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Researchers Tie APT10 Infrastructure and Campaigns to Tianjin-Based Operators

Threat Actor Intelligence · 11 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Aug 15, 2018

Researchers Tie APT10 Infrastructure and Campaigns to Tianjin-Based Operators

Multiple reports linked the Chinese espionage group APT10—also tracked as MenuPass and Cicada—to long-running intrusions that used Poison Ivy, ChChes, and Sodamaster against governments, NGOs, telecoms, legal, pharmaceutical, academic, media, and managed service provider targets across Asia, Europe, and North America. FireEye previously clustered Poison Ivy activity into the menuPass, admin@338, and th3bug campaigns, while Palo Alto documented th3bug watering-hole attacks that delivered Poison Ivy through compromised websites and infrastructure tied together by shared command-and-control patterns. Trend Micro also reported that the Japan-focused ChessMaster espionage campaign overlapped with APT10 in targeting, malware packaging, infrastructure, and tradecraft, and Symantec later said Cicada/APT10 expanded operations through prolonged intrusions, in some cases beginning with Microsoft Exchange access and persisting for months.

Separate attribution research traced historical domain registrations, phishing metadata, social media accounts, and company records to alleged Tianjin-based operators including Gao Qiang, Zhang Shilong, and An Zhiqiang. Investigators said APT10-linked infrastructure such as chromeenter[.]com, js001.3322[.]org, xiaohong[.]org, and related domains connected to Tianjin email addresses, phone numbers, hostnames, and online personas including fisherxp, baobeilong, and @gbaike. The reporting argued that these overlaps tied real-world individuals and a Tianjin technology company to infrastructure associated with earlier Cloud Hopper and FireEye-tracked APT10 activity, strengthening claims that the group’s malware campaigns and domain operations were run by operators based in Tianjin, China.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

32 events · 2005 – Feb 2022
  1. Feb 2022

    Cicada/APT10 campaign activity observed through February 2022

    Symantec reports that the most recent activity it observed in the Cicada/APT10 campaign was in February 2022, with victims including government-related institutions, NGOs, and organizations in telecoms, legal, and pharmaceuticals.

    Cicada: Chinese APT Group Widens Targeting in Recent Espionage Activity | SECURITY.COM
  2. 2021

    Cicada/APT10 espionage campaign began

    Symantec says the earliest activity in a Cicada, also known as APT10, espionage campaign targeting organizations across Europe, Asia, and North America occurred in mid-2021.

    Cicada: Chinese APT Group Widens Targeting in Recent Espionage Activity | SECURITY.COM
  3. Reported Aug 31, 20188y ago

    Intrusion Truth linked An Zhiqiang to APT10-linked domains

    Intrusion Truth published an analysis connecting An Zhiqiang and Tianjin Tianjiaoyiye Technology Co Ltd to chromeenter.com and other domain activity associated with APT10/MenuPass.

    Who is Mr An, and was he working for APT10? - Intrusion Truth
  4. Aug 15, 20188y ago

    Intrusion Truth linked APT10 to Tianjin MSS bureau

    Intrusion Truth states that a prior post on August 15, 2018 linked APT10 to the Tianjin bureau of China's Ministry of State Security.

    Who is Mr An, and was he working for APT10? - Intrusion Truth
  5. Aug 9, 20188y ago

    Intrusion Truth linked APT10 actors to Huaying Haitai and Laoying Baichaun

    Intrusion Truth published an analysis associating alleged APT10-linked individuals including Zheng Yanbin, Gao Qiang, and Zhang Shilong with the Tianjin companies Laoying Baichaun Instruments Equipment Co Ltd and Tianjin Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Co Ltd. The post argued these firms could represent corporate cover connected to APT10 activity and suggested possible state links, while stopping short of claiming definitive proof.

    More on Huaying Haitai and Laoying Baichaun, the companies associated with APT10. Is there a state connection? - Intrusion Truth
  6. Reported Aug 6, 20188y ago

    Intrusion Truth published Zhang Shilong attribution claims

    Intrusion Truth published an analysis linking the baobeilong persona, xiaohong.org, atreex.cn, and RAT-related GitHub activity to Zhang Shilong as a likely APT10 associate.

