Loading story…
Multiple Rust packages were removed from crates.io after a supply-chain attack introduced malicious dependencies into popular crates including arrayref 0.3.10, append-only-vec 0.1.9, and internment 0.8.7. The compromised releases added a direct dependency on the rogue crate proc-macro1, while a second malicious crate, proc-macro-en, was also published as part of the same campaign. RustSec said the malicious versions were available for roughly 86 to 107 minutes before removal, with arrayref alone downloaded 2,285 times during that window; the related publisher account for proc-macro-en was locked, and no patched versions were issued because the packages were classified as malicious rather than conventionally vulnerable.
Trace attribution and downstream blast radius.
12 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Wiz Research published an analysis on 2026-08-20 assessing that the crates.io supply-chain campaign likely had North Korea links, citing infrastructure overlaps with the Mastra campaign and the npm axios attack associated with UNC1069. The report, informed in part by Google Threat Intelligence context, tied the activity to shared Hostwinds infrastructure and reused C2 characteristics.
RustSec reported and issued advisories covering the malicious crates and compromised dependent releases, including arrayref, append-only-vec, internment, and proc-macro-en. The advisories classified the incidents as malicious supply-chain issues.
In response to the malicious publication, proc-macro-en was removed from crates.io and the related user account was locked. No patched version was provided because the crate was classified as malicious.
The malicious append-only-vec release remained available for about 107 minutes before being removed from crates.io. The advisory stated there was no evidence of actual usage.
The malicious internment release was removed about 90 minutes after publication. The advisory stated there was no evidence of actual usage of the compromised version.
The malicious arrayref release was removed about 86 minutes after publication. RustSec later stated there were no patched versions and that unaffected versions were 0.3.9 and earlier.
A compromised version of internment was published on crates.io with a direct dependency on proc-macro1, introducing the same malicious build-script execution path during builds.
A new compromised version of append-only-vec was published with a direct dependency on proc-macro1, which would execute a malicious build script during the build process.
Within the same minute that malicious arrayref 0.3.10 was published, legitimate arrayref versions 0.3.5 through 0.3.9 were yanked from crates.io. The action would have left the malicious release as the only unyanked recent version and could have pushed developers toward it via Cargo warnings.
A compromised version of arrayref was published with a direct dependency on proc-macro1, causing a malicious build script to execute during Cargo builds. The release was later reported to have been downloaded 2,285 times during its availability window.
A single version of the Rust crate proc-macro-en was published on crates.io as part of the same supply-chain attack associated with proc-macro1. The crate contained the same malicious build script as proc-macro1.
A public analysis documented that proc-macro1 and proc-macro-en used identical malicious build scripts to download platform-specific payloads from 23.254.165.112:9089 and pass 23.254.165.112:443 as the initial C2 endpoint. The report also described the Windows payload as a PowerShell backdoor with host profiling, Chromium data collection, persistence, and remote command execution capabilities.
Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, breaches, and observables Mallory has linked to this story. Indicator values are masked here and available in full in the app.
Indicator values are masked on this page. View all 13 in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.
See attribution and downstream blast radius, and whether this package or vendor reaches your builds.
7 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
upwind.io
Open sourcecyberveille.ch
Open sourcerustsec.org
Open sourcerustsec.org
Open sourcerustsec.org
Open sourcerustsec.org
Open sourcegist.github.com
Open sourceMap indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
A supply-chain attack hit the Rust ecosystem after `arrayref` **0.3.10** was published with a dependency on **`proc-macro1` 1.0.107**, a typosquatted package impersonating `proc-macro2`. The malicious crate used a `build.rs` script to download and execute a second-stage payload during compilation, meaning developers and CI systems could be compromised simply by building an affected project. Rust maintainers said they received a report at **07:15 UTC** and removed the malicious packages, including related crates such as `proc-macro-en`, `aovine`, `arone`, `aronenao`, and `tinymember`, while also restoring or yanking affected versions of `arrayref`, `internment`, and `append-only-vec`. Investigators said the payload infrastructure contacted **`23.254.165.112`** over ports **`9089`** and **`443`**, bypassed TLS certificate validation, selected platform-specific malware for Unix and Windows, and allowed builds to appear normal after execution. The campaign appears to have used a fake **`dtolney`** account to mimic Rust maintainer David Tolnay and likely leveraged a compromised publisher account for `arrayref`; crates.io locked the affected author account as a precaution. Because `arrayref` is widely used and can reach downstream projects through dependencies such as `tiny-skia`, `sctk-adwaita`, and `winit`, maintainers warned that Rust GUI applications and other software stacks may have been exposed, and advised users to inspect Cargo caches and lockfiles, treat affected hosts as compromised, rotate credentials, and rebuild artifacts from clean sources.
