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Malware7 associated CVEs

Hajime

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 day ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns7Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs53Tracked
Type
Worm
Capabilities
ScanningBrute forceDefense evasionPersistence
Platforms
LinuxIOTNetwork device

Hajime is a self-propagating Linux IoT worm first observed in 2016 that recruits routers, digital video recorders, and cameras into a decentralized botnet. It supports multiple ARM and MIPS architectures and compromises devices worldwide through default-credential brute forcing and exploitation of exposed management services. Its propagation methods include Telnet credential attacks, TR-064 command injection, the Chimay-Red exploit against MikroTik routers, and exploitation of GPON router vulnerabilities CVE-2018-10561 and CVE-2018-10562.

Hajime separates peer-to-peer communications and update management from scanning and propagation through a modular architecture. It uses BitTorrent’s public Kademlia distributed hash table for peer discovery and decentralized command and control, transferring architecture-specific components through a custom protocol layered over uTP. Signed configuration updates identify current binaries, enabling rapid distribution of new exploits and core functionality without a conventional centralized command server.

Following infection, Hajime modifies firewall rules to block services commonly targeted by competing IoT malware. Observed implementations also terminate selected processes, disable hardware watchdogs, masquerade as a legitimate Telnet service, and use packed payloads. A big-endian MIPS core update introduced reboot persistence in March 2018.

Hajime is distinguished from many IoT botnets by the absence of observed DDoS or other disruptive attack modules in published analyses. Operator messages and its blocking of competing infection vectors have prompted descriptions of it as a vigilante botnet, but it nevertheless accesses and modifies devices without authorization. Its operators and their affiliation have not been reliably established.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

7 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2018-10562via ndss symposiumExploited in the wildCommand Injection in Dasan GPON Router DiagnosticsOn May 8, 2018, the mipseb atk started scanning port 80 for GPON routers manufactured by South Korea-based DASAN Zhone Solutions, using a pair of vulnerabilities.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-10561via ndss symposiumExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Dasan GPON RoutersThe vulnerabilities, detailed in CVE-2018-10561 and CVE-2018-10562, enable an attacker to bypass the device's HTTP server authentication by appending ?images to a URL, and to carry out a shell injection.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-4464via ndss symposiumExploited in the wildMissing Authentication in Kguard DVR 104/108/v2The arm5 atk added scanning for MCTP services on port 9000, specifically targeting KGuard Digital Video Recorders using CVE-2015-4464.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2016-10372via ndss symposiumExploited in the wildTR-064 command injection in Eir D1000 modemsIn 2017, the mipseb and mipsel atks added an exploit targeting the TR-064 service on port 7547 (CVE-2016-10372).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-10088via vulncheck blogUnauthenticated HTTP login buffer overflow in XiongMai uc-httpd 1.0.0the botnet is co-located with a Xiongmai NVR/IP camera’s HTTP server... correlate three known vulnerabilities this server is affected by: CVE-2017-7577, CVE-2018-10088, and CVE-2022-45460... CVE-2018-10088, in particular, is already associated with the Satori, Hajime, and BotenaGo botnets.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-20149via vulncheck blogExploited in the wildChimay Red“Eventually attackers, including the Hajime botnet, exploited this vulnerability in the wild.” | CVE-2017-20149, also known as Chimay Red... affected the HTTP interface of Mikrotik routers... attackers, including the Hajime botnet, exploited this vulnerability in the wild... Greynoise continues to see active scanning for the vulnerability.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-10888via vulncheck blogOut-of-bounds Read in libgit2 git_delta_applyCVE-2018-10888, in particular, is already associated with the Satori, Hajime, and BotenaGo botnets.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

IoT malware scans the Internet for IoT devices that use default or weak usernames and passwords.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Multiple botnets exploited GPON CVE-2018-10561 (authentication bypass) and CVE-2018-10562 (command execution) to expand infections. Muhstik also added exploits for JBoss CVE-2007-1036.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

echo -ne “ DOWNLOADER_HEX_BYTES ” >> .s ... ./.s>.i; chmod +x .i; ./.i; rm .s; exit

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence4

“Check the version number of the device and send the Exploit which carried the Shellcode. Once the vulnerability is successfully exploited, Hajime will be downloaded and executed.”

