REvil and DoppelPaymer Drove APT-Style Ransomware and Double Extortion
Threat Actor Intelligence · 8 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Sep 23, 2021

Ransomware operators behind REvil/Sodinokibi and DoppelPaymer increasingly ran intrusions like targeted espionage campaigns, combining long dwell times, privilege escalation, lateral movement, data theft, and enterprise-wide encryption. Research from Mandiant, Secureworks, JPCERT/JSAC, and CERT-FR describes attackers gaining entry through exposed RDP and VPN services, phishing-delivered malware such as QAKBOT, Emotet, and Dridex, brute force, and exploitation of internet-facing systems, then expanding control with tools including Mimikatz, BloodHound, PsExec, WMI, Cobalt Strike, and Empire. In many cases, affiliates or partner crews obtained domain administrator access, tampered with backups and security tools, abused Active Directory group policy and scheduled tasks, and used open SMB shares or administrative utilities to push ransomware across networks.
REvil also helped normalize double extortion by stealing data before encryption, threatening public leaks, and in some cases publishing victim files or warning that stolen information could be sold or used to pressure public companies through market disclosure. Reporting on Sodinokibi showed the gang first releasing allegedly stolen victim data after nonpayment and later promoting leak-site tactics as a standard coercion method, while Sophos observed exfiltration in roughly half of investigated REvil incidents, often staging data in Mega.nz. Separate reporting said REvil’s operators secretly retained a master decryption capability and allegedly hijacked affiliate negotiations, underscoring how ransomware-as-a-service groups maintained centralized control even as affiliates conducted the intrusions.


