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Malware5 associated actors

ZeroCleare

Tracked since Nov 25, 2025 · Updated 3 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs16Tracked
Type
Wiper
Capabilities
Defense evasionByovd
Platforms
Windows
Also known asZEROCLEAR

ZeroCleare is a destructive Windows disk-wiping malware family associated with Iranian threat activity. It has been deployed against energy and industrial organizations in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabian targets. A variant was also used during the HomeLand Justice campaign alongside ROADSWEEP ransomware to destroy data on compromised hosts.

ZeroCleare abuses the legitimate EldoS RawDisk driver to directly overwrite disk contents, corrupting file systems, partitions, and the master boot record and rendering affected systems unusable. Its deployment chain can exploit a vulnerable, digitally signed VirtualBox driver to bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement and load the unsigned RawDisk driver. Malicious PowerShell scripts have also been used to bypass Windows controls.

Earlier variants targeted the system drive, while a later variant accepts operator-supplied command-line arguments to select a drive, install and start the disk driver, perform wiping, or uninstall the driver. It queries disk geometry and capacity through Windows device-control operations before overwriting disk data. ZeroCleare functions as a destructive payload on already compromised systems rather than as a file-encrypting ransomware family. Dustman is a related wiper identified as a ZeroCleare variant or successor.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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OilRig

[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) collaborated on the destructive portion of the [ZeroCleare](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1151) attack.(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
APT33

In 2019-2020, a couple new wipers – ZeroCleare and Dustman, were exposed in 2 operations against entities in the Arabian Peninsula.

via clearsky blogclearskysec.com
Pumpkin Sandstorm

Pumpkin Sandstorm DEV-0146 Iran ZeroCleare

via web archiveweb.archive.org
Handala

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors used a version of ZeroCleare to wipe disk drives on targeted hosts.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
ShroudedSnooper

...ROADSWEEP, the CHIMNEYSWEEP backdoor, and a ZEROCLEAR wiper variant (aka Cl Wiper)...

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

the threat actors exploited a vulnerability in the company’s VPN service to gain initial access and establish a foothold in the company’s network

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence4

[ZeroCleare](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1151) can receive command line arguments from an operator to corrupt the file system using the [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) driver.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4

[ZeroCleare](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1151) can use a malicious PowerShell script to bypass Windows controls.(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Dragonfly has used the command line for execution. Empire uses a command-line interface to interact with systems. StarProxy has used the command line for execution of commands.

T1106Native APIEvidence3

[ZeroCleare](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1151) can call the `GetSystemDirectoryW` API to locate the system directory.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence6

[ZeroCleare](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1151) has used a vulnerable signed VBoxDrv driver to bypass Microsoft Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) protections and subsequently load the unsigned [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) driver.(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

it bypassed the Windows Driver Signature Enforcement (DSG), which protects Windows from loading unsigned drivers (RawDisk driver).

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

VOID MANTICORE has masqueraded malicious payloads to resemble legitimate applications. During HomeLand Justice, threat actors renamed ROADSWEEP to GoXML.exe and ZeroCleare to cl.exe.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence7

[ZeroCleare](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1151) has the ability to uninstall the [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) driver and delete the `rwdsk` file on disk.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022)

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

ZeroCleare and Dustman mirrored Shamoon’s reliance on modified legitimate drivers to achieve destructive effects.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence4

[ZeroCleare](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1151) can deploy a vulnerable, signed driver on a compromised host to bypass operating system safeguards.(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

"Play has used Base64-encoded PowerShell scripts to disable Microsoft Defender," "StrongPity can use PowerShell to add files to the Windows Defender exclusions list," and "ZeroCleare can use a malicious PowerShell script to bypass Windows controls."

Discovery

1 technique
T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[ZeroCleare](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1151) can use the `IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX`, `IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY`, and `IOCTL_DISK_GET_LENGTH_INFO` system calls to compute disk size.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)

Impact

4 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence5

wiper malware can be defined as malicious software that tries to destroy data.

T1561Disk WipeEvidence3

Many wipers also make sure to overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR) of the disk.

T1561.001Disk Content WipeEvidence3

If the MBR is destroyed, the computer won't start. | ZeroCleare overwrites the disks directly with 0x55 bytes. This, of course, starts with the MBR and continues with all partitions.

T1561.002Disk Structure WipeEvidence4

[ZeroCleare](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1151) can corrupt the file system and wipe the system drive on targeted hosts.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022)(Citation: IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

16 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching16Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping18Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.