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Help Desk Impersonation Leads to AD CS Abuse Through ESC1 and ESC8

Attack Tradecraft · 13 sources · Updated 13d ago · First seen Oct 30, 2026

Help Desk Impersonation Leads to AD CS Abuse Through ESC1 and ESC8

Microsoft Threat Intelligence investigated two unattributed intrusions in which attackers impersonated IT help desk staff through Microsoft Teams and persuaded users to approve remote access, primarily through Quick Assist. The attackers staged portable runtimes, performed discovery, and exploited insecure Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) configurations—not a vulnerability in Teams. In the first intrusion, ESC1 certificate-template abuse compromised privileged identities and enabled DCSync. Automated containment blocked substantial follow-on activity, but a privileged account excluded from containment remained usable and supported data exfiltration.

In the second intrusion, attackers used PetitPotam and ESC8 NTLM relay to obtain a domain-controller certificate and a Kerberos ticket-granting ticket; customer-led workstation isolation stopped further observed progression. The incidents highlight the need to tighten remote-support verification, harden certificate templates and enrollment endpoints, and ensure containment covers all compromised privileged accounts. Recovery must address certificate and Kerberos persistence separately: password resets do not revoke issued certificates, and certificate revocation does not invalidate previously issued Kerberos tickets.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

13 events
  1. Reported Oct 30, 202618d ago

    Microsoft publishes investigation of the ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths

    Microsoft published technical findings on the two unattributed intrusions, including initial-access script indicators and certificate-aware response guidance. The report explained that password resets do not revoke issued certificates and certificate revocation does not invalidate previously issued Kerberos tickets.

    From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths | Microsoft Security Blog
  2. Reported Oct 30, 202618d ago

    Customer isolates Case 2 workstation after Defender alerts

    Following Microsoft Defender ESC8-related alerts, the customer isolated the workstation associated with certificate enrollment and Kerberos activity. No further attack progression was observed.

    From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths | Microsoft Security Blog
  3. Reported Oct 30, 202618d ago

    Case 2 attacker obtains a Kerberos ticket for the domain-controller account

    The attacker used the issued domain-controller certificate for Kerberos PKINIT and obtained a ticket-granting ticket for the domain-controller account.

    From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths | Microsoft Security Blog
  4. Reported Oct 30, 202618d ago

    Case 2 attacker relays NTLM to obtain a domain-controller certificate

    The attacker relayed the domain controller's NTLM authentication to AD CS Web Enrollment through ESC8. Using submission and retrieval endpoints under /certsrv, the attacker obtained a Domain Controller template certificate without knowing the domain controller's password.

    From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths | Microsoft Security Blog
  5. Reported Oct 30, 202618d ago

    Case 2 attacker uses PetitPotam to coerce domain-controller authentication

    With the ESC1 path unavailable, the attacker used PetitPotam over the Encrypting File System Remote Protocol to coerce a domain controller into authenticating to an attacker-controlled system.

    From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths | Microsoft Security Blog
  6. Reported Oct 30, 202618d ago

    Excluded Case 1 account enables file-server access and data exfiltration

    The privileged account excluded from containment remained usable and was subsequently used to access a file server. The attacker launched Rclone renamed as SearchApp.exe to recursively copy selected files to an external SFTP destination using 20 concurrent transfers.

    From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths | Microsoft Security Blog
  7. Reported Oct 30, 202618d ago

    Expanded Case 1 containment blocks more than 1,000 SMB access attempts

    Attack disruption targeted the newly compromised user and eight additional privileged identities. The response blocked more than 1,000 subsequent SMB file-access attempts and additional logon attempts.

    From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths | Microsoft Security Blog
  8. Reported Oct 30, 202618d ago

    Case 1 attacker performs DCSync as containment takes effect

    Within seconds of obtaining one privileged certificate, the attacker authenticated to a domain controller and performed DCSync. Attack disruption limited further replication and follow-on activity.

    From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths | Microsoft Security Blog
  9. Reported Oct 30, 202618d ago

    Case 1 attacker returns and obtains eight more privileged certificates

    Approximately 90 minutes after the first disrupted session, the attacker targeted 16 users and compromised another workstation. The attacker reused the ESC1-vulnerable template to obtain certificates for eight additional privileged accounts.

    From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths | Microsoft Security Blog
  10. Reported Oct 30, 202618d ago

    Defender disrupts Case 1 access, but one privileged account is excluded

    Microsoft Defender attack disruption targeted the compromised user and three certificate-compromised identities, restricting remote logons and SMB access and disconnecting active sessions. One privileged account was excluded from automated containment.

    From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths | Microsoft Security Blog
  11. Reported Oct 30, 202618d ago

    Case 1 attacker exploits ESC1 to obtain certificates for three privileged accounts

    The attacker discovered an insecure AD CS template permitting requester-supplied identities, authentication, broad enrollment, and weak issuance controls. During the first intrusion wave, the attacker used it to obtain certificates for three highly privileged accounts.

    From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths | Microsoft Security Blog
  12. Reported Oct 30, 202618d ago

    Attackers stage portable runtimes and conduct internal discovery

    After gaining remote control, attackers extracted archives into KB-prefixed user-profile directories and executed attacker-controlled code using portable runtimes. Staged components collected host, network, and process information, while compromised workstations connected to domain infrastructure over LDAPS and SMB.

    From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths | Microsoft Security Blog
  13. Reported Oct 30, 202618d ago

    Attackers impersonate help desk staff to gain remote access in two intrusions

    Attackers contacted users through Microsoft Teams messages and calls, impersonating IT or help desk personnel and persuading them to approve remote access, primarily through Quick Assist. In Case 1, the first wave targeted three accounts and compromised one workstation.

    From help desk impersonation to AD CS abuse: Investigating ESC1 and ESC8 intrusion paths | Microsoft Security Blog
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Affected products

2 linked
Active DirectoryActive Directory Certificate Services

Observables

4 linked

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