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Malware9 associated actors

VenomRAT

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 4 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors9Associated
ATT&CK55Techniques
IOCs173Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
KeyloggingExfiltrationReconnaissanceDefense evasionPost exploitationDLL sideloadingPersistencePrivilege escalation
Delivery
PhishingMalspamLure
Platforms
Windows

VenomRAT is a Windows remote access trojan written in C# for the .NET Framework and associated with the AsyncRAT and DcRAT code lineage. Distributed as commodity crimeware, it enables remote command execution, keylogging, system reconnaissance, data exfiltration and file theft. Builds include hidden virtual network computing (HVNC) functionality for concealed interactive access. Its keylogger records process names and window titles and periodically transmits captured keystrokes to its command-and-control server. Reconnaissance functions collect hardware specifications, installed applications and running-process information.

VenomRAT includes defense-evasion features such as WMI-based virtual-machine checks, dynamic Windows API resolution, in-memory AMSI and ETW patching, and termination of selected security, monitoring and administrative processes. Capabilities and enabled settings vary by build; some deployments delegate installation, persistence and anti-analysis functions to preceding loaders.

Delivery commonly involves malicious email attachments. The PAPERMILL campaign used Indian tax-notice phishing lures and disk-image attachments containing a renamed, legitimately signed Notepad++ executable. The executable sideloaded a malicious proxy DLL, which decrypted an intermediate stage and used Donut shellcode to reflectively load VenomRAT in memory. This delivery chain implemented sandbox-detection delays, repeated UAC elevation prompts and RunOnce persistence. Recovered payloads identified version 6.0.3 with HVNC, stealer and file-grabbing functionality. PAPERMILL targeted Indian entities, but attribution to a specific established threat actor remains unconfirmed.

VenomRAT infrastructure was targeted during Operation Endgame in November 2025, alongside Rhadamanthys and Elysium infrastructure. A principal suspect associated with VenomRAT was arrested in Greece.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

9 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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PAPERMILL

The recovered configuration identifies VenomRAT version 6.0.3 with hidden virtual network computing, data-stealing and file-grabbing capabilities.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
Nullbulge

This comparison explores the core technical differences between VenomRAT and AsyncRAT by analyzing their architecture, capabilities, and tactics.

via rapid7 blograpid7.com
APT-C-36

This comparison explores the core technical differences between VenomRAT and AsyncRAT by analyzing their architecture, capabilities, and tactics.

via rapid7 blograpid7.com
OPERA1ER

This comparison explores the core technical differences between VenomRAT and AsyncRAT by analyzing their architecture, capabilities, and tactics.

via rapid7 blograpid7.com
Coral Rider

This comparison explores the core technical differences between VenomRAT and AsyncRAT by analyzing their architecture, capabilities, and tactics.

via rapid7 blograpid7.com
alexeikun

DCRAT → VenomRAT, EchoRAT, Gh0stRAT, BitRAT, CyberSpike, Dumpling RAT, DarkRAT (via ShaShenRAT)

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch

+3 more in the app. View in Mallory

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

55 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

4 techniques
T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

T1583.003 — Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server (Resource Development)

T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence2

Proofpoint is tracking a cluster of cybercriminal threat activity leveraging Cloudflare Tunnels to deliver malware. Specifically, the activity abuses the TryCloudflare feature that allows an attacker to create a one-time tunnel without creating an account.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence2

T1587.001 — Develop Capabilities: Malware (Resource Development)

T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

T1588.001 — Obtain Capabilities: Malware (Resource Development)

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

« VenomRAT ». Ce programme malveillant identifié en 2020 était principalement « diffusé via des campagnes d'hameçonnage ou de sites Internet malveillants »

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Il est généralement diffusé via des campagnes de phishing, des logiciels piratés, des pièces jointes malveillantes ou encore via l’exploitation des vulnérabilités non corrigées.

