll32 and thread creation as part of execution.

    CyberThreatIntel/North Korea/APT/Lazarus/2020-05-05/Analysis.md at master · StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel · GitHub
  6. 2020

    Remote-template Word lure drops OneNote-path DLL implant

    The 2020 infection chain fetched an external DOTM template, whose macro extracted a decoy document and an architecture-specific DLL saved as onenote.db under the victim's AppData path. The macro loaded the DLL, invoked its export, opened the lure document, and quit the original file.

    CyberThreatIntel/North Korea/APT/Lazarus/2020-05-05/Analysis.md at master · StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel · GitHub
  7. 2020

    Lazarus campaign targets aerospace, defense, and South Korean military

    A later Lazarus spear-phishing campaign used remote template injection in malicious Word documents to deliver a DLL-based implant against targets including Boeing DSS, Boeing PMS, BAE/Lockheed Martin, and the Republic of Korea Army. Victim identifiers embedded in the malware were mapped to those organizations in the analysis.

    CyberThreatIntel/North Korea/APT/Lazarus/2020-05-05/Analysis.md at master · StrangerealIntel/CyberThreatIntel · GitHub
  8. 2019

    Backend C2 selectively serves TorisMa second stage to chosen victims

    The campaign's backend VBScript on compromised websites profiled victims and used whitelist and blacklist logic to decide whether to deliver a second-stage TorisMa payload or a decoy Doris payload. Selection was based on victim IP hashes and collected system information.

    The Lazarus' gaze to the world: What is behind the first stone?
  9. 2019

    Campaign establishes persistence via Startup shortcut and rundll32

    The first-stage implant created a Startup-folder shortcut named thumbnail.lnk that launched rundll32.exe with the dropped DLL and its export, enabling persistence at logon. The implant then performed reconnaissance and beaconed to command and control over HTTP POST.

    The Lazarus' gaze to the world: What is behind the first stone?
  10. 2019

    Lazarus spear-phishing campaign delivers Word-based first-stage implant

    A Lazarus-attributed spear-phishing campaign used spoofed emails with malicious Microsoft Word documents to infect victims. The documents dropped a DLL disguised as a database file, executed it via macros, and displayed a decoy document to the user.

    The Lazarus' gaze to the world: What is behind the first stone?
Linked entities

Related entities

Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, breaches, and observables Mallory has linked to this story. Indicator values are masked here and available in full in the app.

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Threat actors

1 linked

Malware

1 linked

Affected products

1 linked
Word

Organizations

3 linked
Lockheed MartinBoeingHindustan Aeronautics Limited

Observables

23 linked

Indicator values are masked on this page. View all 23 in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.

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