Loading story…
A supply-chain compromise of the third-party GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files, tracked as CVE-2025-30066, potentially exposed workflow secrets in repositories using the action. The action was used by more than 23,000 repositories, but that figure does not establish how many experienced secret exposure. Investigators identified a possible link to the compromise of reviewdog/action-setup@v1, tracked as CVE-2025-30154, and reported that multiple Reviewdog actions were affected during a specific timeframe.
CISA issued an alert naming both compromised actions and added both vulnerabilities to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog. Organizations should identify affected action usage, review workflow logs for secret exposure, update compromised workflow references, rotate potentially exposed secrets, and investigate suspicious activity. The potential impact extends beyond workflow execution: exposed credentials could enable unauthorized access to connected systems and services.
See which actors are running it and whether you're in range.
4 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
CISA added CVE-2025-30066 and CVE-2025-30154 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog.
Investigators identified a possible connection between the tj-actions/changed-files compromise and the breach of reviewdog/action-setup@v1. The relationship remained tentative, and the investigation was ongoing when FortiGuard published its report.
The GitHub Action reviewdog/action-setup@v1 was compromised in an incident tracked as CVE-2025-30154. Multiple Reviewdog actions were affected, but the supplied report did not identify the timeframe boundaries or provide a complete list of affected actions.
Attackers compromised the third-party GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files, tracked as CVE-2025-30066, potentially exposing workflow secrets through action logs. More than 23,000 repositories used the action, but the number that experienced secret exposure was not established.
Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, and breaches Mallory has linked to this story.
Correlate live exploitation activity against the software you actually run, and see where you're exposed.
2 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
Map indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
The popular GitHub Action **`tj-actions/changed-files`** was compromised in a software supply-chain attack that redirected multiple release tags to a malicious commit, **`0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67`**, causing affected workflows to dump CI secrets into GitHub Actions logs. Early reporting indicated that all versions might be affected because tags in the repository had been moved to the attacker-controlled commit, prompting maintainers and defenders to urge organizations to immediately stop using the action, review workflow runs, and rotate any credentials that may have been exposed. GitHub later tracked the incident as **`CVE-2025-30066`**, and the project retagged releases and published **`v46.0.1`** with guidance to pin only to a known-safe immutable commit.
Jul 24, 2026The widely used GitHub Action **`tj-actions/changed-files`** was compromised after an attacker gained write access to the repository and retargeted release tags to a malicious orphaned commit, causing workflows pinned to tags rather than immutable SHAs to run attacker-controlled code. The backdoor downloaded and executed a remote payload that scraped decrypted GitHub Actions secrets from process memory and printed them into workflow logs, exposing repositories that executed the action and creating acute risk for public projects where logs were openly accessible. The incident was detected after anomalous outbound network activity was observed, and the maintainer removed the malicious changes soon afterward. Follow-on analysis found the blast radius was substantial because the action was referenced across roughly **23,000 repositories** and many workflows were not pinned to a full commit hash. GitGuardian reported that among workflows executed during the compromise window, hundreds showed signs of exploitation and **603 secrets** were exposed in logs, including temporary GitHub tokens, DockerHub credentials, AWS keys, GitHub personal access tokens, Jira tokens, and cloud.gov credentials. Organizations using the action were urged to review workflow runs from March 14 onward, delete affected logs, rotate any exposed credentials, audit dependencies and commits, and pin third-party GitHub Actions to full commit SHAs to reduce future supply-chain risk.
Jun 29, 2026
A GitHub Actions supply-chain attack compromised widely used actions including **`tj-actions/changed-files`** and components in the **reviewdog** ecosystem after attackers abused insecure workflow patterns to steal maintainer personal access tokens and move trusted tags to malicious code. Investigators traced the intrusion to a malicious pull request against the SpotBugs ecosystem using the dangerous **`pull_request_target`** trigger, which exposed a maintainer token that was later used to implant another workflow, steal additional tokens, and overwrite action tags. The malicious action chain leaked CI/CD secrets and environment variables by dumping runner memory into workflow logs, affecting downstream repositories at scale and including a targeted attempt involving Coinbase, which said the incident did not damage its assets. Separate research showed that GitHub Actions integrations with Azure via OpenID Connect can also be undermined when federated identity credentials trust unsafe subject identifiers such as unprotected branches, tags, environments, or especially **`pull_request`**, allowing contributors to obtain Azure access tokens under weak configurations. The analysis found that even reusable workflows constrained with **`job_workflow_ref`** can still expose cloud access if the workflow permits caller-controlled code execution through mechanisms such as script injection or Terraform plan behavior. Together, the findings show that GitHub Actions trust boundaries can fail both in software supply chains and cloud federation unless organizations pin actions to commit SHAs, protect refs, minimize token permissions, validate reusable workflows, and enforce least-privilege access to secrets and cloud roles.
Aug 19, 2026