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Researchers detailed SugarLocker (also tracked as Sugar Ransomware and Encoded01) as a newly observed ransomware-as-a-service operation built in Delphi and marketed to affiliates through the RAMP forum by the user gustavedore. The operator advertised attacks via compromised network access and RDP, excluded most CIS countries from targeting, and offered tiered revenue-sharing terms. Analysis indicates the malware had been under development since at least early 2021 and included configurable RaaS features such as persistence, host identification, periodic C2 beaconing, automated Tor browser download for negotiations, and ransom notes including BackFiles_encoded01.txt, while encrypted files could carry the .encoded01 extension.
Technical reviews found code reuse between a custom crypter and the ransomware payload, including a modified RC4-like routine for unpacking and string decoding, suggesting a shared developer or tightly integrated build process. The malware uses the SCOP encryption algorithm from GPLib for file encryption, supports multiple file- and key-encryption algorithms, and includes a network mode that can reuse one encryption key across an entire victim environment, potentially enabling decryption with a single recovery tool. Researchers also noted ransom-note similarities to REvil and visual overlap with Cl0p infrastructure, but at the time of reporting had not confirmed real-world attacks or identified an active data leak site.
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The operator using the handle “gustavedore” began ransomware-as-a-service recruitment on the RAMP forum in November 2021. The post advertised attacks via network access and RDP, excluded most CIS countries, and offered tiered revenue-sharing terms to affiliates.
An analyzed SugarLocker sample was created on 2021-09-04 18:00:27 UTC. S2W identified it as an x86 executable and provided its hashes in the report.
S2W assessed that the SugarLocker/Encoded01 ransomware had likely been under development since at least early 2021, based on functionality and later updates observed in samples.
S2W published a technical analysis of SugarLocker, also called Encoded01 ransomware, linking it to the operator “gustavedore.” The report documented its Delphi implementation, configurable encryption and key-encryption options, Tor-based negotiation portal, and the lack of confirmed real-world attacks or a leak site at that time.
Walmart Global Tech researchers published an analysis describing Sugar as a newly observed ransomware-as-a-service operation focused mainly on individual computers. The report detailed code reuse between a custom crypter and the ransomware, identified use of the SCOP algorithm from GPLib, and released indicators of compromise.
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FortiGuard Labs said the **DeathRansom** ransomware campaign is strongly tied to **Vidar** stealer activity and several other malware operations through shared infrastructure, naming conventions, and recurring attribution artifacts. Researchers found Vidar samples attempting to access Bitbucket paths under the profile name **`scat01`** and likely retrieving DeathRansom variants named in the **`Wacatac_YYYY-MM-DD_HH-MM.exe`** format. The same cluster was also linked to **Azorult**, **Evrial stealer**, **1ms0rryStealer**, and **Supreme miner**, with repeated use of identifiers including the nickname **`scat01`**, the email **`vitasa01@yandex.ru`**, and the domain **`gameshack[.]ru`**. FortiGuard assessed that false Slovak and Nepali language artifacts were likely planted to mislead investigators, while other evidence pointed to a Russian-speaking operator associated with the online persona **SoftEgorka** and likely connected to **Egor Nedugov** from the Rostov-on-Don/Aksay area. Separate technical profiling described DeathRansom, also detected in some cases as **Wacatac**, as a ransomware family that evolved from early variants that sometimes only mimicked encryption into later builds that performed real file encryption. The malware primarily targeted English-speaking users, dropped a **`read_me.txt`** ransom note, demanded Bitcoin payment through attacker-controlled email addresses, and checked systems against a whitelist of CIS-region languages before running. Analysts documented multiple delivery paths, including **RDP compromise**, spam, malicious downloads, botnets, exploits, malvertising, fake updates, and trojanized installers, and noted changing cryptographic implementations involving **Curve25519/ECDH**, **Salsa20**, **RSA-2048**, **AES**, and **SHA-256**. The reporting also noted code or family relationships with **EZDZ-Locker**, **TechandStrat**, **HelloKitty**, **FiveHands**, **DCRTR**, and **STOP** ransomware.
Aug 15, 2026
Researchers reported that multiple ransomware families, including **DoNex**, **BabLock/Rorschach**, and **LockBit Black (v3)**, share substantial code and operational overlap with **LockBit**, underscoring how leaked builder code and recycled components continue to fuel new strains. SANS assessed DoNex as an unoriginal **LockBit-derived** operation closely resembling **Darkrace**, with behavior including process and service termination, network-share enumeration, event-log clearing, ransom-note deployment, and forced reboot after encryption. Trend Micro similarly found that BabLock appears heavily based on **LockBit 2.0** while incorporating features from other families, using DLL sideloading, Direct SysCalls, VMProtect, and unusual random numeric file extensions. Separate reverse engineering of LockBit v3 identified serious implementation flaws, including a **keystream reuse** bug and a design issue that could cause permanent data corruption, enabling partial decryption in some cases via an open-source decryptor. Operational reporting also showed LockBit affiliates continuing to refine delivery and post-exploitation methods. ASEC documented phishing emails posing as copyright claims that delivered LockBit through nested password-protected archives and a fake PDF executable, after which the malware deleted shadow copies, altered boot recovery settings, established persistence, and encrypted files with the `.lockbit` extension. SentinelOne described a LockBit-linked intrusion that began with **Log4Shell** exploitation against an unpatched **VMware Horizon** server and progressed to abuse of legitimate Microsoft Defender tooling for DLL sideloading of **Cobalt Strike**, alongside PowerShell execution, web-shell deployment, and other living-off-the-land techniques. Together with earlier DarkSide analysis showing similar use of **Salsa20/RSA**, service killing, shadow-copy deletion, and network-resource encryption, the reports show a ransomware ecosystem in which LockBit code, cryptography, and tradecraft are repeatedly repackaged into new campaigns and variants.
Aug 15, 2026
REvil, also known as Sodinokibi and tracked by some researchers as **GOLD SOUTHFIELD**, evolved into one of the most consequential ransomware-as-a-service operations by combining aggressive affiliate-driven intrusions with increasingly sophisticated extortion. Reporting tied the group to multiple access methods including RDP brute force, spam, watering-hole compromises, malvertising, unpatched VPN and RDP systems, and malware such as **IcedID** and **Qakbot**. Researchers also documented how REvil’s malware and ecosystem were reused or repurposed: Secureworks assessed that **LV ransomware** was a modified REvil 2.03 beta with a replaced configuration, while separate reporting linked REvil’s rise to the vacuum left by **GandCrab** and described its shift toward leak-site pressure, targeted credential fields, affiliate tracking, and removal of geographic execution restrictions in later samples. The operation’s most damaging campaign exploited multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in **Kaseya VSA**, abusing the platform’s auto-update mechanism to push ransomware through managed service providers and impact an estimated **1,500 downstream organizations**. Victims included Swedish retailers and dozens of customers served by affected MSPs, prompting Kaseya to shut down SaaS VSA, advise customers to take internet-exposed on-premises servers offline, and work with the FBI. After law-enforcement disruption and arrests, researchers reported revived REvil Tor infrastructure and newly compiled samples in 2022 that appeared to come from source code rather than recycled binaries, with updated keys, payment domains, victim-specific account targeting, and evidence of active development despite one buggy build that renamed files without encrypting them.
Aug 15, 2026