Skip to main content
Mallory
← Back to News
loader-delivery-mechanismdefense-evasion-methodthreat-infrastructure-trackingpayload-delivery-evasion

TamperedChef Installers Hide Server-Gated Loaders Behind Working Apps and EV Signatures

Malware Intelligence · 13 sources · Updated 6d ago · First seen Nov 11, 2026

TamperedChef Installers Hide Server-Gated Loaders Behind Working Apps and EV Signatures

Researchers linked CookUp recipe installers and other working applications to a TamperedChef/EvilAI-associated loader campaign spanning nine companies’ EV code-signing certificates and 25 command-and-control domains. Rogue Authority identified shared payload-unpacking code and an identical 32-byte constant across Go, .NET, NSIS, Inno Setup, and modified 7-Zip installers, also connecting OpenSUpdater samples to the cluster. The applications provide legitimate-looking functionality while a separate loader contacts remote infrastructure and conditionally retrieves additional content. Padded certificate areas and mismatched certificate-table sizes can prevent SigCheck and other analysis tools from displaying signatures that Windows accepts, creating a visibility gap rather than evidence that the software is trustworthy.

Luke Acha’s DragonsGate Loader research describes the evolving download and execution mechanism, including newer .NET variants that check for analysis tools and sometimes exit before showing an application interface. Controlled testing partially reproduced a 32-byte, hash-like server-response condition requiring an even digit sum, but reached only an update interface—not a confirmed malicious payload. Additional server-side gating is suspected; the final payload, campaign objective, and full post-installation impact remain unconfirmed. Related Unit 42 and LevelBlue reporting describes TamperedChef clusters and the CL-CRI-1089/FlutterBridge macOS campaign delivering FlutterShell, but does not establish FlutterShell as the unidentified CookUp payload. Defenders should prioritize blocking the published domains, hunting associated signing certificates and installer behaviors, and investigating unexpected network activity from newly installed productivity apps rather than relying on valid signatures alone.

Hunt this familyPull IOCs and campaign context straight into your stack.
Get the IOCs
Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

7 events · Nov 11, 2026
  1. Reported Nov 11, 20266d ago

    Operation FlutterBridge exposes FlutterShell backdoor targeting macOS

    Public research documented Operation FlutterBridge, a macOS malvertising campaign distributing the Flutter-based FlutterShell backdoor. The recovered artifacts were associated with the CL-CRI-1089 cluster.

    AndreGironda: @SquiblydooBlog @luke92881 Public reporting on CL-CRI-1089 -- https://t.co/BpetCM2uhs -- https://t.co/1C42yBuIKN -- htt...
  2. Reported Nov 11, 20266d ago

    Unit 42 links TamperedChef clusters through certificate and code reuse

    Unit 42 analyzed TamperedChef clusters using certificate and code reuse, documenting trojanized productivity applications and malvertising used to deliver stealthy payloads.

    AndreGironda: @SquiblydooBlog @luke92881 Public reporting on CL-CRI-1089 -- https://t.co/BpetCM2uhs -- https://t.co/1C42yBuIKN -- htt...
  3. Reported Nov 11, 20266d ago

    CookUp installer analysis reveals a server-gated hidden loader

    Researchers analyzed an EV-signed Go recipe-app installer that installs a harmless decoy while concealing a loader designed to download and execute an in-memory DLL when a server token passes an even-digit-sum check. The final gated payload was not observed.

    SquiblydooBlog: There's an on-going wave of TamperedChef that @luke92881 has been chasing. TamperedChef = apps that work as advertised ...
  4. Reported Nov 11, 20266d ago

    Nine campaign signing certificates reported to issuing authorities

    Researchers reported all nine identified EV code-signing certificates to their issuing certificate authorities and added them to CertGraveyard. The report did not establish that any of the certificates had been revoked.

    CookUp follow-up: nine signing companies and 25 C2 domains behind the “useful app” installers - rogueauthority.org
  5. Reported Nov 11, 20266d ago

    Researchers identify certificate padding that obscures installer signers

    Campaign installers padded their signature areas with junk bytes, creating certificate-size mismatches that caused some analysis tools to omit signer information. Windows nevertheless accepted the signatures.

