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Russian OAuth Phishing Campaign Abuses Microsoft 365 Authorization Codes and Entra PRTs

Social Engineering & Fraud · 5 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Aug 26, 2026

Russian OAuth Phishing Campaign Abuses Microsoft 365 Authorization Codes and Entra PRTs

Russian-linked threat actor UTA0352 targeted NGOs with Microsoft 365 OAuth phishing that impersonated trusted Microsoft first-party applications, including Visual Studio Code and Microsoft Authentication Broker. The operation sought authorization codes that could be exchanged for Microsoft Graph access tokens; one observed path used Authentication Broker and the Device Registration Service to obtain a refresh token, register an attacker-controlled device, and mint a Microsoft Entra ID Primary Refresh Token (PRT).

A PRT is a long-lived, device-bound Entra credential used to provide SSO and obtain tokens for multiple cloud applications. If attackers gain code execution or access to an authenticated Azure AD/Entra-joined Windows user context, they may be able to request PRT-derived token material through BrowserCore.exe and obtain reusable refresh tokens that can preserve MFA and device-compliance claims. Defenders should correlate Entra sign-in, audit, and Microsoft Graph logs for session IDs reused from different IP addresses, anomalous Authentication Broker-to-Device Registration Service token activity, scripted device registrations, and refresh-token-to-PRT transitions; endpoint telemetry should also flag suspicious BrowserCore.exe and Microsoft account token-provider activity.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

3 events
  1. Reported Jun 25, 20251y ago

    UTA0352 uses phished tokens to access Microsoft 365 data

    The campaign operators used captured OAuth material and ROADtools to obtain tokens, download Outlook email, and access SharePoint resources through Microsoft Graph. In the device-registration path, they obtained refresh-token material, registered an Entra ID device, and minted a PRT for persistent access; Volexity reported a victim's 2FA approval was followed by email access through SharePoint.

    Microsoft Entra ID OAuth Phishing and Detections | Elastic Security Labs
  2. Reported Jun 25, 20251y ago

    UTA0352 conducts OAuth phishing campaign against NGOs

    Russian-linked threat actor UTA0352 targeted NGOs with customized Microsoft Entra ID OAuth authorization URLs that impersonated trusted Microsoft first-party applications, harvesting authorization codes and security tokens.

    Microsoft Entra ID OAuth Phishing and Detections | Elastic Security Labs
  3. Reported Jul 21, 20206y ago

    Microsoft requires nonce for PRT-cookie requests

    Microsoft Entra ID stopped allowing Primary Refresh Token (PRT) cookies to be requested without an SSO nonce, preventing the previously described nonce-less cookie workflow.

    Abusing Azure AD SSO with the Primary Refresh Token - dirkjanm.io
Linked entities

Related entities

Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, and breaches Mallory has linked to this story.

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Threat actors

1 linked

Affected products

5 linked
Azure Active DirectoryOffice 365Microsoft Entra IdMicrosoft-GraphMicrosoft 365

Organizations

1 linked
Microsoft Corporation
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