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Mallory
Malware5 associated actors1 associated CVE

DonutLoader

Tracked since Dec 9, 2025 · Updated 2 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days6 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK46Techniques
IOCs121Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Process injectionDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingClickfixMalvertising
Platforms
Windows

DonutLoader is an open-source shellcode-generation and in-memory loading tool used in Windows malware execution chains. It packages .NET assemblies, DLLs, and native executables into position-independent shellcode that loads and executes embedded payloads in process memory, avoiding the need to write the final executable to disk. Its loading routines support payload decryption, decompression, and manual PE mapping. Observed deployments have erased PE headers, removed execution artifacts, and patched AMSI and ETW functions to reduce inspection and telemetry. DonutLoader shellcode is also deployed through process injection, including injection into Windows Explorer and other legitimate Windows processes.

DonutLoader has delivered information stealers, remote-access trojans, and backdoors, including Remus, Agent Tesla, QuasarRAT, CASTLESTEALER, and SPECTRALVIPER. Delivery chains incorporating it have used phishing attachments, fake-CAPTCHA ClickFix lures, malicious advertisements, and multistage script loaders. In the REF2754 intrusion campaign, it loaded SPECTRALVIPER during attacks against large Vietnamese companies, including agribusiness and financial-services organizations. Its use across unrelated campaigns reflects its role as a reusable payload-execution component rather than a tool exclusive to one threat actor. Credential theft, surveillance, and command-and-control functions generally belong to the payloads it loads rather than to DonutLoader itself.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2026-33634via the hacker newsExploited in the wildTrivy Ecosystem Supply-Chain CompromiseOn Windows systems, the hack of the Telnyx Python SDK resulted in the deployment of an executable named "msbuild.exe" that employs several obfuscation techniques to evade detection and extracts DonutLoader, a shellcode loader, from a PNG image present within the binary to load a full-featured trojan and a beacon associated with AdaptixC2, an open-source command-and-control (C2) framework.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
NGC4020

“Дешифрованные данные представляют собой шеллкод DonutLoader ... DonutLoader загружает и выполняет в памяти QuasarRAT.”

via rt solarrt-solar.ru
REF9334

In parallel, the installer delivers PULSAR through RC4-encoded DonutLoader shellcode injected into explorer.exe.

via elastic security labselastic.co
APT32

The unsigned DLL (dbg.config) contained DONUTLOADER shellcode which it attempted to inject into sessionmsg.exe. DONUTLOADER was configured to load the SPECTRALVIPER backdoor, and ultimately the situationally-dependent P8LOADER or POWERSEAL malware families.

via elastic security labselastic.co
TeamPCP

On Windows systems, the hack of the Telnyx Python SDK resulted in the deployment of an executable named "msbuild.exe" that employs several obfuscation techniques to evade detection and extracts DonutLoader, a shellcode loader, from a PNG image present within the binary to load a full-featured trojan and a beacon associated with AdaptixC2, an open-source command-and-control (C2) framework.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
Velvet Tempest

...Velvet Tempest ... used a ClickFix lure ... to drop payloads like DonutLoader and CastleRAT.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

46 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

The campaign appears to be spreading through malvertising, where attackers pay to place malicious links in search engine ads and sponsored results.

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

Threat actors may have also used SEO poisoning to further boost the site’s visibility in organic search results.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Many of the Keitaro IP addresses we saw in the AS214351 network host and distribute malware.

T1566PhishingEvidence3

Cybersecurity analyst Louis Schürmann from Swiss Post Cybersecurity investigated an incident that began with a seemingly harmless email and developed into a multi-stage attack.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Stage 1: Email Delivery Victim receives spearphishing email with .JS attachment Lure themes: "Bill of Lading", "Vessel Particulars", "Urgent Inquiry For Quotation"

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

The user is directed to a malicious URL which presents a fake CAPTCHA.

