VenomRAT
- Type
- RAT
- Capabilities
- KeyloggingExfiltrationReconnaissanceDefense evasionPost exploitationDLL sideloadingPersistencePrivilege escalation
- Delivery
- PhishingMalspamLure
- Platforms
- Windows
VenomRAT is a Windows remote access trojan written in C# for the .NET Framework and associated with the AsyncRAT and DcRAT code lineage. Distributed as commodity crimeware, it enables remote command execution, keylogging, system reconnaissance, data exfiltration and file theft. Builds include hidden virtual network computing (HVNC) functionality for concealed interactive access. Its keylogger records process names and window titles and periodically transmits captured keystrokes to its command-and-control server. Reconnaissance functions collect hardware specifications, installed applications and running-process information.
VenomRAT includes defense-evasion features such as WMI-based virtual-machine checks, dynamic Windows API resolution, in-memory AMSI and ETW patching, and termination of selected security, monitoring and administrative processes. Capabilities and enabled settings vary by build; some deployments delegate installation, persistence and anti-analysis functions to preceding loaders.
Delivery commonly involves malicious email attachments. The PAPERMILL campaign used Indian tax-notice phishing lures and disk-image attachments containing a renamed, legitimately signed Notepad++ executable. The executable sideloaded a malicious proxy DLL, which decrypted an intermediate stage and used Donut shellcode to reflectively load VenomRAT in memory. This delivery chain implemented sandbox-detection delays, repeated UAC elevation prompts and RunOnce persistence. Recovered payloads identified version 6.0.3 with HVNC, stealer and file-grabbing functionality. PAPERMILL targeted Indian entities, but attribution to a specific established threat actor remains unconfirmed.
VenomRAT infrastructure was targeted during Operation Endgame in November 2025, alongside Rhadamanthys and Elysium infrastructure. A principal suspect associated with VenomRAT was arrested in Greece.
Associated threat actors
9 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The recovered configuration identifies VenomRAT version 6.0.3 with hidden virtual network computing, data-stealing and file-grabbing capabilities.
This comparison explores the core technical differences between VenomRAT and AsyncRAT by analyzing their architecture, capabilities, and tactics.
This comparison explores the core technical differences between VenomRAT and AsyncRAT by analyzing their architecture, capabilities, and tactics.
This comparison explores the core technical differences between VenomRAT and AsyncRAT by analyzing their architecture, capabilities, and tactics.
This comparison explores the core technical differences between VenomRAT and AsyncRAT by analyzing their architecture, capabilities, and tactics.
DCRAT → VenomRAT, EchoRAT, Gh0stRAT, BitRAT, CyberSpike, Dumpling RAT, DarkRAT (via ShaShenRAT)
+3 more in the app. View in Mallory
Techniques & procedures
55 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
4 techniques
Resource Development
T1583.003 — Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server (Resource Development)
Proofpoint is tracking a cluster of cybercriminal threat activity leveraging Cloudflare Tunnels to deliver malware. Specifically, the activity abuses the TryCloudflare feature that allows an attacker to create a one-time tunnel without creating an account.
T1587.001 — Develop Capabilities: Malware (Resource Development)
T1588.001 — Obtain Capabilities: Malware (Resource Development)
Initial Access
5 techniques
Initial Access
« VenomRAT ». Ce programme malveillant identifié en 2020 était principalement « diffusé via des campagnes d'hameçonnage ou de sites Internet malveillants »
Il est généralement diffusé via des campagnes de phishing, des logiciels piratés, des pièces jointes malveillantes ou encore via l’exploitation des vulnérabilités non corrigées.
Il est généralement diffusé via des campagnes de phishing, des logiciels piratés, des pièces jointes malveillantes ou encore via l’exploitation des vulnérabilités non corrigées.
The operator used a believable tax-related lure and contained a seemingly routine attachment... Tax_Notice_45594.img. | Files carried inside a mounted ISO do not inherit Mark-of-the-Web... the Tax_Notice_45594.exe inside comes out clean – no MOTW, so SmartScreen and the Office/Explorer downloaded-from-the-internet warnings never fire.
In recent campaigns, messages contained URLs leading to a JavaScript file. If executed, the file spawned PowerShell to download and run VenomRAT.
Execution
9 techniques
Execution
That subdomain hosts an LNK file, which uses PowerShell to fetch a JavaScript file from the same tunnel.
This batch file is heavily obfuscated and does the real heavy lifting. It opens the fake invoice PDF as a decoy while downloading a second ZIP file that carries a Python package.
When executed, it establishes a connection to an external file share, typically via WebDAV, to download an LNK or VBS file.
When executed, the LNK/VBS executes a BAT or CMD file that downloads a Python installer package and a series of Python scripts leading to malware installation.
The JavaScript, once deobfuscated, quietly pulls down a batch file from the same infrastructure.
apc_run_payload – the APC callback that eventually executes the decrypted shellcode... The APC callback is responsible for executing the decrypted payload in memory.
This exploit triggers security warnings that could deceive unsuspecting users into executing harmful commands... The malicious command is executed once the victim “Agrees” to the default options twice.
“Opening it mounts what appears to be a local drive,” allowing the malicious execution chain to begin.
After patching, Donut loads mscoree.dll , calls CLRCreateInstance to start the .NET CLR (v4.0.30319), and invokes ExecuteInDefaultAppDomain with the target class and method names stored in the instance.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
installer_thread – establishes persistence through Registry Key edits... HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce → …\RuntimeBroker\RuntimeBroker.exe.
