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Malware1 associated actor6 associated CVEs

Omni

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns6Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK3Techniques
IOCs12Tracked
Type
Botnet
Capabilities
DDOSInitial accessScanningDefense evasion
Platforms
LinuxNetwork deviceIOT

Omni is a Mirai-derived botnet targeting Linux-based routers and other embedded devices, including digital video recorders, network video recorders, and IP cameras. Observed in May 2018, it compromises vulnerable devices and enrolls them into a centrally controlled botnet capable of distributed denial-of-service attacks. Its payloads support multiple processor architectures.

Early Omni campaigns exploited CVE-2018-10561 and CVE-2018-10562, an authentication bypass and command injection vulnerability in Dasan GPON routers that together enable unauthenticated remote command execution. The infection sequence separately downloaded a payload, granted it executable permissions, and executed it. Subsequent Omni-related samples combined eleven known exploits affecting routers and surveillance equipment, including vulnerabilities in Huawei, Netgear, D-Link, and Realtek-based devices. These samples propagated exclusively through exploitation rather than credential brute forcing, encrypted configuration strings using XOR-based schemes, and installed firewall rules to block subsequent infection attempts on selected ports.

Omni shared payload-hosting infrastructure with Owari and was also distributed through the exploit-based WICKED malware. These operational links connect it to the broader cluster of Mirai-derived botnets that included Owari, Sora, and WICKED, without establishing a confirmed operator identity.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

6 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2018-10561via trend micro researchExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Dasan GPON RoutersCVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562: Authentication bypass and command injection vulnerabilities, respectively, for the Dasan gigabit passive optical network (GPON) routers.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2016-6277via trend micro researchExploited in the wildRemote OS command injection in NETGEAR routersVulnerability that can allow the execution of remote arbitrary commands in Netgear R7000 and R6400 devices.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-10562via trend micro researchExploited in the wildCommand Injection in Dasan GPON Router DiagnosticsCVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562: Authentication bypass and command injection vulnerabilities, respectively, for the Dasan gigabit passive optical network (GPON) routers.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-17215via trend micro researchExploited in the wildRemote Command Injection in Huawei HG532 DeviceUpgrade ServiceArbitrary command execution vulnerability in Huawei HG532 routers.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2014-8361via trend micro researchExploited in the wildRealtek SDK miniigd UPnP SOAP Command InjectionUniversal Plug and Play (UPnP) Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) command execution vulnerability affecting different devices using Realtek software development kit (SDK) with the miniigd daemon.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-2051via trend micro researchExploited in the wildHNAP SOAPAction Header Command Injection in D-Link DIR-645Home Network Administration Protocol (HNAP) SOAPAction-header command execution vulnerability that works on certain D-Link devices.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Wicked

These variants include Owari, Omni, Wicked, and SORA.

via fortinet threat researchfortinet.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

If a connection is established, it will attempt to exploit the device and download its payload... Exploits and the corresponding target ports are listed below. Port 8080: Netgear DGN1000 and DGN2200 v1 routers... Port 81: CCTV-DVR Remote Code Execution... Port 8443: Netgear R7000 and R6400 Command Injection (CVE-2016-6277)...

Execution

1 technique
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The original Mirai used traditional brute force attempts to gain access to IOT devices. The WICKED bot, on the other hand, uses known and available exploits, with many of them already being quite old.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

After a successful exploit, this bot then downloads its payload from a malicious web site, in this case, hxxp://185.246.152.173/exploit/owari.{extension} .

Indicators of compromise

Observables

12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching12Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities6CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping3Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.