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APT3 Linked to Pirpi Zero-Day Campaigns and Alleged Operator Infrastructure

Threat Actor Intelligence · 7 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen May 5, 2017

APT3 Linked to Pirpi Zero-Day Campaigns and Alleged Operator Infrastructure

Researchers and independent investigators tied the Chinese cyber-espionage group APT3—also tracked as Gothic Panda, Buckeye, UPS Team, and TG-0110—to long-running intrusions targeting government, research, technology, aerospace, defense, transport, manufacturing, and telecommunications organizations. Reporting says the group used spear-phishing, browser and Flash zero-day exploits including CVE-2014-1776, CVE-2014-6332, and CVE-2015-3113, then deployed the Pirpi remote access trojan to move laterally, install backdoors, and steal intellectual property and other confidential data, initially focusing on the United States and United Kingdom before expanding activity to Hong Kong.

Technical analysis found APT3 repeatedly reused exploit components, shellcode, steganographic delivery through animated GIFs, and command-and-control patterns across campaigns, with Pirpi variants sharing encrypted HTTP cookie-based communications and similar command loops while newer builds added stronger obfuscation and anti-analysis features. Separate attribution research claimed historic DNS and WHOIS records linked infrastructure such as httb[.]net, vcersoft[.]com, uyre[.]net, inc-work[.]com, microsoft-ie[.]com, unixfocus[.]net, and shuyan[.]com to alleged operators including Wu Yingzhuo and Dong Hao, arguing that shared registration artifacts exposed personnel behind the espionage activity.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

12 events · 2010 – May 5, 2017
  1. May 5, 201710y ago

    Intrusion Truth names Dong Hao as alleged second APT3 operator

    Intrusion Truth published an attribution chain linking Dong Hao to domains and registration artifacts associated with infrastructure previously tied to Wu Yingzhuo. The article concluded Dong Hao was a second alleged APT3 operator involved in registering domain names.

    Who is Mr Dong? - Intrusion Truth
  2. May 2, 201710y ago

    Intrusion Truth identifies Wu Yingzhuo as alleged APT3 operator

    Intrusion Truth published research tracing historic WHOIS, DNS, and alias data from Pirpi-linked domains to an individual it identified as Wu Yingzhuo, alleging he was the 'Mr Wu' behind parts of APT3 infrastructure. The article also linked related domains and IP data to Guangdong, China, as further attribution context.

    Who is Mr Wu? - Intrusion Truth
  3. Apr 26, 201710y ago

    Intrusion Truth publishes attribution profile of APT3

    Intrusion Truth published a profile of APT3 describing its aliases, targeting, malware, and infrastructure tradecraft, and asserting that domain registration metadata could identify people and entities behind the group. The article also referenced a follow-up claim linking APT3 to Boyusec, described as a Chinese intelligence contractor.

    Who is behind this Chinese espionage group stealing our intellectual property? - Intrusion Truth
  4. 2017

    U.S. unseals indictments against alleged APT3 operators

    Six months after Intrusion Truth's 2017 attribution reporting, U.S. authorities unsealed indictments against Wu Yingzhuo, Dong Hao, and Xia Lei on hacking-related charges. The indictment identified Trimble, Siemens, and Moody's Analytics as U.S. victims.

    The destruction of APT3 - Intrusion Truth
  5. Mar 2016

    Hong Kong infections rise significantly

    APT3 infections in Hong Kong increased significantly in March 2016, according to the reporting summarized in the reference. This indicated a notable escalation of the group's activity there.

    Who is behind this Chinese espionage group stealing our intellectual property? - Intrusion Truth
  6. Jul 10, 201511y ago

    Unit 42 reports UPS exploiting Hacking Team Flash zero-days

    Unit 42 reported that UPS exploited zero-days exposed in the Hacking Team breach. This connected the group to another set of high-end exploit operations in 2015.

    UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload
  7. Jun 23, 201511y ago

    FireEye publishes "Operation Clandestine Wolf" on APT3 Flash zero-day use

    FireEye published a blog post titled "Operation Clandestine Wolf" describing APT3 exploitation of an Adobe Flash zero-day. The reporting publicly documented the group's use of the vulnerability in active espionage operations.

    UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload
  8. Jun 23, 201511y ago

    Adobe patches Flash zero-day CVE-2015-3113

    Adobe patched CVE-2015-3113, a Flash zero-day that UPS had exploited in espionage activity. The vulnerability was part of a broader cluster of zero-day campaigns tied to the group.

    UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload
  9. Jun 2015

    APT3 expands targeting to Hong Kong

    Symantec reported that APT3 had begun infecting organizations in Hong Kong, marking an expansion beyond its earlier focus on the United States and United Kingdom. This represented a geographic shift in the group's victimology.

    Who is behind this Chinese espionage group stealing our intellectual property? - Intrusion Truth
  10. Nov 2014

    UPS exploits Internet Explorer zero-day CVE-2014-6332

    UPS exploited CVE-2014-6332 in a later 2014 campaign. FireEye reported the group used VBScript for this exploitation, and Unit 42 noted code and naming overlaps with other UPS zero-day activity.

    UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload
  11. May 2014

    UPS exploits Internet Explorer zero-day CVE-2014-1776

    APT3, tracked by Unit 42 as UPS, exploited CVE-2014-1776 in campaigns that delivered a Pirpi payload. Unit 42 later identified shared exploit and payload components linking this activity to later UPS operations.

    UPS: Observations on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload
  12. 2010

    FireEye first reports APT3 in "Hupigon Joins The Party"

    FireEye first reported the cyber espionage group later tracked as APT3 in 2010. The group was associated with the Pirpi remote access trojan and targeting in the United States and United Kingdom.

    Who is behind this Chinese espionage group stealing our intellectual property? - Intrusion Truth
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