Privilege Escalation
5 techniques
Privilege Escalation
It uses this access to allocate memory, create threads, and copy shellcode into place, all classic building blocks of process injection
The technique used here is Early Bird APC Queue injection. It plants code into a newly created process before that process starts running its main thread
Process Injection (T1055.012): CreateProcessAsUserW → Create suspended target process; WriteProcessMemory → Write payload into target address space; SetThreadContext → Redirect execution to payload entry point; ResumeThread → Resume execution under target process identity
installer_thread – establishes persistence through Registry Key edits... HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce → …\RuntimeBroker\RuntimeBroker.exe.
If not admin, relaunch itself with the runas verb, spawn a watchdog thread that keeps re-popping UAC until the user gives in.
Stealth
20 techniques
Stealth
Then three passes over the body – ^= xor1, bitwise NOT, ^= xor2 followed by a DWORD level Fisher–Yates de-shuffle and finally RC4 with the 16-byte key applied.
Dynamic API Resolution ✔ DInvokeCore class for dynamic API resolution T1027.007 ✘ Not implemented
The last 26 bytes of the file are a parameter block... three passes over the body – xor, bitwise NOT, xor – followed by a DWORD level Fisher–Yates de-shuffle and finally RC4.
Every section has been deliberately named to suggest it contains something else entirely... the section named .pdata is the import table.
Install directory %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Crypto\RuntimeBroker\... Masquerade RuntimeBroker.exe (impersonates Windows Runtime Broker).
Defense Evasion Masquerading: Double Extension T1036.007 1–6 .pdf.lnk, .pdf.wsh, .PDF.lnk
It uses this access to allocate memory, create threads, and copy shellcode into place, all classic building blocks of process injection
The technique used here is Early Bird APC Queue injection. It plants code into a newly created process before that process starts running its main thread
Process Injection (T1055.012): CreateProcessAsUserW → Create suspended target process; WriteProcessMemory → Write payload into target address space; SetThreadContext → Redirect execution to payload entry point; ResumeThread → Resume execution under target process identity
[Stage 3: Batch Downloader] - Deletes .bat files post-execution (anti-forensics)
“This technique can strip the internet-origin mark from the files inside, reducing the warnings Windows would normally display.”
The Kramer class decodes source at runtime and passes it to eval().
Defense Evasion System Binary Proxy Execution: Wscript T1218.005 1–4, 6 wscript.exe WSH/WSF execution
Clicking it downloads a ZIP file containing an internet shortcut, and opening it connects to a TryCloudflare subdomain.
Check Constant Fails if CPU cores <= 1... Physical RAM... Free disk... Uptime... Cursor moved... Screen resolution... Last user input.
Check Constant Fails if CPU cores <= 1... Physical RAM... Free disk... Cursor moved... Screen resolution... Last user input.
Instead of exiting when a check fails... it falls into Sleep(0x493E0) ... 5 minutes and then continues anyway. Most automated sandboxes have shorter analysis windows.
[Stage 3: Batch Downloader] - Hides payload directories with attrib +h
After patching, Donut loads mscoree.dll , calls CLRCreateInstance to start the .NET CLR (v4.0.30319), and invokes ExecuteInDefaultAppDomain with the target class and method names stored in the instance.
MODULE_NET_DLL indicates to us that this is a .NET DLL, reflectively loaded into the process.
Defense Impairment
3 techniques
Defense Impairment
The ISO format is a deliberate choice. ISOs auto-mount on Windows 10/11 without third-party software, bypassing Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) protections that would otherwise trigger SmartScreen warnings on downloaded executables (T1553.005).
Client.Helper.ProcessCritical calls RtlSetProcessIsCritical, so killing the process BSODs the box... Client.Program.StopHVNC kills cvtres processes.
Anti-process Monitoring ✔ Terminates system monitoring and security processes T1562.009 ✘ Not implemented
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
Keylogging ✔ Advanced keylogger with filtering and process tracking T1056.001 ✔ Basic keylogger with clipboard logging T1056.001
Discovery
6 techniques
Discovery
Process discovery ✔ This the capability to obtain a listing of running processes T1057 ✘ Not implemented
Hardware Interaction ✔ Collects CPU, RAM, GPU, and software data using WMI T1082 ✔ Collects system data via Win32_ComputerSystem T1082
Check Constant Fails if CPU cores <= 1... Physical RAM... Free disk... Uptime... Cursor moved... Screen resolution... Last user input.
Check Constant Fails if CPU cores <= 1... Physical RAM... Free disk... Cursor moved... Screen resolution... Last user input.
Instead of exiting when a check fails... it falls into Sleep(0x493E0) ... 5 minutes and then continues anyway. Most automated sandboxes have shorter analysis windows.
Both VenomRAT and AsyncRAT perform System Language Discovery (T1614.001) by reading HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language .
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
Keylogging ✔ Advanced keylogger with filtering and process tracking T1056.001 ✔ Basic keylogger with clipboard logging T1056.001
Il peut également intégrer des fonctionnalités de surveillance telles que le keylogging, la capture d’écran en temps réel...
Webcam Access ✔ Camera detection and access T1125 ✘ Not implemented
Command and Control
6 techniques
Command and Control
“Its server is configured for remote command traffic,” with C2 endpoint “154.36.188.201:4449.”
C2 endpoint 154.36.188.201:4449... VenomRAT handles C2 + capabilities.
Il peut également intégrer des fonctionnalités de surveillance telles que le keylogging, la capture d’écran en temps réel, l’accès aux fichiers et le téléchargement de charges utiles supplémentaires.
Useful starting points are MITRE ATT&CK techniques for remote access software (T1219)
C2 Protocol Tunneling T1572 1–6 Cloudflare tunnel for origin obfuscation
All tunnels use Cloudflare's free Quick Tunnel service ( trycloudflare.com ). The origin server IP is never exposed — all traffic proxies through Cloudflare's anycast network
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
When executed, it establishes a connection to an external file share, typically via WebDAV, to download an LNK or VBS file.
Observables
173 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
79 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.