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DragonOK Expanded Espionage Campaign With Updated PlugX and Sysget Malware

Threat Actor Intelligence · 6 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Jan 12, 2017

DragonOK Expanded Espionage Campaign With Updated PlugX and Sysget Malware

The DragonOK espionage group was linked to a renewed wave of targeted intrusions against organizations in Japan and other parts of Asia, using updated malware families including PlugX variants, Sysget, IsSpace, and TidePool. Researchers tied a PlugX variant known as PIPX to DragonOK through overlapping command-and-control infrastructure, domain registration patterns, and tradecraft previously associated with the group. The activity primarily targeted manufacturing and high-tech organizations in Japan and Taiwan, while related reporting also identified likely victims in Tibet and Russia.

The attacks used phishing emails, malicious executables, and weaponized RTF documents exploiting CVE-2015-1641, alongside techniques such as DLL sideloading, code injection into nslookup.exe, and persistence through services, autorun registry keys, and PowerShell-based registry changes. DragonOK’s newer tooling showed stronger encryption, anti-debugging and anti-VM protections, altered command-and-control communications, and an unusual method of storing encrypted payloads in registry values such as HKLM\SOFTWARE\BINARY or HKCU\SOFTWARE\BINARY instead of loading directly from disk. The combined reporting indicates the group was actively refining its malware and broadening operations while maintaining a strong focus on Japanese targets.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

11 events · 2014 – Nov 2017
  1. Reported Dec 18, 20179y ago

    LAC links PIPX infrastructure and tradecraft to DragonOK

    LAC assessed that the PIPX PlugX variant was strongly linked to DragonOK based on overlapping infrastructure, registrant data, and ties to domains and malware families such as Aveo and Sysget.

    PlugXと攻撃者グループ "DragonOK"の関連性|ラックピープル|アーカイブ | 株式会社ラック
  2. Nov 2017

    Sysget variant confirmed in targeted attack

    The LAC analysts confirmed Sysget use again in a targeted attack in late November 2017 and assessed the sample as a Sysget v4 variant.

    PlugXと攻撃者グループ "DragonOK"の関連性|ラックピープル|アーカイブ | 株式会社ラック
  3. Oct 2017

    PIPX campaign uses McAfee-themed file trio

    A campaign observed around October 2017 used the files mcoemcpy.exe, mcutil.dll, and either Mlog.dat or mcafee.res to run the PIPX malware chain.

    PlugXと攻撃者グループ "DragonOK"の関連性|ラックピープル|アーカイブ | 株式会社ラック
  4. Oct 2017

    Targeted attacks observed using PIPX PlugX variant

    Analysts observed multiple targeted attacks from around October 2017 using the PIPX PlugX variant, delivered in RAR self-extracting archives and executed through DLL sideloading and code injection into nslookup.exe.

    PlugXと攻撃者グループ "DragonOK"の関連性|ラックピープル|アーカイブ | 株式会社ラック
  5. Oct 2017

    DragonOK activity against Japan becomes more noticeable again

    The LAC report says DragonOK's activity targeting Japan became more noticeable again from late October 2017, indicating a renewed wave of operations.

    PlugXと攻撃者グループ "DragonOK"の関連性|ラックピープル|アーカイブ | 株式会社ラック
  6. Jan 12, 201710y ago

    JPCERT/CC reports PlugX sample with Poison Ivy API hash code

    JPCERT/CC had previously reported a PlugX sample that used Poison Ivy API hash code, a detail later referenced in the LAC analysis of related malware activity.

    PlugXと攻撃者グループ "DragonOK"の関連性|ラックピープル|アーカイブ | 株式会社ラック
  7. Reported Jan 5, 201710y ago

    DragonOK campaign uses updated Sysget, IsSpace, and TidePool

    Unit 42 attributed multiple recent attacks to DragonOK and reported the group was delivering updated Sysget variants, along with IsSpace and TidePool, via phishing emails and malicious RTF documents exploiting CVE-2015-1641. Japan was the primary target, with likely additional targeting in Taiwan, Tibet, and Russia.

    DragonOK Updates Toolset and Targets Multiple Geographic Regions
  8. Apr 2016

    PIPX sample observed using RasTls file set

    A PIPX PlugX variant was observed around April 2016 using the files RasTls.exe, RasTls.dll, and RasTls.dll.msc as part of its execution chain.

    PlugXと攻撃者グループ "DragonOK"の関連性|ラックピープル|アーカイブ | 株式会社ラック
  9. Sep 2015

    New NfLog/IsSpace variant analyzed with CVE-2015-5122 delivery

    A September 2015 report analyzed a new variant of the NfLog RAT, also known as IsSpace, and attributed its use to SAMURAI PANDA. The malware was reportedly deployed using a repurposed Hacking Team Adobe Flash exploit for CVE-2015-5122 and proxied C2 traffic through Google App Engine.

    Wikileaks
  10. Mar 2015

    Unit 42 links Jan-Mar 2015 Japan phishing campaign to DragonOK

    Unit 42 identified five phishing attacks conducted between January and March 2015 against Japanese organizations, primarily a manufacturing firm and later a high-tech organization, and attributed the activity to DragonOK. The campaign used Sysget/HelloBridge as a first-stage payload and revealed a newly identified custom backdoor, FormerFirstRAT, alongside other DragonOK-associated tools.

    Unit 42 Identifies New DragonOK Backdoor Malware Deployed Against Japanese Targets
  11. 2014

    DragonOK uses Sysget in Japan by at least 2014

    The LAC report states that the Sysget malware family, associated with DragonOK, had been used in targeted attacks in Japan since at least 2014.

    PlugXと攻撃者グループ "DragonOK"の関連性|ラックピープル|アーカイブ | 株式会社ラック
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