TamperedChef Installers Hide Server-Gated Loaders Behind Working Apps and EV Signatures
Malware Intelligence · 13 sources · Updated 6d ago · First seen Nov 11, 2026

Researchers linked CookUp recipe installers and other working applications to a TamperedChef/EvilAI-associated loader campaign spanning nine companies’ EV code-signing certificates and 25 command-and-control domains. Rogue Authority identified shared payload-unpacking code and an identical 32-byte constant across Go, .NET, NSIS, Inno Setup, and modified 7-Zip installers, also connecting OpenSUpdater samples to the cluster. The applications provide legitimate-looking functionality while a separate loader contacts remote infrastructure and conditionally retrieves additional content. Padded certificate areas and mismatched certificate-table sizes can prevent SigCheck and other analysis tools from displaying signatures that Windows accepts, creating a visibility gap rather than evidence that the software is trustworthy.
Luke Acha’s DragonsGate Loader research describes the evolving download and execution mechanism, including newer .NET variants that check for analysis tools and sometimes exit before showing an application interface. Controlled testing partially reproduced a 32-byte, hash-like server-response condition requiring an even digit sum, but reached only an update interface—not a confirmed malicious payload. Additional server-side gating is suspected; the final payload, campaign objective, and full post-installation impact remain unconfirmed. Related Unit 42 and LevelBlue reporting describes TamperedChef clusters and the CL-CRI-1089/FlutterBridge macOS campaign delivering FlutterShell, but does not establish FlutterShell as the unidentified CookUp payload. Defenders should prioritize blocking the published domains, hunting associated signing certificates and installer behaviors, and investigating unexpected network activity from newly installed productivity apps rather than relying on valid signatures alone.


