Researchers Tie APT10 Infrastructure and Campaigns to Tianjin-Based Operators
Threat Actor Intelligence · 11 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Aug 15, 2018

Multiple reports linked the Chinese espionage group APT10—also tracked as MenuPass and Cicada—to long-running intrusions that used Poison Ivy, ChChes, and Sodamaster against governments, NGOs, telecoms, legal, pharmaceutical, academic, media, and managed service provider targets across Asia, Europe, and North America. FireEye previously clustered Poison Ivy activity into the menuPass, admin@338, and th3bug campaigns, while Palo Alto documented th3bug watering-hole attacks that delivered Poison Ivy through compromised websites and infrastructure tied together by shared command-and-control patterns. Trend Micro also reported that the Japan-focused ChessMaster espionage campaign overlapped with APT10 in targeting, malware packaging, infrastructure, and tradecraft, and Symantec later said Cicada/APT10 expanded operations through prolonged intrusions, in some cases beginning with Microsoft Exchange access and persisting for months.
Separate attribution research traced historical domain registrations, phishing metadata, social media accounts, and company records to alleged Tianjin-based operators including Gao Qiang, Zhang Shilong, and An Zhiqiang. Investigators said APT10-linked infrastructure such as chromeenter[.]com, js001.3322[.]org, xiaohong[.]org, and related domains connected to Tianjin email addresses, phone numbers, hostnames, and online personas including fisherxp, baobeilong, and @gbaike. The reporting argued that these overlaps tied real-world individuals and a Tianjin technology company to infrastructure associated with earlier Cloud Hopper and FireEye-tracked APT10 activity, strengthening claims that the group’s malware campaigns and domain operations were run by operators based in Tianjin, China.