Execution

12 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

Using the recovered values, the malware establishes persistence by registering a scheduled task named IntelDriver through the Windows schtasks utility, causing execution upon user logon.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

First, social engineering was employed, followed by a PowerShell dropper, and finally an in-memory infostealer payload was delivered.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence9

The reconstructed content is subsequently Base64-decoded and decrypted using a repeating XOR key (tk) before being executed through PowerShell's Invoke-Expression (IEX) mechanism.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

The infection chain begins with a heavily obfuscated Windows batch script that conceals its functionality through variable substitution and control-flow obfuscation.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

Scheduled-task persistence via a VBS launcher: The malware creates a scheduled task that executes a Visual Basic Script (VBS), ensuring it automatically runs again after a system reboot or user logon.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

The malware uses a staged execution chain that moves from Python bytecode into shellcode... The persisted Python bytecode stage contains loader indicators

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2

Stage 2: JavaScript Execution via WSH Double-click triggers WScript.exe (Windows Script Host) Script begins deobfuscation through 4-layer chain

T1106Native APIEvidence1

The package is copied, marked as executable and launched in a new thread... the loader uses raw syscalls supplied by a small framework... Since all high-risk operations ... run through these handcrafted syscalls, standard API calls to monitor are never seen by common user-land EDR hooks.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence3

It then uses DonutLoader shellcode to load the final .NET payload into memory, reducing evidence for scanners looking only for suspicious files.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence4

This CAPTCHA instructs the user to execute a series of keyboard shortcuts (Win + R, Ctrl + V, Enter), which runs a PowerShell command previously copied to the clipboard by the website. | First, social engineering was employed... The initial point of entry is user-driven execution of a PowerShell command, delivered through a social engineering tactic known as ClickFix.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence2

Current delivery methods include fake CAPTCHA “ClickFix” pages that trick victims into executing malicious PowerShell via the Windows Run dialog

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Recent 2026 campaigns show Vidar delivered through malvertising leading to fake cracked-software downloads, and via trojanized GitHub repositories disguised as legitimate developer tools

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

Using the recovered values, the malware establishes persistence by registering a scheduled task named IntelDriver through the Windows schtasks utility, causing execution upon user logon.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence7

The cryptographic loop identified at the end of the installation in persistence is a simple implementation of RC4 ... installs itself in persistence ... A “Run” registry key installing a Windows Security persistence can indicate an infection by the loader.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

Using the recovered values, the malware establishes persistence by registering a scheduled task named IntelDriver through the Windows schtasks utility, causing execution upon user logon.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence10

DONUTLOADER shellcode ... attempted to inject into sessionmsg.exe. SPECTRALVIPER can load and inject executable files.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Execution Reflective Code Loading T1620 Donut decrypts + loads PE in-memory Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files: Embedded Payloads T1027.009 Chaskey-16 CTR encrypted Donut payloads Defense Evasion Masquerading: Legitimate Name T1036.005 Process named nsvchost.exe Defense Evasion Subvert Trust Controls T1553 Inline C# avoids pre-compiled AV detection Privilege Escalation Token Manipulation T1134.001 SeDebugPrivilege via AdjustTokenPrivileges Discovery Process Discovery T1057 CreateToolhelp32Snapshot for svchost.exe Lateral Movement Process Injection: DLL Injection T1055.001 VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory into svchost.exe

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

Python runtime abuse for Early Bird APC injection into suspended legitimate processes

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence7

The cryptographic loop identified at the end of the installation in persistence is a simple implementation of RC4 ... installs itself in persistence ... A “Run” registry key installing a Windows Security persistence can indicate an infection by the loader.

Stealth

19 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence7

Analysis revealed multiple layers of obfuscation, including environment-variable substitution, dynamic command reconstruction, extensive control-flow flattening, and large volumes of junk REM, ECHO, and SET statements intended to hinder static analysis.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

...extracts DonutLoader, a shellcode loader, from a PNG image present within the binary to load a full-featured trojan and a beacon associated with AdaptixC2...

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence2

The dropped PE is not AgentTesla itself but a DonutLoader shellcode packer. DonutLoader unpacks and executes the AgentTesla binary entirely in memory, leaving no additional artifacts on disk beyond the initial dropper.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

extracts DonutLoader, a shellcode loader, from a PNG image present within the binary

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence2

The next-stage shellcode is a payload configured from DonutLoader ... used to wrap .NET assemblies, DLLs, and EXEs into position-independent shellcode.

