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Turla Refreshes JavaScript Backdoors in G20 Lure and Watering-Hole Campaigns

Threat Actor Intelligence · 3 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Aug 14, 2026

Turla Refreshes JavaScript Backdoors in G20 Lure and Watering-Hole Campaigns

Researchers reported that Turla updated its JavaScript-based espionage tooling across multiple intrusion paths, including a G20-themed spearphishing lure and long-running watering-hole operations. Proofpoint identified a new .NET/MSIL dropper that used a likely legitimate G20 Digital Economy Taskforce PDF invitation as a decoy, then wrote a Stage 1 JavaScript file to disk, created persistence with a scheduled task, fingerprinted the host, and loaded the JS/KopiLuwak backdoor in memory. The malware communicated over HTTP POST with compromised legitimate websites and supported reconnaissance, arbitrary code execution, and file transfer, indicating use in early-stage intelligence collection against likely targets such as diplomats, journalists, and policymakers.

Separate reporting tied Turla to selective watering-hole compromises of legitimate, often embassy-related, websites that redirected chosen visitors to attacker infrastructure after browser and plugin fingerprinting. ESET also described an updated malicious Firefox extension linked to Turla that abused Instagram comments and a hidden bit.ly path for command-and-control discovery, while earlier research on the Epic Turla operation provides broader context for the group’s established cyber-espionage tradecraft. Together, the reports show Turla continuing to evolve stealthy first-stage access methods, blending decoy documents, compromised websites, social media, and legitimate web services to profile victims and deploy JavaScript backdoors.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

7 events · 2014
  1. Reported Aug 18, 20179y ago

    Proofpoint notifies CERT-Bund about suspected Turla activity

    Proofpoint said it had not observed the full attack in the wild and had found the MSIL dropper on a public malware repository, but warned the activity could be ongoing. The company notified CERT-Bund about the findings.

    Analysis of Turla APT G20-Targeted Attack | Proofpoint US
  2. Reported Aug 18, 20179y ago

    Proofpoint links refreshed KopiLuwak to compromised website C2s

    Proofpoint disclosed that the newer KopiLuwak variant communicated over HTTP POST with two compromised legitimate websites and used RC4 to encrypt traffic. The backdoor supported reconnaissance, arbitrary code execution, file upload, and file download.

    Analysis of Turla APT G20-Targeted Attack | Proofpoint US
  3. Reported Aug 18, 20179y ago

    Proofpoint identifies new Turla MSIL dropper for JS/KopiLuwak

    Proofpoint reported that Turla was using a new .NET/MSIL dropper, internally named Runer.exe, to install a refreshed JavaScript-based KopiLuwak backdoor. The chain dropped a decoy PDF and JavaScript components, established persistence with a scheduled task, fingerprinted the host, and loaded the backdoor in memory.

    Analysis of Turla APT G20-Targeted Attack | Proofpoint US
  4. Reported Aug 18, 20179y ago

    Turla prepares G20-themed KopiLuwak lure for October Hamburg meeting

    Proofpoint analyzed a likely legitimate PDF invitation themed around a G20 Digital Economy Taskforce meeting scheduled for October in Hamburg, Germany. The lure was embedded in a new .NET/MSIL dropper used to deploy the JS/KopiLuwak backdoor.

    Analysis of Turla APT G20-Targeted Attack | Proofpoint US
  5. 2014

    Turla watering-hole campaigns observed targeting embassy-related sites

    ESET reported that Turla had been using watering-hole techniques since at least 2014, compromising legitimate websites, often embassy-related, to profile and selectively target visitors. The activity focused on governments, officials, and diplomats.

    Turla’s watering hole campaign: An updated Firefox extension abusing Instagram
  6. Date unknown

    Bit.ly link tied to Turla extension records limited February activity

    ESET reported that the extracted URL http://bit.ly/2kdhuHX resolved to static.travelclothes.org/dolR_1ert.php, a Turla-associated watering-hole C2. Bit.ly statistics showed 17 hits in February, suggesting a limited test run.

    Turla’s watering hole campaign: An updated Firefox extension abusing Instagram
  7. Date unknown

    Instagram comment posted for Turla Firefox extension C2 discovery

    ESET said the malicious Firefox extension derived a hidden bit.ly path from a comment on a Britney Spears Instagram post. The relevant comment was posted on February 6 and was used to recover the shortened C2 URL.

    Turla’s watering hole campaign: An updated Firefox extension abusing Instagram
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