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Mallory
Malware5 associated actors

Comebacker

Tracked since Nov 26, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK21Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingMalspam
Platforms
Windows

Comebacker is a custom Lazarus-associated Windows backdoor and loader used in multi-stage intrusion chains for espionage and financially motivated operations. It has been observed in campaigns targeting aerospace and defense-themed victims and in broader Lazarus activity linked to Medusa ransomware intrusions. The malware is also associated with Diamond Sleet and has been noted in operations showing code reuse by Moonstone Sleet.

Comebacker is typically deployed as an intermediate or final stage in layered execution chains. Observed delivery methods include malicious Microsoft Office documents with VBA macros and trojanized software packages, including malicious Python and npm packages aimed at developers. In one documented chain, a macro-enabled lure document decrypted and launched successive loader stages that established persistence and ultimately executed the Comebacker payload entirely in memory. Aerospace and defense-themed decoys and impersonation of related organizations indicate use in espionage-oriented targeting.

Functionally, Comebacker acts as a backdoor/loader that establishes command-and-control communications over HTTPS, generates a victim identifier, and supports beaconing with encrypted traffic. Reported variants use AES-128-CBC to protect outbound and inbound C2 data, while additional stages and downloaded payloads have been protected with ChaCha20; other reported variants used HC256 and RC4 for configuration and payload decryption. Comebacker can receive tasking from its controller, enter retry loops when instructed, terminate on command, and download, verify, decrypt, memory-load, and execute additional payloads by export name with supplied arguments. This makes it a flexible staging component for follow-on malware such as BLINDINGCAN.

Persistence has been observed through Windows startup mechanisms and service-based installation. Reported chains created startup-folder shortcuts to relaunch loader components, while other variants selected service names from existing svchost groupings and installed service DLLs with registry-backed configuration. Execution is commonly fileless or memory-resident at the final stage, and the malware uses custom decryption, compression, and dynamic loading routines to hinder analysis.

Comebacker has appeared alongside other Lazarus tooling including BLINDINGCAN, ChromeStealer, InfoHook, RP_Proxy, and Mimikatz. In ransomware-related intrusions, it has served as one component of a broader post-compromise toolkit used for access maintenance, credential theft, staging, and follow-on deployment. High-confidence reporting consistently places Comebacker within the Lazarus ecosystem as a bespoke backdoor/loader for Windows operations.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

We observed a new version of the Comebacker malware leading to a new variant of their BLINDINGCAN remote access tool.

via gen insights research bloggendigital.com
APT38

Malware and Tools · Comebacker : Customized backdoor and loader associated with Lazarus

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
Pompilus

"The arsenal includes Comebacker, a custom backdoor and loader exclusively associated with the group"

via industrialcyberindustrialcyber.co
Andariel

"Tools Used In Recent Campaigns... Comebacker backdoor"

via infosecurity magazine cominfosecurity-magazine.com
Contagious Interview

Moonstone Sleet ... extensively reusing code from known Diamond Sleet malware like Comebacker

via microsoft security blogmicrosoft.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

| Tactics | Techniques | ... | Resource Development | T1583 . 001 : Acquire Infrastructure : Domains |

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

"Comebacker... embedding it within seemingly innocuous Python and npm packages..." and "Alternate attack sequences have entailed the use of malicious npm packages... masquerading as... a technical skills assessment."

T1566PhishingEvidence1

"Moonstone Sleet is observed to set up fake companies and job opportunities to engage with potential targets"; "delivering a trojanized version of PuTTY ... via apps like LinkedIn and Telegram as well as developer freelancing platforms"; "sending candidates a 'skills test' that instead delivers malware"

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

When a victim opens one of the malicious .docx files and enables macros, the embedded VBA code executes.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

cmd.exe /C powershell -Command "$s = (New-Object -COMWScript.Shell).CreateShortcut('C:\\ProgramData\\USOShared\\Micro.lnk'); ... $s.Save()"

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

cmd.exe /C powershell -Command "$s = (New-Object -COMWScript.Shell).CreateShortcut(...)"

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

These files were identified as Microsoft Word documents, each containing a malicious VBA macro.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

When a victim opens one of the malicious .docx files and enables macros, the embedded VBA code executes.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

To establish persistence, the loader creates a shortcut ( .lnk ) to USOPrivate.dll in the user's Startup folder.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

cmd.exe /C powershell -Command "$s = (New-Object -COMWScript.Shell).CreateShortcut('C:\\ProgramData\\USOShared\\Micro.lnk'); $s.TargetPath = 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe'; $s.Arguments = '\"[USOPrivate.dll path]\" LoadMimi \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe\"'; $s.Save()"

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

To establish persistence, the loader creates a shortcut ( .lnk ) to USOPrivate.dll in the user's Startup folder.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

cmd.exe /C powershell -Command "$s = (New-Object -COMWScript.Shell).CreateShortcut('C:\\ProgramData\\USOShared\\Micro.lnk'); $s.TargetPath = 'C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe'; $s.Arguments = '\"[USOPrivate.dll path]\" LoadMimi \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe\"'; $s.Save()"

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

Following decryption, the loader decompresses the resulting data using the zlib library.

T1027.015CompressionEvidence1

Following decryption, the loader decompresses the resulting data using the zlib library.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The macro decrypts and deploys two embedded components that are stored as large hexadecimal strings: a loader DLL and a decoy document.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

After creating the shortcut, the loader calls the LoadMimi funciton USOPrivate.dll using rundll32.exe.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

USOPrivate.dll is the final loader in the infection chain. It decrypts the embedded Comebacker and executes it directly from memory.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence3

The Lazarus Group's Medusa ransomware campaign includes the use of various tools - RP_Proxy, a custom proxy utility Mimikatz, a publicly available credential dumping program

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

"...establish contact with a command-and-control (C2) server to retrieve additional payloads." and "...execute a portable executable received from a C2 server."

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The malware then prepares to beacon out to its hardcoded C&C server: hxxps://hiremployee[.]com

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

If the server's response does not match any of the control commands, the malware downloads and executes a payload from the message... If a message that satisfies the above condition is received, it downloads the encrypted file from the C&C server and executes it.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

The outbound data is first encrypted with AES-128-CBC and then Base64-encoded.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

All C&C communications occur over HTTPS. The outbound data is first encrypted with AES-128-CBC and then Base64-encoded.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping21Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.