T1566PhishingEvidence4

Il est généralement diffusé via des campagnes de phishing, des logiciels piratés, des pièces jointes malveillantes ou encore via l’exploitation des vulnérabilités non corrigées.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence8

The operator used a believable tax-related lure and contained a seemingly routine attachment... Tax_Notice_45594.img. | Files carried inside a mounted ISO do not inherit Mark-of-the-Web... the Tax_Notice_45594.exe inside comes out clean – no MOTW, so SmartScreen and the Office/Explorer downloaded-from-the-internet warnings never fire.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

In recent campaigns, messages contained URLs leading to a JavaScript file. If executed, the file spawned PowerShell to download and run VenomRAT.

Execution

9 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

That subdomain hosts an LNK file, which uses PowerShell to fetch a JavaScript file from the same tunnel.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence4

This batch file is heavily obfuscated and does the real heavy lifting. It opens the fake invoice PDF as a decoy while downloading a second ZIP file that carries a Python package.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

When executed, it establishes a connection to an external file share, typically via WebDAV, to download an LNK or VBS file.

T1059.006PythonEvidence5

When executed, the LNK/VBS executes a BAT or CMD file that downloads a Python installer package and a series of Python scripts leading to malware installation.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence4

The JavaScript, once deobfuscated, quietly pulls down a batch file from the same infrastructure.

T1106Native APIEvidence3

apc_run_payload – the APC callback that eventually executes the decrypted shellcode... The APC callback is responsible for executing the decrypted payload in memory.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

This exploit triggers security warnings that could deceive unsuspecting users into executing harmful commands... The malicious command is executed once the victim “Agrees” to the default options twice.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence7

“Opening it mounts what appears to be a local drive,” allowing the malicious execution chain to begin.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

After patching, Donut loads mscoree.dll , calls CLRCreateInstance to start the .NET CLR (v4.0.30319), and invokes ExecuteInDefaultAppDomain with the target class and method names stored in the instance.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence5

installer_thread – establishes persistence through Registry Key edits... HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce → …\RuntimeBroker\RuntimeBroker.exe.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

It uses this access to allocate memory, create threads, and copy shellcode into place, all classic building blocks of process injection

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence3

The technique used here is Early Bird APC Queue injection. It plants code into a newly created process before that process starts running its main thread

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

Process Injection (T1055.012): CreateProcessAsUserW → Create suspended target process; WriteProcessMemory → Write payload into target address space; SetThreadContext → Redirect execution to payload entry point; ResumeThread → Resume execution under target process identity

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence5

installer_thread – establishes persistence through Registry Key edits... HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce → …\RuntimeBroker\RuntimeBroker.exe.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence2

If not admin, relaunch itself with the runas verb, spawn a watchdog thread that keeps re-popping UAC until the user gives in.

Stealth

20 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence8

Then three passes over the body – ^= xor1, bitwise NOT, ^= xor2 followed by a DWORD level Fisher–Yates de-shuffle and finally RC4 with the 16-byte key applied.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

Dynamic API Resolution ✔ DInvokeCore class for dynamic API resolution T1027.007 ✘ Not implemented

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence3

The last 26 bytes of the file are a parameter block... three passes over the body – xor, bitwise NOT, xor – followed by a DWORD level Fisher–Yates de-shuffle and finally RC4.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

Every section has been deliberately named to suggest it contains something else entirely... the section named .pdata is the import table.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence2

Install directory %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Crypto\RuntimeBroker\... Masquerade RuntimeBroker.exe (impersonates Windows Runtime Broker).

T1036.007Double File ExtensionEvidence1

Defense Evasion Masquerading: Double Extension T1036.007 1–6 .pdf.lnk, .pdf.wsh, .PDF.lnk

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

It uses this access to allocate memory, create threads, and copy shellcode into place, all classic building blocks of process injection

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence3

The technique used here is Early Bird APC Queue injection. It plants code into a newly created process before that process starts running its main thread

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

Process Injection (T1055.012): CreateProcessAsUserW → Create suspended target process; WriteProcessMemory → Write payload into target address space; SetThreadContext → Redirect execution to payload entry point; ResumeThread → Resume execution under target process identity

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

[Stage 3: Batch Downloader] - Deletes .bat files post-execution (anti-forensics)

T1070.006TimestompEvidence2

“This technique can strip the internet-origin mark from the files inside, reducing the warnings Windows would normally display.”

