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A report from OpenSource Malware says the DPRK-linked PolinRider campaign compromised legitimate GitHub maintainer accounts and used them to publish malicious npm releases, highlighting a case involving developer DiogoAngelim and the packages fetch-page-assets and html-to-gutenberg. The report says fetch-page-assets version 1.2.9 was identified and removed under advisory GHSA-vxq2-vhm7-7mhq, but attackers continued publishing malicious versions 1.2.10 through 1.2.14, with payloads tied to PolinRider/NullReceiver concealed in files including .vscode/tasks.json, a fake .woff2 font, and later babel.config.cjs.
The article says the compromise extended beyond a single package: all seven non-archived public repositories under the maintainer’s account were allegedly reinfected in coordinated force-push waves, indicating sustained attacker control over both the GitHub account and build environment. OpenSource Malware estimates the campaign has reached 4,367 repositories across 2,152 owners and argues that current GitHub and npm response mechanisms, which focus on removing specific malicious versions, are insufficient when attackers retain control of trusted maintainer accounts and can repeatedly ship new poisoned releases.
Trace attribution and downstream blast radius.
11 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
A Bluesky account, lazarusholic, published a post on 2026-08-24 linking to the OpenSourceMalware article titled "NPM Isn't Prepared For North Korean PolinRider Attack." The post associated the case with GitHub, npm, PolinRider, and NullReceiver and characterized it as a North Korean attack.
The article says a raw-content check on 2026-08-24 returned HTTP 200 for .vscode/tasks.json on the main branch of all seven affected repositories. This was presented as confirmation that the malicious launcher remained present across the victim's public repos.
The report says fetch-page-assets versions 1.2.13 and 1.2.14 were published on 2026-08-23 and refreshed the babel.config.cjs payload. It identifies both versions with campaign marker global.i="A8-3292-2" and says v1.2.14 became the latest dist-tag on npm.
The article states the same seven DiogoAngelim repositories were reinfected in another coordinated force-push burst on 2026-08-23. GitHub timestamps reportedly showed the updates landed across all seven repositories within 30 seconds.
The report says commit 7bd8eb2 on 2026-07-31 restored the fake font payload and added a second obfuscated NullReceiver loader to babel.config.cjs in fetch-page-assets v1.2.12. It identifies this version with campaign marker global.i="A8-3292-1".
The article says all seven non-archived public repositories under DiogoAngelim were infected in a coordinated burst on 2026-07-31. GitHub server-side timestamps reportedly showed the seven repositories were updated within 56 seconds, indicating account-wide attacker control.
The report states npm pulled fetch-page-assets version 1.2.9 on 2026-06-24 after it was flagged. However, the article says later malicious versions remained available.
On 2026-06-24, GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-vxq2-vhm7-7mhq was published for fetch-page-assets. The advisory identified version 1.2.9 as malicious.
The article says JFrog published research in June about compromised npm packages fetch-page-assets v1.2.9 and html-to-gutenberg v4.2.11. This marked public reporting on the malicious package activity.
According to the report, fetch-page-assets version 1.2.9 was released on 2026-05-25 and was the first npm version to ship the malicious files to downstream users. The package carried the hidden VS Code task trigger and NullReceiver loader components.
The OpenSourceMalware case study says the initial compromise occurred on 2026-03-29 via a github-actions[bot] commit during a release workflow. It states the malicious changes added .vscode/tasks.json and a fake font file, public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2, to the repository.
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Researchers reported a broad software supply chain campaign targeting developers and cryptocurrency users through hijacked packages, browser extensions, and compromised maintainer accounts across ecosystems including **npm**, **Go**, **Chrome**, and **Packagist**. Socket linked the activity to North Korean actors associated with the **Contagious Interview** operation and identified 108 malicious packages and extensions spanning 162 release artifacts, while JFrog separately analyzed hijacked npm packages `html-to-gutenberg` `4.2.11` and `fetch-page-assets` `1.2.9` that were uploaded with malicious code. The activity appears to rely on account hijacking rather than compromise of GitHub itself, and some attacker infrastructure reportedly remains active even after certain packages were removed. The malware chain used unusual delivery and evasion techniques aimed at developer workstations, including a **VS Code folder-open task** instead of standard npm lifecycle scripts, JavaScript hidden in a fake font file, and encrypted payload retrieval from blockchain transaction data on **TRON**, **Aptos**, and **BNB Smart Chain**. Researchers said the campaign deployed components including **BeaverTail**, **DEV#POPPER RAT**, **OmniStealer**, a `socket.io` backdoor, and a Python infostealer to steal browser credentials, password-manager contents, cryptocurrency wallet data, developer secrets, and operating system credential-store material across **Windows**, **macOS**, and **Linux**. Security firms warned that affected developer systems and credentials should be treated as fully compromised.
Aug 3, 2026
Researchers reported active **software supply chain attacks** in which legitimate GitHub accounts and repositories were compromised and then used to distribute malware to developers. In one case, the verified **dev-protocol** GitHub organization was hijacked and repurposed to host polished **Polymarket** trading-bot repositories that secretly pulled typosquatted npm dependencies. Running the project exfiltrated `.env` contents including wallet private keys to attacker-controlled infrastructure, performed host fingerprinting, and modified firewall settings to expose SSH access; victims were advised to rotate wallet and API secrets and inspect `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` for persistence. A separate but related GitHub-focused campaign, dubbed **ForceMemo**, involved takeover of developer accounts and force-pushes to hundreds of Python repositories so that malicious code was appended to files such as `setup.py`, `main.py`, and `app.py` while preserving original commit metadata. Anyone installing directly from those repos could trigger the payload, and the activity affected projects ranging from Django applications to ML and Streamlit code. A report on malicious npm packages posing as a Roblox *Solara* executor was excluded because it describes a different npm ecosystem campaign centered on **Cipher stealer**, not the GitHub account and repository hijacks used in the other incidents.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported multiple self-propagating npm supply-chain malware campaigns that used compromised maintainer accounts and poisoned package updates to infect developer and CI/CD environments. JFrog said **IronWorm** was distributed through 36–37 malicious npm packages republished from the compromised `asteroiddao` account, where `preinstall` hooks launched a Rust ELF payload on Linux. The malware stole credentials and secrets tied to AWS, npm, SSH, Vault, OpenAI, Anthropic, Kubernetes, and Exodus wallets, hid with an **eBPF rootkit**, and used **Tor** for command-and-control. Investigators also linked the activity to poisoned GitHub repositories across nine organizations, including backdated malicious commits attributed to spoofed automation identities such as `claude`, `dependabot[bot]`, `renovate[bot]`, and `github-actions[bot]`. A separate but related wave, tracked by Sonatype as **Shai-Hulud "Miasma"**, pushed 281 malicious npm package versions and used `binding.gyp` with `node-gyp` to execute during installation, bypassing defenses that only inspect lifecycle scripts. Like IronWorm, the malware harvested developer and CI/CD secrets, validated stolen access, and republished trojanized versions of legitimate packages to continue spreading through repositories, build systems, and registries. Researchers said active exploitation was observed in the wild and warned that public impact may understate the full scope, particularly where private projects and CI runners were exposed through trusted publishing flows and compromised maintainer credentials.
Jul 12, 2026