    CookUp follow-up: nine signing companies and 25 C2 domains behind the “useful app” installers - rogueauthority.org
  6. Reported Nov 11, 20266d ago

    CookUp investigation expands to nine signing companies and 25 C2 domains

    Researchers linked installers using nine companies’ EV certificates and 25 command-and-control domains through shared unpacking code and an identical 32-byte constant. The findings connected OpenSUpdater builds to the same cluster, although the final-stage payload remained unidentified.

    CookUp follow-up: nine signing companies and 25 C2 domains behind the “useful app” installers - rogueauthority.org
  7. Nov 11, 20267d ago

    DragonsGate research details evolving installer gates and anti-analysis checks

    A research update introduced DragonsGate Loader as a name for TamperedChef/EvilAI-associated installer downloading and execution-gating behavior across NSIS, Inno Setup, Go, and .NET variants, including process checks for analysis tools. Controlled replay of a 32-byte hash-like response satisfying an even-parity condition advanced one downloader to its update interface, but did not produce a confirmed malicious payload.

    DragonsGate Loader: The Evolving Download Mechanism Behind TamperedChef / EvilAI
Linked entities

Related entities

Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, breaches, and observables Mallory has linked to this story. Indicator values are masked here and available in full in the app.

Open in app →

Organizations

9 linked
Virtual Holding Resources, LLCAnimated Productions, LLCLaunch Window, LLCNet Sourcing Experts LLCPausatech LLCROAD MEDIA PASS LIMITEDServe-o-lution LLCBinary Wave Innovations LLCAlternate Financial, LLC

Observables

103 linked

Indicator values are masked on this page. View all 103 in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.

Do you run this?Pull the IOCs, campaigns, and victimology behind this family, ready to push into your SIEM and EDR.
Hunt This Malware
Source coverage

Sources

13 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.

Security Magic BlogNews · Nov 11, 2026
DragonsGate Loader: The Evolving Download Mechanism Behind TamperedChef / EvilAIOpen source ↗
X AndregirondaNews · Nov 11, 2026
AndreGironda: @SquiblydooBlog @luke92881 Public reporting on CL-CRI-1089 -- https://t.co/BpetCM2uhs -- https://t.co/1C42yBuIKN -- htt...Open source ↗
X AndregirondaNews · Nov 11, 2026
AndreGironda: RT @SquiblydooBlog: Like RecipeLister, I don't know what the goal is. The campaigns been running for several months, and...Open source ↗
X AndregirondaNews · Nov 11, 2026
AndreGironda: RT @SquiblydooBlog: The campaign seems most similar to the classic "Recipe Lister", the original TamperedChef, analyzed ...Open source ↗
5 additional sources from 11-11-2026 to 11-11-2026
X SquiblydooblogNews · Nov 11, 2026
SquiblydooBlog: The failure happens because SigCheck (and other certificate parsing tools) find a mismatch between the PE's Security Dir...Open source ↗
X SquiblydooblogNews · Nov 11, 2026
SquiblydooBlog: The installers drop a fairly straight forward app, and then a separate loader that checks a few factors before dropping ...Open source ↗
X SquiblydooblogNews · Nov 11, 2026
SquiblydooBlog: There's an on-going wave of TamperedChef that @luke92881 has been chasing. TamperedChef = apps that work as advertised ...Open source ↗
Rogueauthority BlogNews · Nov 11, 2026
CookUp follow-up: nine signing companies and 25 C2 domains behind the “useful app” installers - rogueauthority.orgOpen source ↗
Mallory platform

See the full picture, correlated to your attack surface.

This page covers what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which threat actors are using it right now, and what to deploy next.

Exposure mappingMap indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Threat actor evidenceEvery observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Associated malwareMalware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Scheduled alertsGet matching new stories delivered to your team as they break, not the next morning.
AI threadsAsk questions about this story and take action on the answers.