Sep 7, 2026
Two malicious Rust packages, named 'faster_log' and 'async_println', were discovered on the official Crates.io repository, where they were designed to steal private keys from cryptocurrency wallets, specifically targeting Solana and Ethereum users. These packages were downloaded nearly 8,500 times before their removal, with 'faster_log' accounting for 7,200 downloads and 'async_println' for 1,200. The malicious crates impersonated the legitimate 'fast_log' crate by copying its README file, repository metadata, and maintaining the original logging functionality to avoid suspicion among developers. The attackers embedded a payload within the crates that, upon execution, scanned the victim's environment and project source files for sensitive information, including hex strings resembling Ethereum private keys, Base58 strings similar to Solana keys or addresses, and bracketed byte arrays that could contain keys or seeds. When such data was found, it was bundled with the file path and line number and exfiltrated to a hardcoded Cloudflare Worker URL, which was confirmed to be live and accepting POST requests during the investigation. The malicious activity was discovered by researchers at the code security company Socket, who promptly reported it to Crates.io. In response, Crates.io removed both packages and suspended the publishing accounts, 'rustguruman' and 'dumbnbased', on September 24th. The incident highlights the risks associated with open-source software supply chains, where attackers can leverage trusted repositories to distribute malware to unsuspecting developers. The malicious crates did not have any dependent downstream crates, which may have limited the spread of the compromise. The attack demonstrates the sophistication of threat actors in mimicking legitimate projects to evade detection and the importance of vigilant monitoring of package repositories. The use of a legitimate logging functionality within the malicious crates further reduced suspicion, allowing the packages to remain undetected for several months. The exfiltration endpoint used by the attackers was not an official Solana RPC endpoint, indicating a deliberate attempt to disguise the data theft operation. This supply chain attack underscores the need for developers to verify the authenticity of third-party packages and for repository maintainers to implement robust security controls. The incident also serves as a warning to the broader cryptocurrency and developer communities about the ongoing threat of targeted attacks seeking to compromise digital assets through software dependencies. Security researchers continue to monitor for similar threats and advise immediate removal of the affected packages from any projects.
Jun 29, 2026
A supply-chain attack on the Rust ecosystem used a malicious typosquatted crate, **`rustdecimal`**, published on crates.io to target cloud-based development pipelines. SentinelLabs found 15 malicious versions, from **`1.22.0`** through **`1.23.5`**, indicating repeated refinement by the attacker. The package checked for the **`GITLAB_CI`** environment variable and, when present, downloaded and executed a second-stage payload, turning compromised CI jobs into an entry point for broader downstream compromise. The second-stage malware was identified as the **Mythic Poseidon** agent written in Go, with Linux and macOS support and backdoor functions including persistence, keylogging, file transfer, and screen capture. Researchers said the campaign also appeared to involve impersonation of a known Rust developer through a fake account to lend credibility to the poisoned dependency and encourage adoption. The malware communicated with a command-and-control endpoint at **`api.kakn[.]li`**, which resolved to **`64.227.12[.]57`**, underscoring the risk that a single malicious package could infect trusted build environments and propagate into software supply chains.
Jun 29, 2026