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1

DonutLoader is a shellcode-based loader leveraging the “Donut” fileless execution framework to deploy secondary payloads such as PureLogs stealer in-memory, avoiding disk-based artifacts

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The loader uses self-modifying techniques with several decryption stubs to unroll itself ... [and] decrypts a 28,233-byte region ... [with] a single-byte XOR key that updates after every iteration.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence5

Following execution notification, the malware prepares a disguised execution vehicle by creating a renamed copy of powershell.exe as HDVz.exe within the user's Downloads directory.

T1036.003Rename Legitimate UtilitiesEvidence1

SysInternals ProcDump was renamed to windbg.exe and abused (-md) as a LOLBAS to load an unsigned malicious DLL.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence10

DONUTLOADER shellcode ... attempted to inject into sessionmsg.exe. SPECTRALVIPER can load and inject executable files.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Execution Reflective Code Loading T1620 Donut decrypts + loads PE in-memory Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files: Embedded Payloads T1027.009 Chaskey-16 CTR encrypted Donut payloads Defense Evasion Masquerading: Legitimate Name T1036.005 Process named nsvchost.exe Defense Evasion Subvert Trust Controls T1553 Inline C# avoids pre-compiled AV detection Privilege Escalation Token Manipulation T1134.001 SeDebugPrivilege via AdjustTokenPrivileges Discovery Process Discovery T1057 CreateToolhelp32Snapshot for svchost.exe Lateral Movement Process Injection: DLL Injection T1055.001 VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory into svchost.exe

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

Python runtime abuse for Early Bird APC injection into suspended legitimate processes

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

The loader then deletes the container within seconds ... Every observed loader detonation deleted Prefetch entries and wiped %TEMP%.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence9

After the patching has taken place, the loader decrypts a 28,233-byte region... This similar decryption routine runs three times in total.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence4

Using the renamed ProcDump application with the -md flag, the adversary loaded dbg.config, an unsigned DLL containing malicious code.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

First, the code checks the machine’s UI language and exits immediately if it detects a CIS locale, such as Russian (ru), Belarusian (by), or Kazakh (kz).

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

The script terminates execution when specific username and filesystem conditions are met... Systems reporting less than 3 GB of RAM are considered suspicious, causing the script to exit without further execution.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence2

After passing its environment-validation checks, the malware creates a working directory at C:\ProgramData\IntelDriver, applies the System (+s) and Hidden (+h) attributes...

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence12

Each blob carries an encrypted Remus PE, decrypts it at runtime, and maps it into memory with the PE header zeroed.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553Subvert Trust ControlsEvidence1

To evade detection and reduce security visibility, the malware employs process injection, dynamic Application Programming Interface (API) resolution, Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass, Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) tampering, and memory-resident execution techniques.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

the malware invokes PowerShell to query the Win32_ComputerSystem class and retrieve the total amount of installed physical memory.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

First, the code checks the machine’s UI language and exits immediately if it detects a CIS locale, such as Russian (ru), Belarusian (by), or Kazakh (kz).

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence4

The script terminates execution when specific username and filesystem conditions are met... Systems reporting less than 3 GB of RAM are considered suspicious, causing the script to exit without further execution.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence2

The first recorded event was creation of dbg.config by the System service, dropped over SMB from a previously compromised endpoint.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

IcedID post-infection C2 traffic: 94.140.114[.]40 port 443 - primsenetwolk[.]com - HTTPS traffic 94.140.114[.]40 port 443 - onyxinnov[.]lol - HTTPS traffic 158.255.211[.]126 port 443 - trashast[.]wiki - HTTPS traffic

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Process Monitor captured a curl.exe process issuing an HTTP POST request to the Telegram Bot API /sendMessage endpoint.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

After process injection, the .NET implant attempts to connect to 167.88.167.9:8356 via outbound TCP, suggesting a dedicated command-and-control channel.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

the malware established two distinct communication channels... issuing an HTTP POST request to the Telegram Bot API /sendMessage endpoint... indicating that successful execution is reported to an operator-controlled Telegram channel.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence7

A loader already on the victim's computer fetches ... blobs directly from a bare IP on TCP/5000 ... [or] retrieves a loader PE first.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

121 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching121Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping46Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.