    Who is Mr Zhang? - Intrusion Truth
  7. Reported Aug 2, 20188y ago

    Intrusion Truth published Gao Qiang attribution claims

    Intrusion Truth published an attribution analysis arguing that the fisherxp persona, Tianjin-linked infrastructure, and APT10-associated Poison Ivy activity pointed to Gao Qiang.

    Who is Mr Gao? - Intrusion Truth
  8. Jul 30, 20188y ago

    Intrusion Truth linked Zheng Yanbin to APT10 infrastructure

    Intrusion Truth published an attribution analysis tying the email address zhengyanbin8@gmail.com and a cluster of domains, including infrastructure cited in commercial reporting, to an individual using the name Zheng Yanbin. The post concluded that Zheng Yanbin was associated with APT10 and likely helped purchase or manage command-and-control infrastructure used by the group.

    Who is Mr Zheng? - Intrusion Truth
  9. Reported Jul 27, 20179y ago

    Trend Micro reported ChessMaster campaign linked to APT10

    Trend Micro described the ChessMaster cyberespionage campaign targeting organizations in Japan and said it showed overlaps with APT10/menuPass in targeting, packers, infrastructure, and tradecraft.

    ChessMaster Makes its Move: A Look into its Arsenal | Trend Micro (US)
  10. Apr 12, 201710y ago

    xiaohong.org registration anonymized after Cloud Hopper report

    Intrusion Truth says that on 2017-04-12 the registration information for xiaohong.org was changed to Domain Protection Services, making it effectively anonymous.

    Who is Mr Zhang? - Intrusion Truth
  11. Apr 6, 201710y ago

    FireEye reported new APT10/MenuPass tools and campaign activity

    A FireEye blog post on APT10/MenuPass documented new tools and a global campaign as the latest manifestation of the longstanding threat.

    APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat
  12. Jan 6, 201611y ago

    xiaohong.org registration updated with new phone and email

    Intrusion Truth reports that on 2016-01-06 the xiaohong.org registration was updated to add phone number +8615122188031 and change the email address to robin4700@foxmail.com.

    Who is Mr Zhang? - Intrusion Truth
  13. 2015

    baobeilong GitHub account forked QuasarRAT and Trochilus

    Intrusion Truth says the baobeilong GitHub account forked both QuasarRAT and Trochilus in 2015, which it cites as evidence of interest in RATs associated with APT10 reporting.

    Who is Mr Zhang? - Intrusion Truth
  14. Jul 21, 201412y ago

    Another th3bug Poison Ivy variant detected

    Palo Alto Networks reports that on 2014-07-21 another Poison Ivy variant, setup.exe, was detected using C2 domain app.qohub.info and matching activity noted by Cisco TRAC.

    Recent Watering Hole Attacks Attributed to APT Group “th3bug” Using Poison Ivy
  15. Jul 16, 201412y ago

    Malicious PYvBte.jar detected on uyghurweb.net

    On 2014-07-16, Palo Alto Networks detected a malicious file named PYvBte.jar on the compromised legitimate site uyghurweb.net; despite the JAR name, it was a Windows executable that downloaded and ran a Poison Ivy payload.

    Recent Watering Hole Attacks Attributed to APT Group “th3bug” Using Poison Ivy
  16. Jul 15, 201412y ago

    Additional th3bug Poison Ivy samples collected

    Palo Alto Networks says additional copies of diff.exe were collected on 2014-07-15 from multiple compromised sites, including uyghurweb.net, and used the same Poison Ivy infrastructure.

    Recent Watering Hole Attacks Attributed to APT Group “th3bug” Using Poison Ivy
  17. Jul 14, 201412y ago

    th3bug watering-hole sample first observed

    Palo Alto Networks reports that the first observed sample in a 2014 th3bug watering-hole campaign was seen on 2014-07-14, downloaded as diff.exe from npec.com.tw and using C2 domain diff.qohub.info.

