Skip to main content
Mallory
← Back to News
endpoint-security-bypassdefense-evasion-methodproof-of-concept-releasepayload-delivery-evasion

Blindside Uses Hardware Breakpoints to Unhook Windows ntdll and Evade EDR

Attack Tradecraft · 3 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Sep 3, 2026

Blindside Uses Hardware Breakpoints to Unhook Windows ntdll and Evade EDR

Cymulate researchers disclosed Blindside, a Windows defense-evasion technique that uses hardware breakpoints and debug registers to acquire a clean ntdll.dll image and replace the hooked .text section in a target process. It creates a child process under debugging, breaks on LdrLoadDll to prevent further DLL loading, and copies the child’s clean ntdll memory before user-mode EDR instrumentation can be introduced. Cymulate said the technique bypassed many, but not all, tested EDR and XDR products and that it notified affected vendors.

The research builds on DLL-unhooking approaches that recover ntdll from newly created suspended processes, where the library is mapped before EDR user-mode DLLs may load. Such techniques can locate the module through the PEB, read its clean image from the child process, change target-memory protections, and restore the original .text bytes to remove syscall hooks; Cymulate reported a proof of concept subsequently loaded encrypted calculator shellcode against some products. Defenders should detect anomalous debugging activity, especially SetThreadContext calls and changes to debug registers DR0–DR3, correlated with suspended-child creation, LdrLoadDll breakpoints, cross-process memory reads, and writes to ntdll executable code.

Who uses this technique?Get the actors, campaigns, and ATT&CK mapping behind it.
Get the tradecraft
Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

3 events
  1. Reported Mar 17, 20268mo ago

    Suspended-process ntdll unhooking technique is documented

    A technique was described that creates a suspended child process to read its initially unhooked ntdll.dll image, then overwrites the current process’s hooked ntdll .text section. The proof of concept reportedly unhooked ntdll and loaded encrypted calculator shellcode against some tested EDR products, while others detected the behavior.

    Extracting Syscalls from a Suspended Process - Cymulate
  2. Reported Mar 17, 20268mo ago

    Cymulate reports notifying vendors and Microsoft about Blindside

    Cymulate stated that it notified vendors whose products were tested and submitted a Blindside report to the Microsoft Security Response Center before publication. Microsoft had declined to comment at the time described by the source.

    EDR Evasion with Hardware Breakpoints: Blindside Technique
  3. Reported Mar 17, 20268mo ago

    Cymulate discloses Blindside hardware-breakpoint EDR-evasion technique

    Cymulate Offensive Research Group described Blindside, which debugs a child process, prevents further DLL loading at LdrLoadDll, and copies its clean ntdll.dll .text section over a target process’s hooked ntdll. Cymulate reported the technique bypassed many, but not all, tested commercial EDR and XDR products.

    EDR Evasion with Hardware Breakpoints: Blindside Technique
Linked entities

Related entities

Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, and breaches Mallory has linked to this story.

Open in app →

Affected products

2 linked
WindowsWindows Server
Do you run this?Get the adversaries, campaigns, and ATT&CK mapping behind this technique, with detections ready to deploy.
See Who Uses This Technique
Mallory platform

See the full picture, correlated to your attack surface.

This page covers what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which threat actors are using it right now, and what to deploy next.

Exposure mappingMap indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Threat actor evidenceEvery observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Associated malwareMalware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Scheduled alertsGet matching new stories delivered to your team as they break, not the next morning.
AI threadsAsk questions about this story and take action on the answers.