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

IoT malware scans the Internet for IoT devices that use default or weak usernames and passwords.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

IoT malware scans the Internet for IoT devices that use default or weak usernames and passwords.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

IoT malware scans the Internet for IoT devices that use default or weak usernames and passwords.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Once the attack successfully passes the authentication stage, the first 52 bytes of the victim’s echo binary are read... The victim’s echo ELF header is then compared against a predefined array, containing the Hajime stub downloader binaries for different architectures.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110Brute ForceEvidence3

This honeypot was designed to be vulnerable to telnet credential brute force attacks... IoT malware scans the Internet for IoT devices that use default or weak usernames and passwords.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence2

“Find a MikroTik device by checking if the target port is open on port 8291, if this port is open,the other common web ports (80,81,82,8080,8081,8082,8089,8181,8880) will be probed next.”

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Once the attack successfully passes the authentication stage, the first 52 bytes of the victim’s echo binary are read... The victim’s echo ELF header is then compared against a predefined array, containing the Hajime stub downloader binaries for different architectures.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence2

This honeypot was designed to be vulnerable to telnet credential brute force attacks... nearly 4700 telnet connections in just three weeks.

T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence2

Originally,Hajime propagated mainly thought TR_069 vulnerability and weak telnet account, as time goes by, more vulnerabilities have been added

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

researchers identified more than 1,350 command-and-control servers spread across 98 providers in 14 countries.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

The sample represents a brand new P2P botnet implemented based on the DHT protocol... join the Mozi P2P network to become the new Mozi Bot node

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence6

Hajime utilizes a decentralized peer-to-peer network to issue commands to its bots. This makes it much harder to locate the Command-and-Control (C2) server for a takedown.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

“Once the vulnerability is successfully exploited, Hajime will be downloaded and executed.”

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

This worm builds a huge P2P botnet... By announcing on the DHT network with a peer id similar to that day’s identifier of the configuration file we were able to be the “nearest” node and collected requests from almost every infected device... All of them were requesting Hajime config.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

On the channel provided by uTP, Hajime made the RC4 communication encryption for each session to ensure that others could not restore the content by packet capture. Besides, Hajime uses a key negotiation algorithm to ensure that the RC4 key is not stealable.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

53 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

42 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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risky biz rssNews · Nov 13, 2026Chinese APT uses SS7, Diameter attacks to spy on targetsAn established botnet covered in a newly published analysis. The newsletter provides no further details about its capabilities or targeting.Read more ↗malwaremustdie blogNews · Nov 11, 2026Malware Must Die!: MMD-0070-2026 - Once upon a time, Linux/Hajime hexstring-pushed a tiny ARM ELF fileless downloaderLinux IoT malware that compromises routers, DVRs and cameras and incorporates them into a peer-to-peer botnet. The report describes 3,029 infected IP addresses across 111 countries, led by Taiwan and South Korea. Payload delivery uses TFTP, HTTP through wget, or a hexstring-staged 480-byte ELF downloader that retrieves a custom-packed payload through socket-level communication and then deletes itself. The main bot disables hardware watchdogs, masquerades as telnetd, blocks inbound ports 23, 7547, 5555 and 5358, removes the CWMP_CR firewall chain, replaces /tmp/ftpupdate.sh with a link to /dev/null, and force-kills processes identified through /proc/net/tcp. It uses BitTorrent DHT and NTP routines for daily lookup-key generation. Although the article discusses claims of benevolent operation and an absence of DDoS attacks, it emphasizes that installation and device modification remain unauthorized compromises. Detection opportunities include unexpected DHT traffic from IoT segments, unauthorized firewall changes, suspicious telnetd executables and filesystem artifacts; DHT signatures can also match legitimate BitTorrent traffic.Read more ↗malware newsNews · Oct 10, 2026Botnet Groups | How Mirai, Emotet, QakBot, Aisuru and Other Botnets Work (and How to Detect and Stop Them) - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and IndicatorsSelf-spreading IoT malware described as using Mirai-like recruitment while carrying no attack payload and blocking ports used by Mirai.Read more ↗malware newsNews · Oct 8, 2026What Is a Botnet? Definition, How Botnets Work, Types, Examples & How to Stay Protected - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and IndicatorsDescribed as a vigilante botnet that reportedly secures vulnerable devices but still accesses and controls them without owners' permission.Read more ↗
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IOC matching53Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities7CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.