    Recent Watering Hole Attacks Attributed to APT Group “th3bug” Using Poison Ivy
  18. 2014

    FireEye analyzed Poison Ivy campaigns and released Calamine

    FireEye's 2014 report introduced the Calamine toolset and said analysis of 194 Poison Ivy samples from 2008 to 2013 clustered activity into the admin@338, th3bug, and menuPass campaigns.

    Fireeye
  19. Jun 2013

    chromeenter.com WHOIS became privacy-protected

    Intrusion Truth says chromeenter.com became WHOIS-protected in late June 2013 before being repossessed by GoDaddy and later named in FireEye reporting.

    Who is Mr An, and was he working for APT10? - Intrusion Truth
  20. May 2013

    Strategic web compromise delivered Poison Ivy via IE zero-day

    FireEye says Poison Ivy was used as the payload of an Internet Explorer zero-day in a strategic web compromise against visitors to a U.S. government website in May 2013.

    Fireeye
  21. Apr 2012

    chromeenter.com registrant changed to Tianjin Tiaoyiye

    Intrusion Truth says the registration for chromeenter.com was updated in April 2012, changing the registrant company to Tianjin Tiaoyiye Technology Co Limited and the registration email to gbaike@gmail.com.

    Who is Mr An, and was he working for APT10? - Intrusion Truth
  22. Feb 15, 201215y ago

    APT10-linked domain stopped resolving to 222.35.137.193

    Intrusion Truth states that weile3322b.3322.org resolved to 222.35.137.193 until 2012-02-15.

    Who is Mr Gao? - Intrusion Truth
  23. 2012

    Nitro campaign remained active using Poison Ivy

    FireEye reports that the Nitro campaign remained active in 2012 and used a Java zero-day to deploy Poison Ivy.

    Fireeye
  24. 2011

    RSA compromise used Poison Ivy payload

    FireEye states that Poison Ivy was used in the 2011 compromise of RSA involving theft of RSA SecurID-related data.

    Fireeye
  25. Apr 2010

    chromeenter.com registered to Hogate Technology

    Intrusion Truth cites WHOIS data showing chromeenter.com was registered in April 2010 to Hogate Technology Co Limited.

    Who is Mr An, and was he working for APT10? - Intrusion Truth
  26. Jan 23, 201017y ago

    APT10-linked domain weile3322b.3322.org began resolving to 222.35.137.193

    Intrusion Truth says the domain weile3322b.3322.org, described as an APT10 domain in commercial reporting, resolved to 222.35.137.193 starting on 2010-01-23.

    Who is Mr Gao? - Intrusion Truth
  27. 2010

    Early 2010 phishing campaign used Tianjin-origin infrastructure

    Intrusion Truth says an early 2010 phishing campaign distributing a Poison Ivy sample originated from masao_tomikawas@yahoo.com, with SMTP headers showing source IP 218.67.128.26 in Tianjin and submitting host fisherxp-pc.domain.

    Who is Mr Gao? - Intrusion Truth
  28. Jan 2010

    fisherxp Twitter account registered

    Intrusion Truth states that the @fisherxp Twitter account was registered in January 2010.

    Who is Mr Gao? - Intrusion Truth
  29. Jul 8, 200818y ago

    xiaohong.org WHOIS updated with fax number

    The xiaohong.org registration was updated on 2008-07-08 to include the fax number +865925163169.

    Who is Mr Zhang? - Intrusion Truth
  30. 2007

    xiaohong.org registered to Zhang Shilong

    Intrusion Truth reports that xiaohong.org registration details in 2007 listed Zhang Shilong as the registrant, with a Tianjin address, phone number, and the email atreexp@yahoo.com.cn.

    Who is Mr Zhang? - Intrusion Truth
  31. 2006

    atreex.cn blog linked to fisherx.com

    Intrusion Truth says a 2006 article on atreex.cn, a Chinese-language hacking and IT security blog, linked to fisherx.com.

    Who is Mr Zhang? - Intrusion Truth
  32. 2005

    Poison Ivy first released

    FireEye's report states that the Poison Ivy remote access trojan was first released in 2005.

    Fireeye
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