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The Kramer class decodes source at runtime and passes it to eval().

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

Defense Evasion System Binary Proxy Execution: Wscript T1218.005 1–4, 6 wscript.exe WSH/WSF execution

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

Clicking it downloads a ZIP file containing an internet shortcut, and opening it connects to a TryCloudflare subdomain.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Check Constant Fails if CPU cores <= 1... Physical RAM... Free disk... Uptime... Cursor moved... Screen resolution... Last user input.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence5

Check Constant Fails if CPU cores <= 1... Physical RAM... Free disk... Cursor moved... Screen resolution... Last user input.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence4

Instead of exiting when a check fails... it falls into Sleep(0x493E0) ... 5 minutes and then continues anyway. Most automated sandboxes have shorter analysis windows.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence2

[Stage 3: Batch Downloader] - Hides payload directories with attrib +h

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

After patching, Donut loads mscoree.dll , calls CLRCreateInstance to start the .NET CLR (v4.0.30319), and invokes ExecuteInDefaultAppDomain with the target class and method names stored in the instance.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence5

MODULE_NET_DLL indicates to us that this is a .NET DLL, reflectively loaded into the process.

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1553.005Mark-of-the-Web BypassEvidence1

The ISO format is a deliberate choice. ISOs auto-mount on Windows 10/11 without third-party software, bypassing Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) protections that would otherwise trigger SmartScreen warnings on downloaded executables (T1553.005).

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence4

Client.Helper.ProcessCritical calls RtlSetProcessIsCritical, so killing the process BSODs the box... Client.Program.StopHVNC kills cvtres processes.

T1688Safe Mode BootEvidence1

Anti-process Monitoring ✔ Terminates system monitoring and security processes T1562.009 ✘ Not implemented

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

Keylogging ✔ Advanced keylogger with filtering and process tracking T1056.001 ✔ Basic keylogger with clipboard logging T1056.001

Discovery

6 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Process discovery ✔ This the capability to obtain a listing of running processes T1057 ✘ Not implemented

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

Hardware Interaction ✔ Collects CPU, RAM, GPU, and software data using WMI T1082 ✔ Collects system data via Win32_ComputerSystem T1082

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Check Constant Fails if CPU cores <= 1... Physical RAM... Free disk... Uptime... Cursor moved... Screen resolution... Last user input.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence5

Check Constant Fails if CPU cores <= 1... Physical RAM... Free disk... Cursor moved... Screen resolution... Last user input.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence4

Instead of exiting when a check fails... it falls into Sleep(0x493E0) ... 5 minutes and then continues anyway. Most automated sandboxes have shorter analysis windows.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

Both VenomRAT and AsyncRAT perform System Language Discovery (T1614.001) by reading HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language .

Collection

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

Keylogging ✔ Advanced keylogger with filtering and process tracking T1056.001 ✔ Basic keylogger with clipboard logging T1056.001

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Il peut également intégrer des fonctionnalités de surveillance telles que le keylogging, la capture d’écran en temps réel...

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

Webcam Access ✔ Camera detection and access T1125 ✘ Not implemented

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence8

“Its server is configured for remote command traffic,” with C2 endpoint “154.36.188.201:4449.”

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

C2 endpoint 154.36.188.201:4449... VenomRAT handles C2 + capabilities.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence8

Il peut également intégrer des fonctionnalités de surveillance telles que le keylogging, la capture d’écran en temps réel, l’accès aux fichiers et le téléchargement de charges utiles supplémentaires.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence6

Useful starting points are MITRE ATT&CK techniques for remote access software (T1219)

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

C2 Protocol Tunneling T1572 1–6 Cloudflare tunnel for origin obfuscation

T1665Hide InfrastructureEvidence1

All tunnels use Cloudflare's free Quick Tunnel service ( trycloudflare.com ). The origin server IP is never exposed — all traffic proxies through Cloudflare's anycast network

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence2

When executed, it establishes a connection to an external file share, typically via WebDAV, to download an LNK or VBS file.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

173 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

79 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching173Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors9Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping55Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.